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YEONHA JUNG
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Major Professor: Martin Fiszbein, Assistant Professor of Economics
ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three essays investigating the historical roots of eco-
nomic development and inequality in the US South.
The first essay examines the impact of slavery on long-run development. Using
county-level data from the US South, I show that slavery has impeded long-run de-
velopment through the human capital channel. The mechanism involves labor market
institutions and their impact on demand for human capital. I find that the history
of slavery hindered integration of black workers into the labor market. Moreover,
border-county analyses show that selective application of laws and regulations was a
primary tool for impeding labor market integration. Through estimating the relative
return to education for each county, I further argue that blacks in a region with a
greater legacy of slavery had fewer incentives to invest in human capital.
The second essay studies the long run effects of cotton agriculture focusing on a
novel aspect of structural change. I show that cotton specialization in the late 19th
century had long-run negative impact on local development, and the negative rela-
tionship became only evident in the second half of the 20th century. I argue that the
change was caused by the mechanization of cotton production. After cotton mecha-
v
nization, cotton labor with low human capital was relocated to local manufacturing.
In response to the inflow of cotton labor, there was a decline in labor productivity in
manufacturing which persisted through directed technical change. Using census data,
I show that initial cotton specialization reduces demand for skills in manufacturing
even to this day.
The third essay addresses the legacy of cotton agriculture on economic inequality.
Using the Gini index of household income, I show that initial cotton specialization in-
creased long-run economic inequality at the county level. Moreover, evidence from the
census data indicates that cotton specialization increased wage inequality exclusively
in the local service sector, without any effects on the other non-agricultural sectors.
As an explanation, I argue that wage inequality in the service sector increased due
to expansion of employment in low-wage occupations followed by a decrease in their
wage level.
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1Chapter 1
How the Legacy of Slavery Survives:
Labor Market Institutions and Demand
for Human Capital
1.1 Introduction
There is an extensive literature discussing the impact of slavery on long-run develop-
ment (Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997, 2002; Nunn, 2008; Bruhn and Gallego, 2012).
The mechanism of this effect, however, remains something of a black box. While
institutions have been found to act as a channel, it does not clarify the path through
which the legacy of slavery could have persisted. This study has two goals. First, I
provide robust causal evidence for the long-run legacy of slavery. Second, beyond the
emphasis on certain channels of effects, I provide a concrete mechanism explaining
how slavery has persisted throughout history.
Using a rich set of county-level data for the US South, I show that slavery has had
persistent, negative impacts on long-run development. Moreover, the timing of the
evidence suggests that human capital was a primary channel for this long-run impact.
To explain this long-run pattern, I suggest a mechanism consisting of labor-market
institutions and their effects on demand for human capital. Firstly, I find that the
history of slavery impeded the integration of black Americans into the competitive
labor market. After slavery was abolished, the previous dependence on slave labor
was followed by increased demand by white elites to maintain blacks as a cheap labor
2force. Using historical data of labor-market institutions, I show that where slavery
had a greater extent, lower integration of black workers ensued, through selective ap-
plication of laws and regulations. Moreover, the separation of black workers reduced
their incentive to invest in human capital. Employing complete-count census data,
I show that relative return to the education of blacks has decreased, where there is
a stronger legacy of slavery. In addition, I discuss two channels that reinforced the
persistence of the mechanism: racial wage discrimination and selective migration.
To control for the endogeneity of slavery, I construct an instrumental variable (IV)
based on the historical relation between slave labor and four plantation crops: cotton,
sugar, rice and tobacco (Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997, 2002; Wright, 2003). Exploit-
ing the crop-specific suitability determined by agro-climatic conditions, I estimate the
ratio of potential output share of these four crops in 1859 to instrument the slave-
to-population ratio in 1860 on a county level. To further assure that the exclusion
restrictions of the IV strategy are appropriate, I perform two exercises in Appendix A,
falsification tests and robustness checks, using placebo and alternative instrumental
variables respectively. The IV results of the estimation show two facts. First, slavery
has had a persistent negative impact on local economic development. Second, the
size of the impact and the timing of the evidence suggest that the long-run impact of
slavery occurred through human capital, specifically of the black population.
The relation between slavery and human capital passes through labor-market in-
stitutions. Using complete-count census data, I first show that the legacy of slavery
impeded the integration of blacks into the post-slavery labor market. Higher slave-
to-population ratios caused more blacks to be confined to low-skill occupations, in
a way that was conditional on human capital. Analyses of occupational segregation
also support these results. After variations in literacy were filtered, I show that higher
slave ratios in 1860 induced greater occupational segregation between black and white
3workers.
Under slavery, the black population was completely segregated in the South, inde-
pendently of county-level slave-to-population ratios. Thus, variations in labor-market
integration cannot be interpreted as a simple remainder of slavery. To identify a causal
link between slavery and black integration into the labor market, I employ historical
data on anti-enticement laws, which were a central element in the so-called Black
Codes. Exploiting discontinuous variation in state-by-year anti-enticement fines, I
use a sample of border counties to show that stronger legacies of slavery gave rise
to a greater ability of employers to recover their position of, in Wrights (1986) term,
laborlord through selective application of laws and regulations.
Occupational segregation originating from the history of slavery prohibited blacks
from fully utilizing their human capital in the labor market. To test whether slavery
reduced the incentive of blacks to invest in their own human capital, I measure blacks
relative return to education for each county, using complete-count census data from
1940. Assigning estimated returns to education as outcome variables, I find that black
workers in counties with greater slave ratios in 1860 were less rewarded for their edu-
cation in the labor market. In addition, I suggest that selective migration and racial
wage discrimination played a role in reinforcing the persistence of the mechanism.
The mechanism found in this research adds to the literature of institutions and
long-run development (North, 1994; Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2005; Banerjee and Iyer,
2005; Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2006). In particular, this paper extends understanding
of the persistence of forced labor systems in various contexts (Acemoglu and Garca-
Jimeno, 2012; Dell 2010). Beyond assigning a long-term significance to a vanished
institution, my findings illustrate the precise channel through which this peculiar in-
stitution has sustained its influence. Principally, I supply the missing links between
slavery and long-run development, examining channels and how they operate in de-
4tail. Instead of merely emphasizing a given channel in an intermediate period, this
study provides a causal and comprehensive way to trace institutional persistence over
the long run.
The findings of this research build on the literature of economic history as well.
Beyond the impact of slavery on the contemporary economy (Fogel and Engerman,
1977, 1980; Wright, 2003), a large literature discusses the continued economic im-
pact of slavery after its abolition. In particular, as Margo (1990) and Collins and
Margo (2006) point out, slavery is likely responsible for the racial gap in educational
attainment, which is considered to be a cause of long-run inequality (Bertocchi and
Dimico, 2012, 2014)1. While existing studies focus on the supply-side of education,
however, I here suggest a different perspective involving the demand-side of human
capital. Through clarification of the causal impact of slavery on individual decisions
concerning the accumulation of human capital, this study examines a novel aspect of
slavery, which has been overlooked in the literature.
In addition, this paper relates to a body of research studying initial inequality and
its impact on economic development. A large literature argues for a negative relation
between inequality and long-run economic development in the subsequent period (Ga-
lor and Zeria, 1993; Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Persson and Tabellini, 1994, Easterly;
2007), a relation in which human capital is a fundamental channel (Galor and Moav,
2004; Galor et al., 2009). By clarifying how initial inequality from slavery affects
individual demand for human capital in the long-run, this research provides an addi-
tional way to understand a negative impact of inequality on economic development.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the strategy of the IV
1Though Bertocchi and Dimico (2014) argue that educational inequality was a channel for the
influence of slavery on long-run racial inequality, their empirical analysis does not precisely identify
whether it was a true channel or just an accompanying result. Moreover, in relation to educational
inequality, the authors understate the role of the return to education and racial discrimination in
the labor market, unlike this study.
5and estimates the long-run impact of slavery on economic development and human
capital. In Section 1.3, a set of evidence is provided that describes the institutional
mechanism of the long-run impact. Finally, section 1.4 provides concluding remarks.
1.2 Historical Background
In 1860, slaves and whites were 34.71% and 63.24% of the total population of the
South. The remaining 2.05% mostly consisted of free blacks and a few Native Ameri-
cans. In the South prior to the Civil War, slaves were the most important agricultural
asset (Ransom and Sutch, 1978; Wright, 1986). While a few slaves performed domes-
tic service, the majority were employed in agricultural production. Cotton, tobacco,
rice, and sugarcane were the major plantation crops,2 which were strongly depen-
dent on slave labor (Fogel and Engerman, 1977, 1995; Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997,
2002).3
In this paper, I use county-level slave-to-population ratio in 1860 as a measure
of slavery. This ratio varies substantially between counties. The county-level aver-
age, the minimum, and the maximum of the slave-to-population ratio in 1860 at the
county level in the data sample were 28.65%, 0% and 92.5%, respectively. As shown
in figure 1.1, slave-to-population ratio varied significantly within states as well as
between them.Because slavery was defined by state law, within-state variation in the
ratio is to be explained by the presence or absence of demand for slave labor. The
2This does not mean that all slaves were employed solely for work on plantation crops. For
instance, slaves on plantations produced grains, vegetables, and other food items for self-sufficiency
(Gallman, 1970; Post, 2003). Moreover, slaves were hired by small farms as well. In the literature, the
possession of twenty slaves generally marks the dividing line between a small farm and a plantation
(Genovese, 2014). which were strongly dependent on slave labor. Moreover, slaves were hired by
small farms as well. In literature, twenty slaves is considered as the approximate criterion dividing
small farms and plantations (Genovese, 2014).
3The efficiency of slave labor is debatable. While Fogel and Engerman (1974, 1977) argue the
efficiency of slavery based on the organization of gang labor, Wright (1978) claims that economies
of scales on plantation farms were not significantly different from those on small family farms. The
mechanism suggested in this paper, however, does not rely on the efficiency of slaver labor. Instead,
the extent of local dependence on slave labor itself plays a significant role.
6relative suitability of the so-called slave crops is an important factor. In section 3, I
propose an IV that rests upon the relation between slavery and the four plantation
crops.
Figure 1·1: Slave to population ratio in 1860
Note: Slave to population ratio is defined as the total number of slaves divided by the
total population. The sample includes counties whose boundaries have not changed
significantly in the subsequent period and information of crop-specific production
is fully available.
A note of caution is that a higher slave-to-population ratio does not imply a higher
share of slaves among the black population. This distinction is important because
this ratio should not be interpreted as indicating a greater severity of slavery. Prior
to the Civil War, the term slave was effectively a synonym for black. In other words,
the low human capital of blacks and their segregation into low-skilled positions were
a common feature in the South, independently of county-level slave-to-population
ratio. In this context, marginal variation in the ratio does not imply any intensity of
slavery within a black population any more than it implies anything about the free
7black population. Instead, “stronger” background of slavery or a similar expression
in this paper refers to the greater dependence of the local economy on slave labor
instead of the harsher nature of the slavery present.
1.3 Slavery and Long-Run Development
1.3.1 Data and Estimating Equations
In this section, I show the negative impact of slavery on long-run development em-
phasizing the role of the human capital channel. For the empirical estimation, I build
a rich dataset with county-level data from various sources. Haines and the Inter-
university Consortium for Political and Social Research (2010) and the Minnesota
Population Center (2011) provide digitized US decennial census data from which I
construct historical socioeconomic variables. Climatic, geographical, and ecological
data are obtained from the FAOs Global Agro-Ecological Zones project (GAEZ). The
sample consists of sixteen states4 remaining after Northern states in which slavery was
not legal in 1860 and Western states that were classified as territories5 in 1860 were
dropped. Because county boundaries have periodically changed until reaching their
present arrangement, I exclude all those counties whose area in a comparison year
overlaps less than 70% of the area of the corresponding county in 1860. In addition,
all outcome variables are adjusted to 1860 boundaries following Hornbeck (2010).
Using this dataset, I estimate the following equation:
yc = α + βSlavec,1860 + γ
′
1XPre,c + γ
′
2XSE,c + µs + c (1.1)
Slavec,1860 is the slave-to-population ratio of county c c in 1860 which is the
4Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, Kentucky, Missouri, Arkansas, Tennessee, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana and Texas.
5The number of counties in Western territories for which data is available is small, and only four
of them have been shown to have had any slaves in 1860. Moreover, the status of legal regulations
on slavery was not established until the Civil War.
8variable of interest. XPre,c and XSE,c are the vectors of predetermined and initial
socioeconomic controls, respectively. µs and c represent state fixed effects and an er-
ror term. More specifically, XPre,c consists of conditions which were determined prior
to Slavec,1860 including climatic (temperature, rainfall), ecological (land suitability,
potential productivity of major crops, terrain elevation) and geographical controls
(latitude and longitude, distance to major ports, distance to large cities, distance to
coastal line, access to railroads and waterways). XSE,c includes a set of initial so-
cioeconomic controls (urbanization rate, literacy rate, ratio of young and old people,
land inequality and farm productivity.)6.
1.3.2 Instrumental Variable Strategy
In spite of the presence of a rich set of controls, variables affecting slavery and long-
run development simultaneously that are here omitted could exist. For instance, high
slave-to-population ratio in 1860 may reflect comparative advantage in agriculture
instead of being an independent variable. If relative suitability for agriculture de-
layed industrialization (Matsuyama, 1992)7, then OLS estimation could be biased
downward. The other direction of bias is possible as well. According to the literature
on structural change, higher agricultural productivity generally facilitates structural
change, pushing labor from the agricultural to the industrial sector (Alvarez-Cuadrado
and Poschke, 2011). If dependence on slavery is driven by higher agricultural pro-
ductivity, this could be a source of upward bias.
6The initial socioeconomic conditions are included to control for potentially omitted variables.
For instance, the coefficients of slavery could be confounded by enduring impact of inequality on
economic growth, as emphasized by Galor and Zeira (1993). Alternatively, the intensive use of slavery
may reflect comparative advantage in agriculture, which could have retarded local industrialization.
However, because the initial socioeconomic conditions could have been affected by slavery as well,
the inclusion of the initial socioeconomic controls may generate the so-called bad control problem
(Angrist and Pischke, 2008). In this context, the most preferred specification does not include initial
socioeconomic controls, but the results are robust to their inclusion.
7The author theoretically shows that comparative advantage in agriculture retards structural
change in a small open economy. Given a large volume of domestic trade and high migration costs
in the late 19th century, the model fits well into the U.S. South in the antebellum period.
9To control for the endogeneity of slavery, I exploit variations in the potential
share of slave crops in 1859, as predicted from crop-specific suitability. Crop-specific
suitability is measured by agro-climate based potential yields provided by the FAO’s
GAEZ.8 Potential share of a crop is estimated from a fractional multinomial logit
(FML) framework (Fiszbein, 2017; Jung, 2018). The outcome variable θic is the
share of output value of crop i in county c9 and Πc is the vector of crop-specific suit-
ability in county c10. Potential share of crop i is then estimated from the following
model.11
E[θic|Πc] = G(βiΠc) ≡ e
βiΠc
1 +
∑I−1
j=1 e
βjΠc
(1.2)
Then, I use the summation of the potential shares of cotton, sugarcane, rice and
tobacco as an IV.12
IVc ≡ θˆcotton,c + θˆsugar,c + θˆrice,c + θˆtobacco,c (1.3)
Table 1.1 summarizes descriptive statistics of the actual- and potential shares
of the four principle slave crops in 1859. Examination of this table suggests two
notable facts. First, the last column shows that the potential share for each crop is
highly correlated with its actual share. Figure 1.2 graphically shows that the share of
8I use the index value under rain-fed and intermediate input level which are most consistent to
the environment of agricultural production in the mid 19th century. County-level data is constructed
using a GIS software.
9The share of output value in 1859 is calculated from sixteen crops, which together account for
97.70% of the value of all crops in the sample, according to the 1860 Census of Agriculture.
10In addition to crop-specific suitability from the FAO’s GAEZ, temperature, rainfall and land
suitability are also included as controls. However, the results are robust to exclusion of the extra
controls.
11Assume farmers maximize piic = βiΠc + uic where piic is the profit from growing crop i at
county c. If uic follows the type I extreme value distribution, then G(βiΠc) is derived as the optimal
probability of growing crop i. Crop choice in a simple theoretical model can be found in Jung (2018).
12Because I control for a rich set of controls including land suitability, climatic and ecological
conditions, the IV estimation results effectively exploit relative dependence on the slave crops con-
ditional on overall agricultural suitability.
10
cotton, sugar, rice, and tobacco grown in a county is a strong predictor of the slave-to-
population ratio. In addition, the potential share is as dispersed across counties than
the actual share. This difference comes from the framework of the prediction. The
predicted potential share consists of two components: relative suitability of the crops
(Πc) and crop-specific parameters (βi). While the parameters reflect crop-specific
market conditions for a given year, the potential share does not capture county-level
production shocks for particular crops, which are an additional source of variation.
Table 1.1: Actual and potential shares of the crops
Actual Share Potential Share
Min Max SD Min Max SD Correlation
Cotton 0.00 0.96 0.32 0.00 0.90 0.25 0.81
Sugarcane 0.00 0.93 0.77 0.00 0.72 0.62 0.90
Rice 0.00 0.90 0.61 0.00 1.00 0.64 0.88
Tobacco 0.00 0.65 0.12 0.00 0.40 0.07 0.62
Notes: The share of output value in 1859 is calculated from 16 crops which account for
97.70% of the value of all crops in the sample according to 1860 Census of Agriculture.
Correlations are computed at county-level.
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Figure 1·2: Predictive power of the instrumental variable
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Note: The actual- and potential share measures the share of cotton, tobacco, rice and sugarcane in
terms of their output values.
The fundamental identifying assumption is that the IV had an influence on long-
run economic development that functioned exclusively through slavery. Two possible
scenarios would violate this assumption. First, the potential share might reflect the
12
persistence of the given crops independent of slavery. If the production of the slave
crops affects the local economy through a distinct channel, then the identifying as-
sumption is not satisfied. In a similar context, the IV estimates could be dominated
by the independent impact of a certain crop. For an example, if sugarcane cultivation
and its impact on the sugar industry had decelerated local industrial development,
then the IV estimates would be biased downward.
To address the exclusion restriction, I present two exercises in Appendix A. Ap-
pendix A.1 presents the robustness of the estimation results to alternative IVs. In
a nutshell, to respond to a potential concern over about the direct impact of cotton
agriculture, I include the potential share of cotton as an exogenous control and use the
potential share of rice, tobacco and sugar among non-cotton crops as an alternative
IV. If the results are robust to sequential exclusion of each slave crop one by one, this
would imply that the original IV estimates are not dominated by any particular crop.
Appendix A.2 shows falsification tests under a placebo IV, which is constructed from
the same methodology but using future data from 1939. If the original IV simply
reflected persistence of the slave crops, independently of their relationship to slavery
in 1860, the placebo IV constructed from 1939 data would produce similar estimation
results as well. In support of the use of the original IV, however, the placebo IV
estimation produces contrasting results.
1.3.3 Instrumental Variable Regression Results
Using the IV strategy, Table 1.2 shows that slavery has a negative impact on economic
development and human capital in the long-run. The variable of interest is the slave-
to-population ratio in 1860, and the outcome variables are log of per capita income and
average literacy rates. According to column 3, without controlling for socioeconomic
controls, an increase of one standard deviation in the slave-to-population ratio caused
a 0.38 standard deviation decrease in log per capita income in 2000, which corresponds
13
to a 4% decrease in per capita income. Similarly, a 1 percentage point increase in
slave-to-population ratio matched a 0.26 percentage point decrease in adult literacy
rate in 1930.
Table 1.2: Instrumental variable regression results
Dependent variable: log of per capita income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1959 2000
Slave to Pop ratio -0.500** -1.470*** -0.391** -1.170***
(0.209) (0.432) (0.167) (0.379)
N 925 923 925 923
F-stat 60.61 18.69 60.61 18.69
[OLS estimates] [-0.347***] [-0.541***] [-0.073] [-0.186***]
Dependent variable: literacy rate in year t measured between 0 and 1
1880 1930
Slave to Pop ratio -0.449*** -0.331 -0.260*** -0.428***
(0.101) (0.281) (0.076) (0.159)
N 924 921 926 924
F-stat 66.70 18.03 59.99 18.91
[OLS estimates] [-0.417***] [-0.456***] [-0.078***] [-0.064***]
First stage regression: slave to population ratio in 1860
Potential share of slave crops 0.331*** 0.147*** 0.317*** 0.153***
(0.041) (0.034) (0.041) (0.035)
R2 0.68 0.78 0.68 0.78
N 924 921 926 924
Predetermined controls Y Y Y Y
Geographical controls Y Y Y Y
Socioeconomic controls N Y N Y
State fixed effect Y Y Y Y
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at state level are shown in the parentheses. The average literacy rate is
measured for adults aged between 21 - 65.
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Figure 1·3: Dynamic patterns of the effects slavery on outcomes: IV
estimates
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Note: These graphs show standardized coefficients and their 95% confidence intervals from 1870 to
2010 without initial socioeconomic controls. Data availability constrains the use of median family
income as a proxy for per capita income in 1950. From 1870 to 1940, I construct per capita output,
which is defined as the sum of manufacturing and agricultural output values, divided by total
population. Human capital is measured by average literacy rate and median years of schooling.
While median years of schooling is available beginning 1940, its value from 1980 is taken from NHGIS
(2016), which provides individual years of schooling at coded levels. The red vertical line denotes
the first period in which the coefficients for slave-to-population ratio are negative and statistically
significant.
I compare timing of the estimates in figure 1.3 by plotting the coefficients and their
95% confidence intervals over a ten-year interval. The results provisionally indicate
two facts. First, the impact of slavery on economic development was persistent over
the long run. Second, the negative impact of slavery on human capital was highly
significant and appears earlier than the impact on economic development. In other
words, the timing of evidence suggests that human capital was a primary channel
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between slavery and long-run development.13
Before the detailed mechanism of the influence of slavery on human capital is
discussed, a glance at the impact of slavery on black literacy rates over time suggests
a way forward for further analysis. Table 1.3 summarizes this impact for 1870, 1900,
and 1930.14 Consistent with the results from the general population, the estimates
show a negative impact of slavery on the literacy rate of blacks, but the impact is
larger and more significant in 1900 than in 1870. This result appears to be counter-
intuitive at first, in that the negative legacy of slavery is not found to be strongest
immediately after emancipation. This pattern, however, is suggestive of the long-run
mechanisms of slavery.
During the antebellum period, slaves were in principle restricted from being ed-
ucated. Because more than 95% of the black population were slaves,15 the absolute
majority of blacks were left illiterate following the Civil War. In other words, imme-
diately after the abolition of slavery, blacks were largely illiterate, regardless of the
extent of slavery in the given county. Relatively small and insignificant coefficients in
1870 reflect this homogeneity within the black population. Then, after blacks began
to receive education, the convergence of black literacy proceeded steadily until the
mid-twentieth century, as shown by the mean values in the last row. The larger and
more significant coefficients for 1900 suggest that the legacy of slavery related more to
13In addition to theoretical literature on human capital as an engine of economic growth (Galor
and Moav, 2004, 2006), there exist evidence that regional convergence within the U.S. after the
Civil War is mostly explained by human capital accumulation. The empirical literature argues that
stagnation of the U.S. South, compared to the other regions, is attributable to human capital instead
of price or input effects. (Mitchener and McLean, 1999; Connolly, 2004).
14The causal relation between slavery and literacy rate of whites is not negative. Because a
stronger history of slavery in a county is associated with a greater share of slaveowners among the
white population in that county, the literacy rate of whites is positively correlated with slavery in the
early postbellum period. The literacy rate of whites rapidly converges to 1 leading the correlation
to become near zero by 1930. Thus, the negative impact of slavery on local human capital should be
interpreted as a result of (1) its negative impact on the human capital of blacks and (2) the higher
share of the black population.
15Free blacks accounted for merely 4.61% of the total black population in the sample
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how blacks adjusted themselves to the postbellum economy, instead of being a mere
extension of the previous history of slavery.
Table 1.3: The causal impact of slavery on literacy rate of blacks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: literacy rate of blacks in 1870 1900 1930
Slave to Pop ratio -0.105 -0.124 -0.215*** -0.536*** -0.143 -0.516*
(0.071) (0.204) (0.059) (0.161) (0.116) (0.302)
F -stat 43.16 19.47 68.20 17.98 59.99 18.91
Predetermined controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Geographical controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Socioeconomic controls N Y N Y N Y
State fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 923 919 922 920 926 924
Mean value 0.15 0.49 0.79
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at state level are shown in the parentheses.
1.4 Mechanism: Slavery, Labor Market Institutions and Hu-
man Capital
Both the OLS and IV estimates show that slavery has had a negative impact on long-
run development through the human capital channel. Moreover, Table 1.3 suggests
that the legacy of slavery on human capital is distinguishable from a mere extension
of the previous history of slavery. In this section, I present evidence that supports the
following mechanism. First, the legacy of slavery impeded the integration of blacks
into the competitive labor market. Second, the negative impact on black integration
functioned through an institutional mechanism: the selective application of laws and
regulations. Last, because black workers could not efficiently utilize their human
capital, their incentive to invest in human capital decreased along with the history of
slavery.
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1.4.1 Slavery and Integration of Blacks into the Labor Market
In this section, I show that greater dependence on slavery in 1860 impeded the inte-
gration of black workers in the subsequent period. After the abolition of slavery, the
integration of blacks into the labor market was mitigated by a variety of factors. In
agriculture, for instance, most had few agricultural assets, and they became share-
croppers at the very bottom of the tenancy ladder. The sharecropping was more
than a style of labor contract. Combined with exploitative rules, such as the Black
Codes16 and Jim Crow laws, sharecropping in the South became institutionalized as
a form of bound labor, distinct from anything found in the labor market of Northern
agriculture (Wiener, 1982; Wright, 1986). The non-agricultural sectors in the South
were no different. Due to institutional barriers, such as discriminatory laws, exclusion
from unions, and disenfranchisement, black workers in non-agricultural sectors were
locked into manual and low-skilled jobs, with substantial difficulty in moving up the
job ladder.
However, blacks isolation in the labor market was not in itself a racial issue.
Rather, it was the result of economic mechanisms that had their roots in the history
of slavery. Such mechanisms rested on the needs and power of white employers after
the abolition of slavery. In the South before the Civil War, slaves were the most
important agricultural asset. Ransom and Sutch (1978) estimate that the value of
slaves constituted 60% of the total agricultural wealth in the five cotton states. In
the words of Wright (1986), slaveowners were not landlords, but laborlords. Greater
dependence on slavery entailed loss of means of production following the end of slav-
ery. This led to a greater need for white employers to readjust the labor market by
16The Black Codes refer to a set of laws passed by Southern states after the Civil War for the
explicit purpose of restricting the rights and freedom of blacks. Specific examples in the context of
slavery are covered in the next section.
18
isolating the black labor force and sustain their pre-abolition economic status.17
Furthermore, higher slave-to-population ratios implies more slaveowners. Due to
the negligible political voice of blacks, especially following the Post-Reconstruction
disenfranchisement, higher shares of former slaveowners among the white population
resulted in greater political and economic power to attain their interests. In 1872,
for instance, conservative, pro-business Redeemers in Alabama succeeded in altering
jury laws and forced six Republican counties to ban black jurors. In this way, white
elites were empowered to exploit institutional tools to intervene in the labor market
and maintain blacks as a separate source of labor. Alston and Ferrie (1989) de-
scribe the social control of white elites in this way: “· · · those representatives needed
to satisfy the interests of their principals. · · · they probably looked to the white rural
elite.”. However, while the authors state that the political power of rural elite resulted
from “remarkable Southern unity”, I argue that institutional environments within the
South varied substantially, depending upon the history of slavery.
Labor Market Status of Blacks
First, I estimate whether slavery actually impeded integration of blacks into the
competitive labor market. Outcome variables are constructed from the complete-
count census data in 188018 provided by the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series
(IPUMS-USA). Among respondents between age 25 and 65 whose occupation cate-
gory is identified, I compute the share of blacks (whites) working in low- and high-skill
17Adopting labor-saving technology could have been a response to this state of affairs. However,
the Southern economy was behindhand in its adoption of new technologies compared to other regions
at least until the end of the Great Depression (Wright, 1986). It would have been a rational reaction,
from the point of view of the white elites, if oppressing black workers were less costly than adopting
new production technologies. Moreover, the relative scarcity of cheap and fertile (productive) land
(capital), relative to labor, could have led to development of labor-using technology (Habakkuk,
1962; Acemoglu, 2010).
18The impact was persistent over the long-run as well. The results of estimation from the 1940
complete-count census data show similar patterns, as shown in Appendix B.
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occupations.19 One thing to note is that the variables indicate within-race structure.
In other words, the outcome variables measure how many of the black (white) work-
ers are in low- or high-skill occupations rather than racial composition within low-
and high-skill occupations. This distinction is crucial for understanding the mech-
anism. In 1880, all black workers in the sample were born and had been raised as
slaves at least until the age of fifteen. If their inferior status in the labor market had
been inherited mechanically from slavery, the share of low-skill workers within black
populations would not vary across counties. Thus, if there is any causal impact of
slavery on the share of the low or high skilled among black workers, this would hint at
heterogeneity across counties regarding how blacks were incorporated into the labor
market.
As predicted, Table 1.4 shows that higher slave concentrations in 1860 in certain
counties led to more blacks being kept in low-skill occupations, while the opposite
tendency holds for whites. These results can be interpreted to mean that, after the
abolition of slavery, blacks competed with less efficiency in the labor market in coun-
ties that were more dependent on slave labor. According to the estimates in column
1, a 1 standard deviation increase in the slave-to-population ratio caused a 0.24 stan-
dard deviation increase in the share of blacks in low-skill occupations. Furthermore,
these estimates are robust to controlling for literacy rate and relative share of agri-
cultural output. This implies a direct linkage between slavery and the labor market,
not a by-product of the human-capital structure or the pace of industrialization.
19Skill-level of occupations are defined by edscor50 variable which “indicates the percentage of
people in the respondent’s occupational category who had completed one or more years of college”.
Thresholds of the edscor50 variable for low- and high-skill occupations are determined at the first
and third quartiles of the entire South sample. In both black- and white samples, the majority of
low-skill workers are farm laborers. Other examples of low-skill occupations include miller, peddler,
lumberman and laundressse.
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Table 1.4: Slavery and integration of blacks into the labor market
1880
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Black White
Dependent variable: Share in low-skill occup high-skill occup low-skill occup high-skill occup
Slave to Pop ratio 0.278** 0.261** -0.158** -0.217*** 0.026 -0.000 0.450*** 0.482***
(0.116) (0.116) (0.068) (0.066) (0.057) (0.066) (0.086) (0.104)
Additional controls at the second stage
Black literacy - -0.107 - 0.038 - - - -
- (0.072) - (0.083) - - - -
White literacy - - - - - -0.026 - 0.037
- - - - - (0.020) - (0.029)
Relative share of agricultural output - 0.017** - 0.010*** - 0.008** - -0.021***
- (0.006) - (0.003) - (0.003) - (0.005)
N 927 927 927 927 930 930 930 930
F-stat 44.26 44.26 44.76 44.76
Predetermined controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Geographical controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Socioeconomic controls N N N N N N N N
State fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at state level are shown in the parentheses. Occupational skill level is determined by edscor50 variable,
which indicates the percentage of workers in each occupational category who had completed at least one year of college. I choose the first and third
quartiles as the thresholds for low- and high-skill occupations. Relative share of agricultural output is defined as the difference between log(per
capita agricultural output) and log(per capita manufacturing value added).
Occupational Segregation in the Labor Market
This section takes a different approach, using measures of segregation between black
and white workers. While Table 1.4 suggests the impact of slavery on the labor mar-
ket, it is necessary to disentangle variation in human capital to argue that the labor
market is a channel between slavery and the structure of human capital. In this
section, I show that the background of slavery caused more occupational segregation
between the races, even after filtering out variation in literacy.
Racial segregation in the labor market was not a matter of difference in the South.
Instead, it took the form of vertical segregation that restricted black workers to per-
forming secondary and low-skill tasks. In an examination of varying patterns of racial
segregation in the labor market, for example, Johnson (1943) concludes that black
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workers performed “· · · most of the work up to the point of manufacture, and the
white workers most of the work from fabrication to marketing”. Moreover, Johnson
emphasizes that occupational segregation was not a result of differences in skill or
ability.
To measure the degree of occupational segregation between blacks and whites, I
compute the index of dissimilarity proposed by Duncan and Duncan (1955), the most
commonly used index in the literature. This index is defined as
Dobs ≡
∑
k
|bk
B
− wk
W
| (1.4)
where bk and wk are the number of blacks and whites in a three-digit occupational
category k following occ1950 variable provided by IPUMS-USA. B and W are the
total number of blacks and whites in the sample.20 The value of index denotes the
percentage of blacks that should change their occupational category to equalize the
distribution of blacks and whites across the occupations. In other words, Dobs = 0
indicates blacks and whites are identically distributed across the occupations and
Dobs = 1 implies perfect segregation.
In addition, I apply the methodology of Hellerstein and Neumark (2008) to sep-
arate out the extent of segregation explained by human capital. As a first step, I
compute simulated segregation measures holding the distribution of literacy. In this
sample, for instance, II first classify the population into literate and illiterate groups.
Identifying the occupations of the respondents, I randomly reassign the race within
each group and compute the segregation measure from the newly generated sample.21
I repeat the simulation for 100 times and call the average of the simulated segregation
20I use the complete-count census in 1880, and the sample is restricted to workers between ages
of 25 and 65 whose occupational category is well identified. To compare meaningful distributions, I
exclude from the sample those counties whose number of black or white workers is less than ten.
21In the actual exercise, I also fix age (young and old) and gender (male and female) which
generates 8 different groups. In other words, race is randomly reassigned within a group of similar
age, same gender and same literacy.
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measures Dcr. Because Dcr is the average of random segregation measures conditional
on literacy, the difference between D and Dcr represents the extent of racial segre-
gation which is not explained by variation in literacy. For instance, D = Dcr means
occupational segregation between the races is entirely explained by literacy of work-
ers. To estimate the extent of segregation which is not accounted for by literacy, I
construct the following effective segregation measure:
D∗ ≡ D
obs −Dcr
1−Dcr (1.5)
which is normalized to take 1 as the maximum value. In short, Dcr and D∗ measure
the extent of racial segregation that is explained and not explained by variation in
literacy respectively. To ensure that the results of the estimation are robust to the
choice of segregation measure, I apply an identical process to the Gini segregation
index, which is chosen because it is both widely used and satisfies the four criteria
for an ideal segregation measure, as suggested by James and Taeuber (1985).22
Supporting section 4.1.1, columns 1 and 2 in Table 1.5 show that a history of
slavery intensified occupational segregation between blacks and whites. Moreover, the
causal impact on occupational segregation survives even after filtering out variation
in literacy rates as in columns 5 and 6. Combined with the results of Table 1.4,
showing that the legacy of slavery induced more employment of blacks (whites) in
low (high)-skill occupations, Table 5 can be interpreted to show that the legacy of
slavery conditionally extended vertical segregation on the level of human capital.
That is, blacks in a county that heavily depended on slavery were more effectively
confined to low-skill occupations.
22After occupations are sorted by the share of black workers, the Gini index can be computed
to measure the unevenness of the occupational distribution of blacks. The Lorenz curve, which is
called the segregation curve in this context, exhibits occupations on the x-axis and share of black
workers on the y-axis. See Hutchens (2001) for computational details.
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Table 1.5: Slavery and occupational segregation between blacks and
whites 1880
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable Dobs Giniobs Dcr Ginicr D∗ Gini∗
Slave to Pop ratio 0.372*** 0.477*** 0.238*** 0.318*** 0.297*** 0.407***
(0.124) (0.121) (0.090) (0.076) (0.105) (0.122)
F -stat 55.34 55.34 55.34 55.34 55.34 55.34
Predetermined controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Socioeconomic controls N N N N N N
State fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 865 865 865 865 865 865
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at state level are shown in the parentheses. The sample consists
workers aged 25 to 65. Counties whose number of black or white workers is less than 10 are excluded from
the sample. Dobs is the observed occupational segregation index and Dcr is the conditionally random index
after randomly reassigning race within literacy groups. D∗ indicates the extent of occupational segregation
after filtering out variation in literacy.
1.4.2 An Institutional Mechanism: Selective Application
The evidence so far indicates that the legacy of slavery impeded the integration of
blacks into the labor market, conditional on the human capital structure. In this
section, I show that the causal impact on the labor market was brought about through
selective application of laws and regulations.
The imbalance of sociopolitical power between blacks and whites in the South has
long been considered in the literature to have enabled discrimination against blacks.
For instance, the disenfranchisement of blacks following the Reconstruction was a
condition for the poor educational opportunities for blacks relative to whites (Margo
1990; Naidu, 2012) and for the reduced bargaining power of black workers (Friedman,
2000). Such an explanation, however, shows no causal link between slavery and its
impact on the labor market. In the South, the existence of laws and regulations that
increased inequality in the literature was a constant, not a variable. For instance,
disenfranchisement, Jim Crow laws, and the Black Codes all existed in southern
states, independently of their slave-to-population ratio in 1860. Thus, if southern
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institutions had simply replaced slavery, variation in occupational standing within
the black population would not have been observed. Furthermore, these laws and
regulations were state-level institutions, while the results of estimation in this paper
indicate a persistent impact of slavery at the county level. In short, the existence of
exploitative institutions itself cannot completely account for effects of the legacy of
slavery on local labor-market conditions.
As noted at the beginning of section 4.1, greater dependence on slave labor before
the Civil War had two implications: greater loss of wealth by white elites and their
higher socioeconomic power in the local economy. I show in this section that greater
dependence on slavery led white employers to efficiently separate black workers from
the labor-market through selective application of labor-market institutions. The so-
called Black Codes are a representative example of such institutions. These were a
set of laws enacted by southern states after the Civil War to exploit blacks in the
labor market. For example, under the vagrancy laws, which were a central element
of the black codes, unemployed blacks without permanent residence could be fined.
Because the amount of fine was not affordable to most poor blacks, those who were
captured by the laws were usually sent to jail. In the words of Du Bois (1935), blacks
who were “caught wandering in search of work, and thus unemployed and without a
home · · · could be whipped and sold into slavery.23”
Anti-enticement laws were another fundamental element of the Black Codes. They
restricted the mobility of blacks in the labor market by making it illegal to hire a
worker who was under another contract. The concept of enticing was defined broadly.
An enticement statute in Louisiana, for instance, prohibited employers from even
aiding an employee under contract to another employer (Clarke, 2018). Technically,
enticement fines could be imposed on both employers and workers, but in effect the
23This entails the result of the convict lease system, in which convicts could be leased out to public
or private industry, which would have minimal responsibilities for housing and feeding the convicts.
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laws were targeted at black employees (Wilson, 1965; Clarke, 2018). Naidu (2010)
shows empirically that these laws had a negative impact on the upward mobility and
wages of black workers in the South.
Figure 1·4: Slavery and anti-enticement laws
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Note: I take the average of maximum enticement fines between 1894 and 1923 as
the y-axis variable. The records of enticement fines were compiled by Holmes (2007)
Thus, I suggest that greater legacy of slavery predicts more application of anti-
enticement laws. Figure 1.4 shows a consistent pattern: the slave-to-population ratio
is positively correlated with enticement fines after Reconstruction era. However, little
causal interpretation of this pattern can be achieved. Since labor market laws and
regulations were set by state authorities, it is hard to know whether they were the
result of unobserved, state-level factors that are also correlated with slavery.
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Figure 1·5: Sample counties along the state borders
To identify the causal mechanism, I take an alternative approach, based on se-
lective application of anti-enticement laws.24 Within a given state-level institutional
environment, the application of such laws was conducted by county-level courts and
local authorities. If such laws were selectively employed as a tool to impede the in-
tegration of blacks in a way that related to the history of slavery in that locality,
then variation in the application of the laws would be observed at the county level
within each state. To assess this argument, I exploit state-year level discontinuity
in the enticement fines which is summarized in table 1.6. I restrict the sample to
the state-border counties and use variation in the enticement fines only within each
24The logic of selective application can be applied to general labor market institutions as well.
Given state-level policy climate in the labor market, the mechanism suggests that the background
of slavery would lead white employers to selectively exercise their bargaining power to oppress black
labor force. Using an index of labor market regulations constructed by Fishback et al. (2009),
Appendix C shows empirical results that support the argument.
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state-border segment. The state-border counties in the sample are depicted in Figure
1.5.
Table 1.6: State-year variation of the maximum enticement fines
1880 1890 1900 1910 1920
DE 0 0 0 0 0
MO 0 0 0 0 0
VA 0 0 0 0 0
AL 0 500 500 500 500
AR 0 0 200 100 100
FL 0 0 100 100 100
GA 0 0 1000 1000 1000
LA 0 0 200 200 0
MS 0 0 100 100 100
NC 0 100 100 100 100
SC 0 0 100 100 100
TX 0 0 0 0 0
KY 0 0 50 50 50
MD 0 0 0 0 0
TN 0 damages damages damages damages
Notes: The records of enticement fines were compiled by Holmes
(2007). As a proxy for “damages” in Tennessee, I adopt half-year’s
wage in manufacturing following Naidu (2010).
The following exercise examines selective application of anti-enticement laws in
relationship with the history of slavery and how it affected blacks in the labor mar-
ket. First, I compare the border counties and check whether discontinuity in the
enticement fines affected the labor-market status of blacks in adjacent counties that
straddle contiguous states. Furthermore, if any impact of enticement fines on black
workers exists, I explore whether the impact varies with the history of slavery at the
within-state county level. In short, between-state discontinuities in enticement fines
reflect the direct impact of anti-enticement laws, and within-state variation captures
the mechanism of the legacy of slavery. For the empirical analysis, I use the following
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equation:
ybsct = αEnticeF inest + βSlavec,1860 ×EnticeF inest + γ′Xsct + δc + δbt + ubsct (1.6)
EnticeF inest is the maximum enticement fine of state s at year t.
25 Since the anti-
enticement fines in Tennessee were recorded as damages, I adopt half-year’s wage in
manufacturing26 as a proxy for damages following Naidu(2010). b denotes a border
segment of two states27 and I control for segment-year fixed effects, δbt. The inclusion
of segment-year fixed effects wipes out segment-level variation. Thus, the coefficients
are identified from neighboring counties within each segment which shares similar
labor market conditions. In addition, to control for cross-sectional endogeneity of
slavery, Slavec,1860 ×EnticeF inest is instrumented by IVc,1860 ×EnticeF inest where
IVc,1860 is the potential share of the slave crops constructed in section 3. The robust
standard errors are clustered both on state and border-segment levels.28
The estimates in table 1.7 show that the anti-enticement laws were enforced
more intensively in counties with stronger history of slavery.The outcome variable
is the share of blacks (whites) employed in low-skill occupations, as classified by ED-
SCOR50, as stated in section 4.1.1. The variables of interest are EnticeF inest and
Slavec,1860 ×EnticeF inest. The former reflects the direct impact of enticement fines
on the labor market at the state level, and the latter measures the selective application
25Because a large part of 1890 census records are missing due to a fire in 1921, outcome variables
in 1890 could not be constructed. The equation is estimated for t = 1880, 1900, 1910 and 1920 but
the results are robust to dropping 1880 and using the periods with equal interval.
26Annual wages in manufacturing are computed as total annual wages divided by the average
number of workers in manufacturing. The data is from Decennial Census of the United States.
27A border segment is a set of contiguous counties located along the border of two states.
28If the standard errors are clustered only at state level, residuals become correlated mechanically
due to the counties in multiple border segments. For instance, Mississippi county in Arkansas is in
three different border-segments and this induces mechanical correlations of the residuals across the
three states. In this context, I cluster standard errors both on state and border-segment levels. Under
the two-way clustering, the cluster-robust variance matrix is computed by VˆS,BS = VˆS + VˆB − VˆS∩B
where S and B denote state and border-segment respectively and Vˆk is the one-way robust matrix
clustered on k (Cameron and Miller, 2015). Application of two-way clustering in a similar context
can be found in Dube et al. (2010) which exploits discontinuity in minimum wage at state borders.
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of the laws in relation to the history of slavery.
Table 1.7: Selective application of the anti-enticement laws 1880-1920
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Var: emp share in low-skill occupations Black White
EnticeF inest -0.020** -0.021** -0.021** 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Slavec,1860 × EnticeF inest 0.039** 0.037*** 0.038*** -0.012 -0.015* -0.013
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Black literacy - -0.207*** -0.207*** - - -
- (0.076) (0.075) - - -
White literacy - - - - -0.101* -0.073
- - - - (0.058) (0.060)
Share of farmland - -0.037** -0.037** - 0.013*** 0.013***
- (0.016) (0.016) - (0.005) (0.005)
Share of blacks - - -0.017 - - -0.183**
- - (0.091) - - (0.078)
F -Stat 46.15 47.75 49.24 46.15 47.52 48.98
Number of counties 265 265 265 265 265 265
Number of border segments 30 30 30 30 30 30
Number of observations 1192 1192 1192 1192 1192 1192
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at state and border-segment are shown in the parentheses. Standardized coefficients are shown in the
table. County-fixed effects and segment-year fixed effects are controlled. All balanced.
The positive and significant coefficients of Slavec,1860 × EnticeF inest in columns
1-3 imply that greater dependence on slave labor resulted in stronger application of
anti-enticement laws, which kept blacks in low-skill occupations. By contrast, the
coefficients of EnticeF inest are significant and negative. This suggests that, after the
legacy of slavery is removed, the direct impact of the laws was actually beneficial to the
integration of black workers. This seemingly counter-intuitive result comes from the
nature of the anti-enticement laws. In principle, the laws did not require application
only to black employees. Thus, after filtering out the selectivity originating from
slavery, restrictions on enticement could have enhanced the bargaining power and
mobility of black workers. Obviously, it should be noted again that this is the impact
on blacks after the history of slavery is filtered out. As shown in Naidu (2010), anti-
enticement laws depressed the labor-market status of blacks. A key implication of
30
the results here is that the negative impact of the laws and regulations on blacks can
be fully explained by selectivity, which in turn is traced to the history of slavery.
Table 1.8: Selective application of the anti-enticement laws: non-
agricultural workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Var: share of low-skill workers in Black White
EnticeF inest -0.035*** -0.032** -0.032** 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.013) (0.014) (0.14) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Slavec,1860 × EnticeF inest 0.070*** 0.065*** 0.064*** -0.013* -0.014 -0.012
(0.021) (0.023) (0.023) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
Black literacy - -0.014 -0.011 - - -
- (0.090) (0.093) - - -
White literacy - - - - -0.061 -0.043
- - - - (0.052) (0.054)
Share of farmland - 0.036* -0.037* - -0.007 0.008*
- (0.022) (0.022) - (0.005) (0.005)
Share of blacks - - 0.107 - - -0.144*
- - (0.233) - - (0.087)
F -Stat 22.22 21.03 22.01 22.22 20.52 21.17
Number of counties 227 219 219 227 219 219
Number of border segments 30 30 30 30 30 30
Number of observations 1020 972 972 1020 972 972
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at state and border-segment are shown in the parentheses. Standardized coefficients are
shown in the table. County-fixed effects and segment-year fixed effects are controlled. All balanced.
One potential source of concern is to be found in farm tenure. In the sample coun-
ties, the 1880 complete-count census records that 73.4% of the black workers were
in the agricultural sector or were farm laborers, which between them constituted the
majority of low-skill occupations. If the results in Table 1.7 were driven by mobility
within the farm-tenure system, then the implication may not be consistent with the
suggested mechanism. For instance, if the legacy of slavery restricted blacks to farm
labor by limiting their access to land, then the results of the estimation would not
be carried over to the incentive for human-capital accumulation. To deal with the
concern, I re-estimate equation 6 using black and white workers in non-agricultural
sectors only. The results are summarized in Table 1.8 and are clearly analogous to
the results of the original estimation.
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Tables 1.7 and 1.8 support the contention that the institutional legacy of slavery
cannot be accounted for by the human capital structure. The coefficients with sim-
ilar size and significance in columns 1 and 2 suggest that the anti-enticement laws
worked as a barrier against the integration of black workers conditionally on their
educational background. These estimates are also robust to controlling for the share
of black population, which excludes explanation based on contemporary demography.
Additionally, smaller and less significant estimates of the white sample reinforce the
selective motivation and application of the laws.
1.4.3 Slavery and Return to Human Capital Accumulation
The previous sections confirm mechanisms of selective application that impeded the
integration of blacks into the competitive labor market. Because the history of slavery
created barriers against black workers, the human capital of blacks could not be fully
brought to bear within the labor market. Thus, greater dependence on slave labor
led to greater decline in the incentive of blacks to invest in human capital. In this
section, I provide evidence that slavery reduced the relative return to education of
blacks in the labor market, using the complete-count census data.
The environment of the labor market in the South did not encourage the accu-
mulation of human capital among blacks. In their influential book, Ransom and
Sutch (1978) write that (1978) “Most blacks · · · hoped that literacy and elementary
education would make them better farmers · · · or open the possibility of becoming in-
dependent landowners or artisans. But such individuals were frequently disappointed
· · · because blacks were never allowed to pursue those occupations.”. In other words,
blacks saw less justification in accumulating human capital because of their “unequal
access to higher-paying jobs of a skilled, supervisory, administrative.” (Wright, 1986).
However, the negativity of the environment for the accumulation of human capital
varied along with the history of slavery in a locality. As shown in section 4.2, the
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height of the barrier against blacks in the labor market was firmly rooted in slavery. If
labor-market conditions of this kind affected individual decisions on the accumulation
of human capital accumulation, then the legacy of slavery should be observed in the
form of reduced incentives for investment in human capital.
To assess the impact of slavery on the incentive for the accumulation of human
capital, I first estimate the relative return to education of blacks for each county, us-
ing the complete-count census data in 1940. Employing estimated returns as outcome
variables, I test whether the return to education of blacks decreased relative to whites
in proportion to the slave to population ratio. The return to education is estimated
from the following standard Mincer equation.
wcj = αc+βc0Educj+βc1Blackcj+βc2Educj×Blackcj+γc1expcj+γc2exp2cj+X ′cjδc+θoccup,j+cj
(1.7)
For each county c, wcj and educj are log weekly wage and years of schooling of
individual j. blackcj is a dummy variable which takes 1 if individual j is black and 0
otherwise, and Xcj is a vector of other individual controls including family size and
dummy variables for sex, marital status, migration and urban residence. Occupation
fixed effects θoccup,j are controlled based on the three-digit occupational classification
provided by IPUMS-USA. This equation is estimated separately for each county c.29
After estimating the Mincer equation, I adopt the measured coefficients as outcome
variables with the same IV strategy.
29I only include full-time workers to compare individuals fully intending to utilize their human
capital in the labor market. However, the results are robust to including workers who worked at least
26 hours per week. After constructing the sample, I exclude counties with less than 20 observations.
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Table 1.9: The legacy of slavery on return to education of blacks in
1940
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel 1 ddDependent variable: estimated coefficient of Black
Slave to pop ratio 0.086 0.056 0.086 0.050 0.042 0.084
(0.194) (0.187) (0.194) (0.188) (0.184) (0.179)
F-stat 52.96 52.96 52.96 52.96 52.96 52.96
N 845 845 845 845 845 845
Panel 2 ddDependent variable: estimated coefficient of Edu×Black
Slave to pop ratio -0.061** -0.054** -0.061** -0.058** -0.061** -0.061**
(0.025) (0.022) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024)
F-stat 52.96 52.96 52.96 52.96 52.96 52.96
N 845 845 845 845 845 845
dIndividual controls in the Mincer equation
dddsex –
√ √ √ √ √
dddMarriage
√
–
√ √ √ √
dddFamily size
√ √
–
√ √ √
dddMigration
√ √ √
–
√ √
dddUrban
√ √ √ √
–
√
Predetermined controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Geographical controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Socioeconomic controls N N N N N N
State fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at state are shown in the parentheses. The outcome variable
in panel 1 measures wage loss of blacks due to the race itself. The latter outcome variable is the racial
disadvantage in return to education.
Table 1.9 shows the negative impact of slavery on the estimated return to edu-
cation of blacks. The outcome variables are the coefficients of Blackcj and Educj ×
Blackcj, as estimated from equation 7. The former measures wage loss among blacks
due to the race itself. The latter is racial disadvantage through return to education.
The results in panel 2 show that the legacy of slavery reduced relative compensation
to the education of blacks in the labor market. That is, the history of slavery in a
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county enabled labor-market conditions in which additional schooling of blacks was
less appreciated by employers.30 The size of the impact was quantitatively substantial.
According to column 6, a 1 standard deviation increase in the slave-to-population ra-
tio led to a 0.33 standard deviation decrease in relative return to education of blacks.
In addition, insignificant and unstable estimates of the dummy variable Black in
panel 1 confirm that the legacy of slavery did not simply re-establish a racial hierarchy
that had previously existed but produced locally heterogeneous market conditions for
black workers. If slavery had maintained its persistence in the labor market through
race alone, independently of the suggested mechanism, then the estimates in panel 1
would be been significant and negative.
1.4.4 Persistence Channels of the Legacy of Slavery
If the negative impact of slavery on human capital was transferred through labor-
market institutions, how was it able to persist? There exists a few scenarios that could
counter-argue the persistent impact. For instance, firms or employers could have had
incentives for arbitraging a discriminatory market(Foote et al., 2003). Otherwise,
there exists a broad literature that attests steady improvements in racial integration
throughout US history (Margo, 1990, 1995; Boustan, 2009). As is clear from Figure
1.3, however, the negative impact of slavery on human capital did not fade even after
the Civil Rights era. In this section, I suggest two channels that allowed the legacy
of slavery to persist: wage discrimination and selective migration.
30The role of educational quality could be a potential counterargument. If the history of slavery
had produced a significant racial disparity in educational quality, then the observed gap in return
to education could reflect lower productivity of the education available to blacks. Using historical
data on race-specific educational quality, I show the results of additional estimations in Appendix
D that rule out this counterargument.
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Wage Discrimination
In the literature on between-group inequality, discrimination is recognized as a source
of persistence of inequality, operating through a vicious cycle. Once the group that
is discriminated against realizes its disadvantages in the market, it comes to invest
less in relevant factors, which strengthens the statistical discrimination against them
(Blau and Kahn, 2000).31 In the context of racial discrimination in US history, Myrdal
(1944) states that “Negro labor is often superior to the white men’s expectation partly
because the thinking in averages and stereotypes makes him underestimate the individ-
ual Negro · · · Employers who do employ Negroes, therefore, often get a higher appre-
ciation of them as workers than employers who do not.”. This logic is applicable to
the long-run impact of slavery in a rather pessimistic way. During the Reconstruction
and Progressive Eras, the institutional legacy of slavery largely restricted blacks to
low-skill occupations and prevented them from accumulating human capital. Where
this historical experience reinforced negative stereotypes of the productivity of black
workers, they faced stronger discrimination, which would in turn further reduce the
incentive to invest in human capital.
To check whether there is a causal link between slavery and racial wage discrimina-
tion, I decompose the racial wage gap observed from the 1940 complete count census
data into parts explained by quantity and prices. After estimating the racial wage
gap due to the difference in prices, called discrimination in literature (Blinder 1973;
Oaxaca and Ransom, 1994), I run IV regression to check whether discrimination in
the labor market is the result of slavery. For wage decomposition, I use the Mincer
specification of equation 7 and follow the traditional method of Oaxaca (1973) and
Blinder (1973).
31Theoretical discussion on the persistent dynamics of discrimination can be found in Tirole (1996).
Anderson et al. (2006) provide experimental evidence.
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∆̂wc = (X¯cw − X¯cb)′(Wcβˆcw + (1−Wc)βˆcb)︸ ︷︷ ︸
wage gap due to quantity
+ ((I −Wc)′X¯cw +W ′cX¯cb)(βˆcw − βˆcb)︸ ︷︷ ︸
wage gap due to returns
(1.8)
∆̂wc is the average wage gap between whites and blacks in county c. For each
race k, X¯ck denotes the vector of the average quantity of endowments
32 and βˆck is the
vector of estimated coefficients from the Mincer equation. The actual decomposition
of the wage gap depends on the choice of weighting matrix Wc which determines the
reference coefficients. To check robustness, I show results under the three different
weighting matrices: (X ′cwXcw + X
′
cbXcb)
−1X ′cwXcw ≡ Ωc, 0 and I. These matrices
define the coefficients from the pooled, black, and white samples as reference coeffi-
cients, respectively.
This decomposition interprets quantity differentials in unobservable variables as
discrimination, but this does not necessarily imply any overestimation it. Above all,
differences in unobserved variables are, in part, the result of discrimination. For in-
stance, racial discrimination can reduce the unobserved productivity of black workers
by limiting their opportunities for productive co-working. Underestimation is also
possible. For an example, if a racial gap in educational attainment results from the
decision made by blacks after realizing the existence of racial discrimination in the
labor market, then its contribution to the wage gap is measured as quantity effects, in
spite of the discriminatory root of this phenomenon. In this sense, the results under
Wc = 0 and I provide upper- and lower bounds of the estimation, treating the return
to endowments from the black-only and white-only samples as references.
The estimates in Table 1.10 show that stronger legacies of slavery led to greater
discrimination against blacks in the labor market. The first outcome variable shows
32As in the Mincer specification, I include education, experience, sex, marriage, family size, mi-
gration and urban residence as controls. However, occupation fixed effects are not included since
occupational choice itself can be a result of discrimination.
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the extent of the wage gap due to quantity differentials in the observed variables.
The other is the discriminatory wage gap. While the estimates support the impact
of slavery for both cases, columns 46 show a stronger and more significant impact on
the discriminatory wage gap. This could be interpreted to mean that the legacy of
slavery over the long run would have been less without the discrimination.
Table 1.10: The legacy of slavery on racial wage discrimination 1940
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: racial wage gap due to differential in quantity discrimination
Slave to Pop ratio 0.179* 0.011 0.310** 0.695*** 0.863*** 0.564**
(0.105) (0.110) (0.121) (0.240) (0.261) (0.245)
F -stat 50.65 50.65 50.65 50.65 50.65 50.65
Predetermined controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Geographical controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Socioeconomic controls N N N N N N
State fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 798 798 798 798 798 798
weighting matrix Ωc 0 I Ωc 0 I
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at state are shown in the parentheses. The outcome variables the decomposed wage gap
attributable to quantity differentials and discrimination respectively. The weighting matrices determine the reference coefficients
for decomposition.
Selective Migration
The suggested mechanism explains the negative impact of slavery on black human
capital well. However, a question of its persistence at a local level still remains, in
that black migration is a prominent feature of US history. As Kim (1998) shows,
gradual migration across counties could induce an equilibration of the national labor
market. Thus, to understand slaverys persistent impact, the way in which slavery
affected patterns of black migration needs to be clarified.
Migration selectivity reinforced the suggested mechanism. The legacy of slavery
rendered places less attractive to potential migrants with high human capital. Because
slavery reduced return to human capital in labor markets, it lowered the benefits
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to education of potential migrants. In that human capital is a critical factor that
increases expected benefits of migration (Margo 1990; Tolnay, 1998; Vigdor, 2002),
black migrants to a destination with stronger background of slavery are expected to
have less human capital than elsewhere.
For the estimation, I construct a sample of migrants using the complete count
census in 1940 which asks for 1935 residence of each respondent. The responses to
the questionnaire allow me to classify cross-county in- and out-migrants aged 25 to
70 years old. In addition, I restrict the sample to respondents who worked at least
20 weeks in the previous year. This was done because the mechanism is based on
the utilization of human capital in the labor market. The results are robust to other
cutoff values.
Table 1.11: Slavery and educational attainment of migrants
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable
med yrs of schooling,
out-migrants
med yrs of schooling,
in-migrants
White Black White Black
Slave to Pop ratio 0.256 -0.069 -0.028 -0.388***
(0.189) (0.133) (0.224) (0.149)
F -stat 44.76 50.50 44.30 38.63
Predetermined controls Y Y Y Y
Geographical controls Y Y Y Y
Socioeconomic controls N N N N
State fixed effect Y Y Y Y
N 930 740 929 642
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at state level are shown in the parentheses.
The in- and out-migrants are identified from the place of residence five years ago. The
samples exclude counties whose number of observations is less than 20. Standardized
coefficients are shown in the table.
Consistent with predictions, Table 1.11 shows that counties with stronger back-
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grounds of slavery received migrants who were less educated. The outcome variables
are median schooling of in- and out-migrants for each race. Due to different scales of
educational attainment between the races, standardized coefficients are shown in the
table. As shown in column 4, the educational level of black in-migrants decreased in
the slave-to-population ratio of the destination counties. This coefficient for white
in-migrants is small and statistically insignificant. This confirms the interpretation
that selectivity in migration comes from the labor-market conditions for black work-
ers. In addition, columns 1 and 2 show that out-migration flows did not offset the
low educational level of in-migrants.
1.5 Conclusion
This paper shows the negative impact of slavery on long-run development and its
comprehensive mechanism. Exploiting agro-climate based crop-specific suitability, I
construct an IV, the potential share of cotton, tobacco, rice, and sugarcane in 1859.
The IV estimations show two facts. First, the legacy of slavery impedes economic
development in the long run. Second, the long-run impact functions through the
channel of human capital.
I suggest a mechanism for the human capital channel, which broadly consists of
two components: institutional intervention in the labor market and its impact on the
demand for human capital. I first present evidence that the legacy of slavery impedes
integration of blacks into the competitive labor market. According to analyses of
occupational segregation, greater dependence on slavery caused the black labor force
to be further separated, even after controlling for variations in literacy. Moreover,
evidence from the skill levels of occupations supports the conception that this was a
vertical segregation, which confined black workers to low-skill occupations.
The causal impact of slavery on the labor market can be explained by the selec-
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tive application of labor-market institutions. Using discontinuity along the border
counties, I show that anti-enticement laws, a central element of the Black Codes,
were selectively enforced to separate the black labor force in a way that matched the
history of slavery in a locality. Moreover, the logic of selective application can be
generalized to the overall institutional climate.
Because blacks could not make full use of their human capital in the labor market,
their incentive to invest in human capital declined. Using the complete-count census
data in 1940, I estimate county-wise relative return to education and show that the
legacy of slavery reduces compensation to the education of blacks in the labor market.
Finally, I suggest that racial wage discrimination and selective migration supported
the persistence of the mechanism in the long run.
1A. Exclustion Restriction of the Instrumental Variable
Appendix 1A.1. Robustness under Alternative Instrumental Variables
The instrumental variable (IV) estimates used in this paper may be biased if the
potential share of the slave crops reflects the significance of a certain crop which
had independent impact on long-run economy. For example, the potential share of
sugarcane in 1859 may be related to the persistence of sugar industries that was a
characteristic of the Deep South. To ensure that the IV estimates are not driven by
the direct impact of any specific crop, I test the robustness of the results to excluding
each crop, one by one.
We can try to check the sensitivity of the IV estimates to sugarcane. In this case,
I construct an alternative IV, (θˆcotton + θˆrice + θˆtobacco)/(1 − θˆsugar) where θˆk is the
potential share of crop k estimated from equation 2. Using the the alternative IV, I
estimate the following equation.
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yc = α + βSlavec,1860 + δθˆsugar + γ
′
1XPre,c + γ
′
2XGeo,c + γ
′
3XEco,c + µs + c (1.9)
In other words, I use the potential share of cotton, rice and tobacco among non-
sugarcane crops o instrument slave to population ratio in 1860 conditional on the
potential share of sugarcane. Since the potential share of sugarcane is included as an
exogenous control, robustness to the alternative IV implies that there is no bias in
the original IV estimates due to sugarcane specialization. I individually apply this
process to cotton, rice, sugarcane, and tobacco.
Table 1.12: Robustness to alternative instrumental variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5))
Dependent variable: log of per capita income in 2000
Slave to Pop ratio -0.391** -0.475 -0.395** -0.442** -0.420**
(0.167) (0.423) (0.162) (0.186) (0.190)
N 925 925 925 925 925
F-stat 60.61 18.69 61.18 59.44 48.41
Dependent variable: literacy rate in 1900
Slave to Pop ratio -0.410*** -0.670*** -0.420*** -0.437*** -0.403***
(0.060) (0.105) (0.062) (0.067) (0.072)
N 922 922 922 922 922
F-stat 68.20 25.78 67.96 67.89 49.17
Excluded crop from the original IV - cotton sugar rice tobacco
Predetermined controls Y Y Y Y Y
Geographical controls Y Y Y Y Y
Socioeconomic controls N N N N N
State fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at state level are shown in the parentheses.
The alternative IVs produce similar results to the original estimates. In Table 1.12,
column 1 contains the original IV estimates, and columns 25 show the results with the
exclusion of cotton, sugarcane, rice, and tobacco respectively. Both the sign and size
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of the estimates are consistent for the specifications. As the potential share of cotton
showed considerable variation in the original IV, the exclusion of cotton reduces the
F-statistics of the first stage and the statistical significance of the estimates, but the
size and direction of the coefficients do not show a significant difference.
Appendix 1A.2. Placebo Instrumental Variable
Another concern for exogeneity regarding the instrumental variable (IV) arises from
the independent impact of the slave crops. For instance, if specialization in cotton
expanded textile production and impeded the growth of high-skill industries, the IV
estimates could be biased downward due to the direct impact of cotton suitability.
The IV consists of two parts: the vector of crop-specific suitability and market
conditions for each crop in 1859 measured by βˆi–estimated parameters using 1859
output shares as outcome variables in equation 2. Since crop-specific suitability is
a fixed component, its specific relation to slavery in 1860 comes from variation in
market conditions in the given year. Thus, if the IV estimates were biased because
of the persistence of the slave crops, which is echoed by crop-specific suitability, then
the potential share of the slave crops in different years would also produce similar
estimates. Thus, I construct a placebo IV, using data from the Census of Agriculture
in 1940 and comparing the results of estimation.
Based on the IV strategy in section 3, I predict the potential share of the slave
crops in terms of their output values in 1939. Since the census did not record the
value of sugar and rice, the potential share of cotton and tobacco are only estimated
values among the slave crops.33 The placebo IV is defined as the sum of potential
share of cotton and tobacco in 1939.
33The Census of Agriculture in 1940 reports the value of corn, wheat, other grains, hay, cotton,
tobacco, potatoes, vegetables, fruits and nuts, horticulture products and all other crops. Because
specific crops are not identified for the categories of other grains, vegetables, fruits and other crops,
I include all the crop-specific suitability in the original FML equation in addition to suitability of
extra crops: onion, carrot, cabbage, tomato and soybean.
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Table 1.13: Falsification tests using the origianl- and placebo instru-
mental variables
Dependent variable: log of per capita income in 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Original (1859) Placebo (1939)
Potential share of slave crops -0.124* -0.179** 0.018 -0.002
(0.059) (0.069) (0.073) (0.062)
R2 0.30 0.32 0.30 0.31
N 925 923 925 923
Dependent variable: median years of schooling 1940
Original (1859) Placebo (1939)
Potential share of slave crops -0.981*** -0.601** 0.186 0.399
(0.197) (0.240) (1.331) (0.316)
R2 0.46 0.49 0.45 0.49
N 924 922 924 922
Predetermined controls Y Y Y Y
Geographical controls Y Y Y Y
Socioeconomic controls N Y N Y
State fixed effect Y Y Y Y
Robust standard errors clustered at state level are shown in the parentheses. The
explanatory variable in column 1 and 2 is the original IV which is the potential share
of the slave crops predicted in 1859. In columns 3 and 4, the placebo IV–the potential
share predicted in 1939– is the explanatory variable. The coefficients are estimated
by OLS.
In Table 1.13, I show the results of falsification tests using the placebo IV. Given
the strong first- and second-stage estimation results in section 3, a reduced-form
relationship between the original IV and long-run development is expected to be
negative as well. Furthermore, where the negative relationship occurred exclusively
through the history of slavery instead of the independent impact of the slave crops,
then the placebo IV would not produce comparable results. Consistent with this
prediction, the OLS estimates in columns 1 and 2 show a negative relationship between
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the original IV and long-run development, while the coefficients of the placebo IV are
insignificant and close to zero, as shown in columns 3 and 4. Identical patterns are
observed with median years of schooling in 1940 from the second panel.
Table 1.14: IV regression results: original- and placebo IVs
Dependent variable: log of per capita income in 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Original IV Placebo IV
Slave to Pop ratio -0.391** -1.170*** 0.129 -0.053
(0.167) (0.379) (0.501) (1.385)
R2 0.27 0.11 0.29 0.32
N 925 923 925 923
F-stat 60.61 18.69 5.74 1.21
Dependent variable: median years of schooling 1940
Original IV Placebo IV
Slave to Pop ratio -3.117*** -3.955*** 1.300 9.095
(0.508) (1.145) (2.360) (10.18)
R2 0.48 0.49 0.36 -0.48
N 924 922 924 922
F-stat 60.60 18.60 5.95 1.29
Predetermined controls Y Y Y Y
Geographical controls Y Y Y Y
Socioeconomic controls N Y N Y
State fixed effect Y Y Y Y
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at state level are shown in the paren-
theses. Original and placebo instrument variables are the potential share of the
slave crops in 1859 and 1939 respectively.
In addition to the falsification tests, Table 1.14 compares the results of the IV
estimation for the original and placebo IVs. In both panels, the estimates for the
placebo IVs are not consistent with the original IV estimates, which are negative
and statistically significant. Moreover, the placebo IV estimates are highly unstable,
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in that the size and direction of the estimates fluctuate significantly when initial
socioeconomic controls are included. Lastly, smaller values for F-statistics suggest
that the potential share of slave crops in 1939 is not a good predictor of the slave-to-
population ratio in 1860.
Appendix 1B. Integration of Black Workers in the Long-Run
Table 1.15: Slavery and integration of blacks into the labor market
1940
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Black White
Dependent variable: 1940 Share in low-skill occup high-skill occup low-skill occup high-skill occup
Slave to Pop ratio 0.283*** 0.454*** -0.059 -0.108 0.087 0.139 0.187** 0.041
(0.095) (0.115) (0.049) (0.065) (0.040) (0.057) (0.078) (0.065)
Additional controls at the second stage
Black median schooling - -0.024*** - 0.003 - - - -
- (0.006) - (0.003) - - - -
White median schooling - - - - - -0.016*** - 0.053***
- - - - - (0.003) - (0.006)
Relative share of agricultural output - 0.030*** - 0.002 - 0.013*** - -0.008***
- (0.005) - (0.001) - (0.002) - (0.002)
R2 0.21 0.46 0.05 0.15 0.21 0.50 0.25 0.58
N 888 701 887 700 930 733 930 733
F-stat 40.58 21.59 40.06 21.59 44.76 22.86 44.76 22.86
Predetermined controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Geographical controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Socioeconomic controls N N N N N N N N
State fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at state level are shown in the parentheses. Relative share of agricultural output is defined by the difference
between log(per capita agricultural output) and log(per capita manufacturing value added)
Section 4.1 shows that the legacy of slavery impedes integration of blacks into the
labor market in 1880. Using the 1940 complete-count census data, Table 1.15 shows
that the impact of slavery persisted in the long run. Because the 1940 census data
provide detailed information in individual workers, I could restrict the sample to full-
time workers reporting positive wage income. In Table 1.15, slavery is shown to have
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impeded the integration of black workers in 1940. According to column 1, a 1 stan-
dard deviation increase in slave-to-population ratio is associated with a 0.20 standard
deviation increase in the share of blacks in low-skill occupations. The coefficient for
the share of whites in high-skill occupations is also consistent with Table 1.15. Col-
umn 7 shows that higher slave-to-population ratios in 1860 induce more whites to
work in high-skill occupations.
Similarly, I re-estimate the occupational segregation between blacks and whites
using the 1940 complete count census data. Though the 1940 census provides highest
grade of schooling for each respondent, classification by detailed education attainment
would not produce comparable estimates, in that the 1880 sample was classified by
literacy. In this sense, the educational attainment for the 1940 sample is divided into
two groups: less than and more than or equal to eight years of schooling. The cutoff
point of eight years is chosen because it generates the most similar distribution to
1880 literacy.34
Table 1.16 shows the long-run impact of slavery on occupational segregation be-
tween blacks and whites. However, contrary to the estimates from 1880, columns 3
and 4 show that observed segregation is mostly explained by variation in the edu-
cational attainment of individuals.35 To put it differently: the effect of the legacy
of slavery on labor market segregation in 1940 disappears when educational attain-
ment is filtered out. This supports that the long-run legacy of slavery was principally
passed down via the human-capital channel.
3454.75% are literate in the 1880 sample. In the 1940 sample, 57.20% have more than or equal to
eight years of schooling.
35Classification of the sample by actual highest grade of schooling produces a similar and stronger
pattern. Such result further supports the role of human capital as a long-run channel.
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Table 1.16: Slavery and occupational segregation in the labor market
1940
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable Dobs Giniobs Dcr Ginicr D∗ Gini∗
Slave to Pop ratio 0.181 0.121 0.236** 0.212* 0.079 0.082
(0.115) (0.151) (0.097) (0.111) (0.144) (0.158)
R2 0.15 0.19 0.24 0.30 0.21 0.21
F -stat 48.38 48.38 48.38 48.38 48.38 48.38
Predetermined controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Geographical controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Socioeconomic controls N N N N N N
State fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 856 856 856 856 856 856
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at state level are shown in the parentheses. The sample
consists workers aged 25 to 65. Counties in which the number of black or white workers is less
than 10 are excluded from the sample. Dobs is the observed segregation index and Dcr is the
conditionally random index after randomly reassigning race within literacy groups. D∗ measures
the extent of occupational segregation not explained by literacy of workers.
Appendix 1C. Policy Climate of the Labor Market
In section 4.2, I show that anti-enticement laws, a central element of the Black Codes,
were employed to separate the black labor force from participation in the competitive
market. In addition to laws aimed at oppressing blacks, the logic of selectivity can
also occur in generic institutional climates. This reflects the relative bargaining power
of employers. Given state-level laws and regulations in the labor market, employers
in a county with a stronger background of slavery would have enforced the regulatory
conditions more selectively to separate black workers. To assess this logic, I estimate
the following equation.
ysct = αLRst + βSlavec,1860 × LRst + γ′Xsct + δc + δt + usct (1.10)
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where LRst is an index value of labor market regulations constructed by Fishback et
al. (2009). LRst takes values between 0 and 1 and is interpreted as an index of how
much the policy climate is in favor of employers. Construction of the index is based
on relative importance of the laws in the labor market. After the list of laws reported
in Labor Laws in the United States by the U.S. Commissioner of Labor(1896, 1904,
1908) and the Bureau of Labor Statistics(1914, 1925) were compiled into seventeen
categories, the authors build the index of each category for state s in year t weighting
dummy variables for the existence of the laws by the share of workers affected.36 The
overall index is calculated by taking average of the index values over the seventeen
categories. Higher values for the original index imply a regulatory climate more fa-
vorable to workers. To make interpretation easier in a consistent context, LRst is
defined as “1−original index value”. In other words, higher LRst indicates greater
bargaining power of employers. The index is available from 1900 to 1924 for most
states but I restrict the periods of analysis to 1900, 1910 and 1920 due to the avail-
ability of outcome variables which are constructed from the decennial census data.37
State-year variation of the index is summarized in table 1.17 δc and δt are county-
and year fixed effects respectively. Xsct contains the same set of time-varying controls
as in equation 6.
Unlike in section 4.2, the sample is not restricted to border counties because LRst
varies continuously across the year. This implies that the estimation of equation 10
does not control for endogeneity of LRst. For instance, changes in LRst could be
correlated with changes in the industrial composition which would affect the nature
36If a law is in force, then the dummy variable for that law has a value of one. Within each
category, all the dummy variables are summed using the share of workers affected as a weight. For
instance, bakery regulations and electrical regulations are classified into the category of Workplace
Activity Regulation. Since electrical regulations affect larger share of workers, higher weight is given
on them than on bakery regulations.
37Complete count census data is available in 1910 and 1920. 5% sample is used for 1900 variables.
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of regulations. However, potential endogeneity of LRst at state-level does not affect
the causal interpretation of within-state variation. As long as the legacy of slavery at
county-level is orthogonal to the state-level unobserved variables, the coefficients of
Slavec,1860 × LRst causally estimate selective application of labor market regulations
conditionally on state-level policy climate. Lastly, as in the estimation of equation 6,
Slavec,1860 × LRst is instrumented by IVc,1860 × LRst.
Table 1.17: State-year variation of the index of labor market regula-
tions
1900 1910 1920
DE 0.927 0.926 0.750
MO 0.682 0.616 0.602
VA 0.858 0.826 0.801
AL 0.943 0.943 0.864
AR 0.965 0.883 0.844
FL 0.896 0.897 0.932
GA 0.919 0.900 0.780
LA 0.783 0.763 0.702
MS 0.991 0.945 0.862
NC 0.907 0.856 0.758
SC 0.854 0.872 0.724
TX 0.890 0.879 0.736
KY 0.897 0.860 0.806
MD 0.877 0.627 0.633
TN 0.821 0.807 0.789
Notes: The index takes values be-
tween 0 and 1. Higher values of
the index indicate greater bargain-
ing power of employers.
Table 1.18 summarizes the results of estimation. Outcome variables are employ-
ment shares in low-skill occupations among the black and the white labor forces. The
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coefficients of Slavec,1860×LRst in columns 1-3 suggest that the laws and regulations
in the labor market were selectively used to oppress black workers, and this selec-
tivity can be traced to the legacy of slavery. Moreover, small the and statistically
insignificant coefficients of LRst suggest that the direct impact of the institutional
environment was not particularly adverse to black workers, so long as the variation
in slavery is filtered out. This pattern is consistent with the conclusion of section
4.2 that the negative impact of the anti-enticement laws stemmed entirely from the
history of slavery. Columns 4-6 further support the mechanism by showing small and
insignificant impact on white workers. To address potential concerns over farm tenure
in section 4.2, I repeat the estimation using the sample of non-agricultural workers.
Table 1.19 summarizes the results, which are robust to the exclusion of agricultural
labor.
Table 1.18: Selective application of labor market regulations 1900-
1920
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent var: share of low-skill workers in Black White
LRst -0.015 -0.017 -0.015 0.009 0.009 -0.054
(0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.008) (0.007) (0.044)
Slavec,1860 × LRst 0.113** 0.112** 0.103* 0.000 0.002 0.008
(0.055) (0.056) (0.056) (0.018) (0.016) (0.007)
Black literacy - -0.099* -0.092* - - -
- (0.056) (0.053) - - -
White literacy - - - - -0.202*** -0.198***
- - - - (0.068) (0.071)
Share of farmland - 0.054*** 0.050*** - -0.021 -0.020
- (0.017) (0.018) - (0.017) (0.016)
Share of blacks - - 0.196 - - -0.045
- - (0.109) - - (0.046)
R2 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.24 0.25 0.25
F -Stat 74.02 75.79 53.03 74.02 70.71 50.58
Number of counties 795 795 795 795 795 795
Number of observations 2385 2385 2385 2385 2385 2385
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at state are shown in the parentheses. Standardized coefficients are shown in the table.
County-fixed effects and year fixed effects are controlled. All balanced.
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Table 1.19: Selective application of labor market regulations: non-
agricultural workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent var: share of low-skill workers in Black White
LRst -0.015 -0.018* -0.020* 0.009 0.004 0.003
(0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
Slavec,1860 × LRst 0.044 0.043 0.049 0.003 -0.002 0.001
(0.033) (0.039) (0.046) (0.006) (0.013) (0.014)
Black literacy - -0.224** -0.229** - - -
- (0.100) (0.100) - - -
White literacy - - - - -0.096** -0.088*
- - - - (0.042) (0.048)
Share of farmland - 0.021 0.024 - -0.047** -0.045**
- (0.057) (0.057) - (0.022) (0.022)
Share of blacks - - -0.139 - - -0.067
- - (0.171) - - (0.097)
R2 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04
F -Stat 75.57 77.53 54.45 75.57 72.16 51.45
Number of counties 779 779 779 779 779 779
Number of observations 2337 2337 2337 2337 2337 2337
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at state are shown in the parentheses. Standardized coefficients are shown in the table.
County-fixed effects and year fixed effects are controlled. All balanced.
Appendix 1D. Slavery, Return to Education and Educational
Quality
Section 4.3 shows that slavery reduced the relative return to education for blacks
in the labor market. As shown in Card and Krueger (1992a), however, educational
quality is an important factor for the return to education as well. The authors find in
another paper (1992b) that the relative quality of black schools explained 20 percent
of the convergence of the blackwhite earnings gap between 1960 and 1980. More
discussion of the racial gap in school quality, returns to schooling, and educational
attainment in the US South can be found in Collins and Margo (2006).
Given the causal relation between educational quality and returns to education,
the presence of a greater legacy of slavery could have reduced return to education
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through its negative impact on educational quality. In such a case, the causal rela-
tion between labor market institutions and incentive for human capital accumulation
could be disputed. To disentangle the mechanism from the role of educational quality,
I estimate the impact of slavery on educational quality and its relation to the return
to education. For a measurement of educational quality,I use a county-by-race index
constructed by Carruthers and Wanamaker (2017). The index is composed of race-
specific school resources at the county-level which include the following eight metrics:
expenditures per enrolled pupil, expenditures per pupil in average daily attendance
(ADA), teachers per enrolled pupil, teachers per pupil in ADA, certified teachers per
enrolled pupil, certified teachers per pupil in ADA, term length, and average teacher
salary. For each metric and year, the authors calculate a Z-score and define the av-
erage of the Z-scores as an index of educational quality.
First, I estimate the causal impact of slavery on educational quality in 1930s.
Since the index of educational quality is constructed for each individual year, average
and median of the indices for each county in 1930s are used as outcome variables.
The estimation results shown in Table 1.20 show that the legacy of slavery sig-
nificantly increased the educational quality of whites.38 While the results suggest
that the history of slavery widened racial gap in educational quality, its pattern is
distinguished from the mechanism in section 4 which specifically affected black work-
ers. For instance, Table 1.7 shows that selective application of anti-enticement laws
was concentrated on black workers, while its impact on white workers was negligible.
38There exist a few potential explanations on the positive impact of slavery on educational quality
of whites. Firstly, it could be a direct consequence of resource allocation. As Collins and Margo
(2006) find, white-dominated school boards could have redirected school funds which were assigned
typically based on the total school-age population. Since the slave-to-population ratio was strongly
correlated with the share of black population ratio in 1930s, slavery could have led to more redirection
of school funds to whites. In a similar context, slavery could have induced a socioeconomic structure
that favored whites. Alvarez-Cuadrado and Poschke (2011) argues that slavery has reduced political
participation of blacks persistently. If less political participation of blacks had expanded high-cost
educational resources rather than affordable public education service, it could have raised educational
quality exclusively for whites.
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Conversely, Table 1.20 implies that educational quality of blacks in the South did not
vary in a way that was tied to the previous extent of slavery.
Table 1.20: Slavery and educational quality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent bariable: Index of educational quality
Average in 1930s Median in 1930s
Black White White-Black Black White White-Black
Slave to pop ratio -0.010 1.035** 1.100 0.314 1.181*** 0.862
(0.906) (0.411) (0.748) (0.949) (0.437) (0.812)
R2 0.17 0.58 0.35 0.15 0.59 0.34
F-stat 32.16 35.76 32.16 32.16 35.76 32.16
N 462 493 462 462 493 462
Predetermined controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Geographical controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Socioeconomic controls N N N N N N
State fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at state level are shown in the parentheses. The index of educational
quality is from Carruthers and Wanamaker (2017). Since the original index is only available for 10 southern
states, the number of observation is smaller than in table 1.10.
To disentangle the role of educational quality from the mechanism of labor-market
institutions and human capital, I reconsider the causal impact of slavery on return to
education of blacks in the context of section 4.3. First, I re-estimate equation 7, using
a sample of workers aged 1825 who did not migrate across counties over the previous
five years. This restricts the sample to those who were aged 1320 in 1935 and in
the same county of residence. Next, assuming the workers received their education
in their county of residence, I estimate the impact of slavery on the coefficients of
Edu×Black controlling for race-specifc educational quality.
Table 1.21 summarizes the results of estimation with and without controlling
for race-specific educational quality. As shown by the similar size of the coefficients,
educational quality does not explain the causal impact of slavery on the labor market.
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Furthermore, the significance of educational quality is modest, compared to the legacy
of slavery. According to the estimates in column 2, 1 standard deviation increase in the
slave-to-population ratio caused a 0.40 standard deviation loss of return to education
for blacks. On the other hand, a 1 standard deviation increase in the educational
quality of blacks reduced the loss of return very slightly, by 0.06 standard deviations.
Table 1.21: Slavery, educational quality and relative return to educa-
tion of blacks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: estimated coefficient of Edu×Black
Slave to pop ratio -0.106** -0.105** -0.116** -0.103**
(0.053) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051)
Index of educational quality
dBlack - 0.004** 0.003 -
- (0.002) (0.002) -
dWhite - - 0.009*** -
- - (0.003) -
dBlack-White - - - 0.002*
- - - (0.001)
R2 0.04 0.09 0.10 0.09
F-stat 34.60 34.60 34.60 34.60
N 414 414 414 414
Predetermined controls Y Y Y Y
Geographical controls Y Y Y Y
Socioeconomic controls N N N N
State fixed effect Y Y Y Y
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at state level are shown in the parentheses.
Since the original index is only available for 10 southern states, the number of observa-
tion is smaller than in table 1.10. To control for educational quality, I use the average
of the index values in 1930s. County-wise Mincer equations are estimated controlling
for sex, marriage, family size and urban residence.
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Chapter 2
The Long Reach of Cotton in the US
South: Tenant Farming, Mechanization,
and Low-Skill Manufacturing
2.1 Introduction
An extensive literature investigates structural change-the reallocation of labor out
of agriculture-as an engine of economic development (Laitner, 2000; Restuccia et
al., 2008; Lagakos and Waugh, 2013). Many studies find a mechanism for this in
improvements in agricultural productivity (Matsuyama, 1992; Caselli and Coleman,
2001; Gollin et al., 2002, 2007).1 Considering agriculture as a single, homogeneous
sector, they argue that the modernization of agricultural production releases labor
from farms and promotes economic development. Heterogeneity within agriculture,
however, may have additional implications for structural change and its relation-
ship to the long-run economy. This paper addresses the negative legacy of cotton
specialization through structural change, with a focus on the evolution of industrial
productivity and technical change.
Cotton is one of the most important crops in US economic history, as indicated by
the wide prevalence of the expression “King Cotton”. That term was coined before
1There is no consensus on the exact mechanism of structural change. Another branch of literature
argues that improvement in industrial production technology causes structural change by attracting
labor from agricultural (Lewis, 1954; Harris and Todaro, 1970; Hansen and Prescott, 2002). Using
cross-country data from the nineteenth century, Alvarez-Cuadrado and Poshke (2011) compare the
two channels of structural change and conclude that while “labor pull” dominated until 1920s, “labor
push” has been a central channel in the later twentieth century.
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the Civil War, but cotton also continued to dominate crop production in the South
in the post-war period. Furthermore, beyond its part in the history of slavery, cotton
agriculture featured a unique type of labor. After the abolition of slavery, cotton
plantations were reorganized into family tenancy farms, which were characterized by
lower human capital than other forms of agricultural labor. Cotton agriculture, with
its historical significance and its distinctive characteristics, provide an ideal setting
for examining the long-run effects of a previous state of local agriculture.
Using a rich set of county-level data from the US South, I show that early cotton
specialization resulted in significant negative impacts on local development in the
second half of the 20th century, in contrast to its slightly positive effects in earlier pe-
riods. I argue that this change was caused by cotton mechanization and concomitant
structural change. As the mechanization of cotton production reduced the demand
for unskilled labor, it displaced many cotton tenants who were absorbed by the local
manufacturing sector. Because cotton tenants had lower human capital than existing
workers, the inflow of cotton tenants negatively affected labor productivity in manu-
facturing. Furthermore, this decline in manufacturing productivity persisted because
of directed technical change, which reduced the demand for skills in the long-run.
To summarize the mechanism in a simple framework, I propose a two-sector model,
in which agriculture is divided into cotton and non-cotton production. Assuming an
endogenous choice of technology in manufacturing, this model illustrates that cotton
mechanization induces sectoral labor reallocation and a resulting technical change in
the manufacturing sector, which is more complementary to unskilled labor.
Estimation of the relationship between initial cotton specialization and local de-
velopment reveals two patterns. First, greater dependence on cotton reduced county-
level per capita income in the long-run. Second, however, its negative impact is only
observable in the second half of the 20th century. To identify the causal effects of
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cotton, I construct the potential share of cotton acreage as an instrumental variable
(IV) for its actual share. The potential share of cotton is predicted from exogenous
crop-specific suitability, as measured by the climate-based potential yields provided
by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).
The transition in the impact of cotton is grounded in the low human capital of
cotton tenants. As discussed by Ransom and Sutch (1978) and Margo (1990) in
different contexts, high labor intensity of cotton production was an obstacle to the
accumulation of human capital. In particular, child labor was a crucial factor. Due
to the advantages of their short stature and small hands, the children of cotton ten-
ant families were frequently forced to work in the fields instead of attending school.
This historical observation is echoed by evidence. Exploiting dissemination of the
boll weevil over the early 20th century, which damaged cotton production but had no
influence on other crops or livestock (Higgs,1976; Lange et al., 2009; Baker, 2015), I
demonstrate that adult cotton tenants were less likely to be literate than other agri-
cultural labor, and that children of cotton tenants worked at higher rates than the
children of non-cotton farm households.
Beginning in the 1950s, the mechanization of cotton production radically altered
the impact of cotton on local development. First, cotton tenants were displaced by
machines. Using the Census of Agriculture, I show that cotton mechanization was
followed by a reduction in the share of tenant farms. Displaced cotton tenants were
absorbed by local manufacturing. Evidence from aggregate employment data indi-
cates that the reduction in the number of farm operators was accompanied by an
increase in manufacturing employment, without significant effects on out-migration.
Manufacturing growth, however, was not homogeneous across industries. While low-
skill industries experienced rapid growth, cotton mechanization slowed the growth of
high-skill industries.
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In contrast to the conventional understanding of structural change, I find that the
manufacturing growth caused by cotton mechanization had a negative impact on in-
dustrial productivity. As a proxy for labor productivity in manufacturing, I compute
per-worker value added and the average wage of production workers. Evidence from
the Census of Manufactures shows that labor productivity in manufacturing has de-
clined on the heels of cotton mechanization. Moreover, the decline in manufacturing
productivity is shown to have persisted in the long-run.
The decline in manufacturing productivity can be explained using two factors:
composition effects and directed technical change. Evidence from the 1940 and 1960
censuses demonstrates that the inflow of cotton tenants reduced the average educa-
tional attainment of unskilled manufacturing labor. Demographic changes further
highlight the sectoral reallocation of cotton tenants: The share of blacks and females
in unskilled manufacturing labor increased, and the share of migrant workers fell.
Furthermore, I argue that the inflow of cotton tenants reduced demand for skilled
workers, which contributed to persistent decreases in manufacturing productivity. I
measure the demand for skills using three variables: decomposition of the college
wage premium, return to education, and employment share in new industries. The
results show that initial cotton specialization had a negative impact on demand for
skills in manufacturing to this day. To ensure that these measures explain technical
change over time, I employ an annual state-level index of policy environment for in-
dustrial innovativeness. By interacting the index with the cotton share, I show that
the history of cotton agriculture hindered the positive policy effects on demand for
skills in manufacturing.
This paper adds to the literature on structural change. In particular, it is in dia-
logue with the works on the “labor push”, which argues that the engine of structural
change is to be found in improvements in agricultural productivity. The argument is
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theoretically based on the so-called “food problem”, that indicates the higher share
of agricultural employment in less-developed economies (Schultz, 1953). Under non-
homothetic preferences,2 theoretical models predict that improvements in agricultural
productivity release farm labor to non-agricultural sectors. As a result, the economy
as a whole grows faster with the resulting enhanced efficiency (Matsuyama, 1992;
Gollin et al., 2002, 2007; Gollin, 2010). While cotton mechanization also contributed
to a labor push, its negative impact on local economic development should be sharply
distinguished from the existing literature. This distinction arises from a considera-
tion of the variation within agriculture. By focusing on the low human capital of
cotton farming, this work reveals a novel aspect of structural change that hinges on
selectivity in labor reallocation. In addition, the described mechanism depends solely
on technical change from the production side. This pattern of structural change,
compared to explanations that rely on the role of subsistence, would have more direct
implications for economic growth of developing countries in the modern period.
This paper also expands previous works on economic development in the US South
(Ransom and Sutch, 1978; Wright, 1978, 1986; Alston and Ferrie, 1993). While this
research similarly stresses how cotton was a critical factor in the US South, I extend
this discussion to include an assessment of the long-run path of development. More-
over, this study is distinguished from literature that explores cotton in the context
of slavery (Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997, 2002; Wright, 2006, Olmstead and Rhode,
2018). The long-run effects of cotton agriculture through structural change, even
beyond the legacy of slavery in US economic history (Nunn, 2008; Bruhn and Gallego
2012; Jung, 2018), offers another lens to understand the historical roots of southern
2While theoretical prediction from non-homothetic preferences is consistent with stylized facts of
structural change, it is not reconciled well with other macroeconomic properties. In this view, recent
literature adopts different specifications of preferences which are consistent to both structural change
and other stylized facts of economic growth such as Kaldor facts (Ngai and Pissarides, 2007), income
and substitution effects (Boppart, 2014) and skill-based technical change (Buera et al., 2015).
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economic development.
In addition, this work emphasizes the agricultural roots of comparative develop-
ment. A sizable literature discusses how pre-industrial agricultural patterns, including
crop mix (Vollrath, 2011, Galor and Ozak, 2016) and production technology (Alesina
et al., 2013, 2018), influenced modern economic outcomes. Adding to the works over
a long-term horizon, many papers study the direct relationship between agriculture
and economic growth. Lagakos and Waugh (2013) and Tombe (2015), for instance,
explain cross-country productivity differences through the inefficiency of labor distri-
bution in agriculture. Closer to my argument, Eberhardt and Vollrath (2016) and
Fiszbein (2017) empirically study how heterogeneity within agriculture affects re-
gional economic development.
Finally, the suggested mechanism contributes to understanding of directed techni-
cal change. Consistent with theoretical arguments (Acemoglu, 1998, 2002), this study
finds that the supply-side impact of cotton mechanization caused technical changes
in manufacturing that were biased toward unskilled labor. Adding to evidence in the
context of tractorization (Manuelli and Seshadri, 2014), automation (Acemoglu and
Restrepo, 2017), immigration (Lewis, 2011; Clemens et al., 2017), and input shock
on the textile industry (Hanlon, 2015), I provide a new perspective to understand the
determinants and processes of directed technical change.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 introduces an IV
strategy and estimates the impact of cotton on economic development, focused on
its change evident in the later half of the 20th century. In Section 2.3, I investigate
the prevalence of the tenancy and low human capital of cotton farming that forms
the basis of the mechanism. Section 2.4 discusses cotton mechanization and conse-
quential structural change, using a simple model and empirical evidence. Section 2.5
concludes the work.
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2.2 The Legacy of Cotton on Long-Run Development
“Cotton Once More King.”
- Grady (1890)
“There is no longer any reason to doubt that there will be profound changes in the cotton
economy in the prospective future.”
- Street (1959)
Figure 2·1: Transition in the legacy of cotton on economic develop-
ment
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Note: Both are binscatter plots with 20 equal-sized bins. The outcome variable of
the upper(lower) figure is the Z-score of per capita income (output) at the county
level. Per capita output is defined as the sum of manufacturing value added and
farm output values divided by total population. The pattern is not affected by the
change in the outcome variable. Details of robustness are shown in Appendix A.2.
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Historical significance of cotton in the US South is widely accepted. Understanding of
its long-run impact on development, however, is not straightforward. Figure 2.1 shows
that correlation between initial cotton specialization and local economic development
changed fundamentally beginning in the second half of the 20th century. The timing
is especially important in the context of US economic history. As Figure 2.2 shows,
the South caught up with the North significantly beginning in the 1950s. A classical
account attributes the convergence to the transition from the “Old South” to the
“New South”, characterized by the demise of the traditional cotton economy (Wright,
1986).
Figure 2·2: Convergence between the South and the North
Note: The map shows county-level income as a percent of US average. While per
capita income is used in 2010, median family income is used as a proxy for 1950
due to constraints of data availability.
This line of thoughts posits that the modernization of cotton production drove out
the low-wage labor market from the South and put southern economic growth back on
track. Figure 2.1, however, sheds a different light on this conventional understanding.
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Employing an IV strategy, this section estimates how the long-run impact of cotton
has changed as of the mid-20th century.
2.2.1 Historical Background
The structure of cotton production changed significantly after the Civil War. Follow-
ing the abolition of slavery, southern plantations were reorganized into a variety of
contractual mixtures (Alston and Higgs, 1982). The cotton plantation was divided
into small tenancies which consisted of both black and white tenant families by the
late 19th century (Ransom and Sutch, 1978). Based on the reconstitution of the labor
system, the significance of cotton in the South continued even after the end of slavery.
In spite of slowdown in international demand for US Cotton,3 the share of cotton in
terms of output values ranged consistently from 30 to 40% in the South, as shown
in Figure 2.3. Woodman (1999) summarized this state of affairs as the following:
“When the Civil War ended, King Cotton reascended his throne”.
Figure 2·3: Share of cotton output values in the US South
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Note: The above graph shows the share of cotton in terms of output values among
13 sample states.
3Wright (1974) estimates that the actual level of demand for cotton in 1879 was 49% of what
would have been achieved had its prewar growth rate continued.
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Until the adoption of mechanical pickers in the 1950s, cotton was the most labor-
intensive crop in the South. The prototype of spindle cotton pickers which simulated
the hand-picking process was introduced in 1936. After the first commercial pro-
duction in 1948, its diffusion in the South started in earnest in the 1950s (Heinicke
and Grove, 2003, 2008; Street, 1959). Before the introduction of mechanical pick-
ers, cotton production was characterized by high labor intensity because cotton bolls
were picked by hands. In addition to labor intensity, seasonality was another crucial
property of cotton production. Chopping, hoeing, and picking were the hardest part
of cotton production and these tasks were concentrated during the harvest season.
In the late 1940s, according to Welch and Miley (1950), it took 182 man-hours to
produce one bale of cotton whereas it took 100 hours were for the harvest season.
Seasonality and labor intensity encouraged the prevalence of tenancy on cotton
farms. Farm owners had to secure a stable labor supply in advance for the harvest
season, so a tenancy contract was a more rational option than other forms of contracts
(Alston, 1981; Eswaran and Kotwal, 1985; Alston and Ferrie, 1989). It was attrac-
tive to poor farmers as well because they could engage in cotton production without
owning any agricultural assets or instruments. Cotton tenants’ socioeconomic status
was not upwardly mobile in general, however. Cotton tenants were locked in debt
peonage (Ransom and Sutch, 1978; Wright, 1978, 1986), so individual wealth accu-
mulation was highly constrained. Human capital accumulation was limited as well.
On top of poverty, their opportunity cost of investing in human capital was high due
to labor-intensive cotton production which fully depended on labor of tenant families.
Child labor used for cotton picking was another crucial factor. Because the heights of
cotton bolls and children were similar, productivity of child labor was notably high on
cotton farms. This was reflected by less investment in the human capital of children
at both local and individual levels (Margo, 1990; Baker, 2015). Section 3 discusses
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the human capital structure of cotton farming in more detail.
Figure 2·4: Share of cotton acreage in 1879
Note: Share of cotton acreage is computed among thirteen crops which were re-
ported in the 1880 Census of Agriculture. Not in the sample includes counties
whose cotton acreage was zero or acreage of crop acreage was not available.
Cotton production varied substantially across counties. In terms of the share of
acreage among total crops, Figure 2.4 shows regional variation in cotton production
in the South. Because cotton was a cash crop demanded by national and interna-
tional markets, county-level variation in cotton production is largely accounted for
by supply-side factors. In particular, agro-climatic conditions were a key factor for
local cotton production. In the next section, I suggest an IV strategy exploiting
crop-specific suitability based on agro-climatic conditions.
2.2.2 Data and Instrumental Variable Strategy
I build a rich dataset at the US county-level from various sources. Socio-economic
variables are constructed from the Census of Agriculture, Census of Manufactures,
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Decennial Census of Population and Housing and County Data Books which are digi-
tized by Haines and the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research
(2010), as well as Census microdata provided by the Minnesota Population Center
(2011). Climatic, geographical, and ecological data are obtained from the FAOs
Global Agro-Ecological Zones project (GAEZ) and aggregated at the county-level. In
13 southern states,4 the sample consists of counties which reported positive cotton
acreage in the 1880 Census of Agriculture. Since the 1880 Census of Agriculture
records acreage by crop in 1879, 1879 is the base year. I choose the base year in light
of two factors. First, transition from slavery-based plantation to family-based tenancy
was mostly complete by 1879. Second, this date was before arrival of the boll weevil
which caused fluctuation in cotton production.5 Cross-sectional variation in cotton
acreage was relatively stable in the late 19th- and early 20th centuries, however, so
changing the base year does not affect estimation results significantly. Robustness to
alternative base years is summarized in Appendix A.1.
Using the constructed dataset, I estimate the equation which is
yc = α + βCottonc,1879 + γ1Slavec,1860 + γ
′
2XPre,c + γ
′
3XSE,c + µs + c (2.1)
Cottonc,1879 is the share of cotton acreage which is the variable of interest. Cot-
ton acreage share is computed among the 13 crops whose acreage information was
recorded in the 1880 Census of Agriculture. Because of inconsistency in crop season-
ality, multiple crops could have been planted in the same land and the questionnaire
asks to report the total acres devoted to each crop. In this sense, Cottonc,1879 effec-
4The sample states include Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missis-
sippi, Missouri, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. California was a
major cotton state as well, but is excluded to compare counties which share similar characteristics
in the Southern economy.
5The boll weevil, which entered the United States from Mexico in 1892, is a beetle which destroyed
cotton bolls without any influence on other crops. The causal impact of the boll weevil on cotton
production is discussed in detail in section 3.1.
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tively measures how much local agriculture depended on cotton farming. To estimate
the long-run impact of cotton separately from the history of slavery, the slave-to-
population ratio in 1860 is controlled as well. As shown in Appendix B.3, however,
estimation results hardly change even if the slavery control is excluded. To further
ensure that the results are not confounded by persistence of slavery, I estimate the
long-run impact of sugar- and tobacco specialization as well in Appendix A.3. While
sugar and tobacco were the major plantation crops produced by slavery before the
Civil War, their impact on local development over time is not consistent with that of
cotton.
XPre,c and XSE,c are the vectors of predetermined and initial socioeconomic con-
ditions respectively. Predetermined conditions include climatic (temperature and
rainfall), ecological (land suitability, potential productivity of major crops, terrain
elevation, and terrain altitude) and geographical (distance to coastal line, latitude
and longitude, distance to major ports, and distance to large cities) controls. Initial
socioeconomic conditions consist of urbanization rate, literacy rate, share of black
population, average farm size, and value of farm equipment all measured in 1880.
Though both the XPre,c and XSE,c are controlled to avoid bias from omitted vari-
ables6, inclusion of initial socioeconomic conditions may cause the so-called bad control
problem due to their correlation with cotton production. Thus, interpretation of the
coefficients in the following sections will be based on the specification without initial
socioeconomic conditions. Estimation results with initial socioeconomic conditions
are also reported for robustness. Lastly, µs and c represent state fixed effects and an
6Geo-climatic conditions for cotton production may have direct impact on economic development
through an independent channel. For instance, high suitability for cotton production would reduce
agricultural diversity which can be a negative factor for long-run development (Fiszbein, 2017).
Initial socioeconomic conditions could be confounding factors as well. Share of black population, for
an example, was strongly correlated with cotton production and could have had direct impact on
economic development in the long-run through persistence of racial inequality (Margo, 1990; Margo,
2016).
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error term.
In spite of a large set of controls, omitted variables cannot be fully eliminated.
One example is local institutional characteristics. Ransom and Sutch (1978) argue
that monopolistic power of merchants in credit markets caused overproduction of
cotton in the South. If the monopoly power had generated significant inefficiency of
local economy independently of cotton production, then OLS estimation from equa-
tion 1 would be biased downward. To avoid endogeneity from omitted variables,
I instrument the share of cotton acreage in 1879 by its potential share predicted
from crop-specific suitability (Fiszbein, 2017).7 Construction of the potential share
follows a typical discrete choice model. Suppose a farmer in county c maximizes
piic = βiΠc + uic where piic is the profit from growing crop i and Πc is the vector of
crop-specific suitability. If uic follows the type I extreme value distribution, then the
optimal probability of growing crop i is derived as P [piic > pijc,∀j 6= i] = eβiΠc
1+
∑
j=1 e
βjΠc
.
I interpret the optimal probability of growing crop i as its potential share of acreage.
Then, I estimate
E[θic|Πc] = e
βiΠc
1 +
∑I−1
j=1 e
βjΠc
(2.2)
from a fractional multinomial logit (FML) framework (Papke and Wooldrige, 1996)
where θic represents the share of crop i at county c. A more detailed discussion of the
optimal crop choice with economic interpretation can be found in Appendix E.1. As
Figure 2.5 shows, the estimated potential share of cotton acreage is a strong predictor
of its actual share.8
7The FAO’s GAEZ provides suitability index value for each crop computed by the procedures of
GAEZ Modul V. I use the index value under rain-fed and intermediate input level which are most
consistent to the environment of agricultural production in the late 19th century. Adopting low
input level provides almost identical results as well. County-level aggregate is constructed using GIS
software.
8In addition to crop-specific suitability from the FAO’s GAEZ, temperature and rainfall are also
included as controls in estimation of equation 2. Exclusion of the extra controls reduces first stage
relevance, but the size and direction of the results are robust.
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Figure 2·5: Actual and potential share of cotton acreage in 1879
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2.2.3 Instrumental Variable Estimation Results
Employing log per capita income as an outcome variable at the county level, I estimate
the long-run impact of initial cotton specialization on local economic development.
Because county-level per capita income is not available before 1959, I construct per
capita output as a proxy for per capita income. Per capita output is defined as total
output per population where total output is the sum of farm output values and man-
ufacturing value added. To make sure that the pattern of estimation is not driven by
the change in the outcome variables, I repeat the estimation in Appendix A.2 using
per capita output measures for 1959 and onward as well. All the outcome variables
are harmonized with county boundaries in 1880. The methodology for harmonization
is illustrated in Appendix D.
To address the likelihood of spatial correlation, standard errors are clustered on
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60mi-by-60mi grid squares following the methodology of Bester et al. (2011). Com-
pared to clustering at arbitrary administrative areas, this approach is more consis-
tent with the historical observations that the postbellum South could be divided into
neighboring regions differentiated by economic geography (Wright, 2001). The results
are almost identical to standard errors clustered at state-level with wild cluster boot-
strap (Cameron, Gelbach and Miller, 2008). Using Conley (1999) standard errors
with various distance cutoffs provides similar results.
Table 2.1: The legacy of cotton on economic development
Dependent variable: log of per capita output/income in year t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1920 1940 1959 1980
OLS Estimates
cotton acreage share 1879 0.114 0.272* -0.066 0.113 -0.528*** -0.471*** -0.285*** -0.256***
(0.152) (0.153) (0.165) (0.170) (0.099) (0.092) (0.068) (0.064 )
R2 0.43 0.47 0.44 0.48 0.32 0.45 0.32 0.44
N 714 714 595 595 737 737 737 737
IV Estimates
cotton acreage share 1879 0.524 1.089*** 0.823* 1.042** -0.842*** -0.661*** -0.708*** -0.478***
(0.430) (0.390) (0.487) (0.441) (0.238) (0.222) (0.164) (0.150)
N 714 714 595 595 737 737 737 737
F-stat 62.77 87.41 46.47 65.25 72.12 102.08 72.12 102.08
First stage regression
Predict share of cotton 0.676*** 0.701*** 0.650*** 0.699*** 0.711*** 0.719*** 0.711*** 0.672***
(0.085) (0.075) (0.095) (0.087) (0.084) (0.071) (0.084) (0.071)
R2 0.83 0.85 0.83 0.85 0.84 0.85 0.84 0.85
N 714 714 595 595 737 737 737 737
Predetermined controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Slave to pop ratio 1860 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Socioeconomic controls N Y N Y N Y N Y
State fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered on 60mi-by-60mi grid squares are shown in the parentheses. In columns 1 to
4, per capita output is employed as a proxy for per capita income. Appendix A.2 summarizes robustness of the results
to using per capita output over the whole sample period.
Table 2.1 shows the OLS and IV estimates with two common patterns. First, the
history of cotton farming has had negative impact on local per capita income. Second,
the negative impact is pronounced beginning only in the 1950s and has persisted ever
since. In addition to the flip of the sign, the negative impact of cotton in the later
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20th century was quantitatively significant. According to the IV estimates in columns
5 and 7, an increase of one standard deviation in the share of cotton acreage caused a
19.03% and 15.98% decrease in per capita income in 1959 and 1980 respectively. On
the other hand, the IV estimates for per capita output in 1920 and 1940 are shown
to be positive.9 As Higgs (1978) states that “cottons golden era brought good times to
many people besides farmers,” the positive coefficients could reflect the prosperity of
cotton production which boosted local economy in the first half of the 20th century.
Figure 2·6: Transition in the legacy of cotton: per capita out-
put/income
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Note: X-axis denotes the year in which the dependent variables are measured.
Estimates are from the most preferred specification without initial socioeconomic
conditions.
To see the pattern of transition more clearly, I plot the IV estimates and their
95% confidence intervals over a ten-year period in Figure 2.6. The red line denotes
1948 in which the first commercial production of spindle pickers began. Consistent
with table 2.1, the negative impact of initial cotton specialization is observed only
after cotton mechanization started. Taken together, the results confirm the change in
9Contrary to the IV estimates, the OLS estimates in columns 1-4 are close to zero and less
significant. Two explanations are possible for this. Firstly, IV estimates correct attenuation bias.
Since the share of cotton acreage was measured in a specific year depending on self-reporting,
measurement errors could have caused sizable attenuation bias. More importantly, endogeneity due
to omitted variables are mitigated. For instance, as mentioned in section 2.2, IV estimates could
have wiped out endogeneity from local institutions.
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the impact cotton as of the 1950s. Cotton production supported the local economy
successfully until the mid-20th century, but a sharp change in economic environment
overturned the legacy of cotton fundamentally and irreversibly. In Appendix A.3,
I repeat the estimation using wheat, corn, sugar and tobacco specialization as ex-
planatory variables to ensure that the transition pattern is not found in alternative
crops.
2.3 Human Capital of Cotton Production
“Southern families may have demanded little education because of poverty, ignorance, and
opportunities to employ child labor on farms or in cotton mills.”
- Wright (1987)
This paper argues that mechanization of cotton production, which started in the
1950s, reshaped the legacy of cotton on local development. As a basis for the mecha-
nism, this section investigates two important characteristics of cotton farming: preva-
lence of tenant farming and low human capital of cotton tenants.
Cotton production was strongly dependent on tenant farming due to intensity
and seasonality of labor demand. Cotton was the most labor-intensive crop in US
agricultural history. According to the estimation of Rasmussen (1962) and yield per
acre computed from the Census of Agriculture, 84 man-hours were needed to produce
one acre of cotton while 17 man-hours were sufficient for an acre of wheat. Further-
more, because of the strong seasonality of cotton production, a majority of the labor
demand was required during the harvest season (Welch and Miley, 1950; Whatley,
1987). In this sense, it was crucial for cotton farm owners to secure stable labor
supply for harvesting at the beginning of the year. As “an understandable market
response” (Reid, 1973), tenancy contract was adopted as a solution in the Cotton
South.10 .
10Tenancy contract was mutually beneficial to both sides. Landlords were provided with stable
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Furthermore, cotton tenants were distinguished by their low human capital. Above
all, there was strong selection in the composition of cotton tenants which consisted
of descendants of slaves and poor whites who had no agricultural assets other than
their own labor (Aiken, 2003).11 In addition, cotton tenants had less incentive to
invest in human capital because of the nature of cotton production. First, the high
labor intensity of cotton production increased opportunity cost of investing in human
capital. Second, and more crucially, child labor was notably productive on cotton
farms. Because the heights of cotton bolls and young children were relatively similar-
contrary to adult farmer-cotton picking was not as “back-breaking” work to young
children. Thus, cotton farms during the harvest season were the work fields of chil-
dren. (Baker, 2015; Margo, 1990). Greater intensity of child labor on cotton fields
reinforced the vicious cycle of underinvestment in human capital.
Because there is no data to distinguish cotton tenants from other agricultural
labor, I examine the effects of exogenous variation in cotton production on the com-
position of agricultural labor as an alternative strategy. I estimate the following
equations.
yc,t = βCottonc,t + γ
′Xc,t + θs,t + θc + c,t (2.3)
Cottonc,t = αBWc,t−1 + δ′Xc,t + θs,t + θc + νc,t (2.4)
Cottonc,t is the share of cotton acreage of county c in year t. The equation is estimated
labor supply and tenants were able to engage in production without contributing other than their
own labor (Street, 1959). In contrast, annual wage contract could not be an option due to a conflict of
interests. In view of the principal-agent problem, tenancy contract was a rational choice to minimize
supervision costs and risks of farm owners (Alston, 1981). Furthermore, location of cotton farms in
distance from urban centers increased costs of hiring wage workers (Whatley, 1987).
11Inferior socio-economic background of cotton tenants could have weakened their positions under
the contracts. For instance, Alston and Ferrie (1993) argue that cotton farm owners could success-
fully keep tenants cheap and dependent by providing paternalistic contracts using their political
power.
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for t = 1900, 1910 and 1920 and the sample consists of the Southern counties which
reported positive acreage of cotton at least once in the sample periods.12 θs,t and θc are
state-year and county fixed effects respectively. County-level controls and outcome
variables are constructed from the complete count census data provided by IPUMS-
USA. Detailed definition of the variables can be found in Appendix C.
In spite of a set of controls, variation in the cotton share could be endogenous.
To instrument the share of cotton acreage, I exploit exogenous dissemination of the
boll weevil in the early 20th century. The boll weevil is a kind of beetle which was
significantly destructive to cotton production (Higgs, 1976; Lange et al., 2009; Giesen,
2012). According to the estimation of Lange et al. (2009), the boll weevil infestation
reduced cotton production approximately by 50% within five years. Furthermore, the
narrow diet of the weevil restricted its effects strictly on cotton without any influence
on other crops or livestock (Coakley et al., 1969).
Figure 2·7: Spread of the boll weevil, 1892-1922
Note: 1923 map from U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA).
12The share of cotton acreage is computed from the Census of Agriculture in each decade. Since
the census recorded acreage of each crop in the previous year, Cottonc,t is in practice the share of
cotton in year t− 1.
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Based on the historical context between the boll weevil and cotton production,
I instrument Cottonc,t by BWc,t−1 which is the dummy variable of whether the boll
weevil was present in the previous year in county c.13 BWc,t−1 is imputed from the
first year of the boll weevil’s arrival at county-level digitized by Lange et al. (2009).
The original observation of the weevil’s dissemination comes from the USDA map in
Figure 2.7.
In examining human capital of cotton farming, repeated cross-sectional regres-
sions using the boll weevil has two advantages. First, it estimates the descriptive
characteristics of cotton tenants separately from the history of slavery. By exploiting
decade-to-decade variation in cotton production with county fixed effects, estimation
results illustrate the characteristics of cotton farming in the post-war period. Sec-
ond, the boll weevil IV is preferred to the potential share of cotton which cannot be
estimated in a consistent way across the sample period. Because the kinds of crops
with acreage information vary for the Census of Agriculture in different years, the
potential share of cotton could be measured heterogeneously.
In table 2.2, columns 1 and 2 indicate the prevalence of tenant farming on cotton
fields. Because the census data does not distinguish farm owners and tenants, I de-
fine farmers who rented their housing units as tenants, based on the fact that housing
units of farmers were mostly located within their farms in the early 20th century
(Collins and Margo, 2011). 14 The positive estimates imply that decrease in cotton
13I use the presence of the boll weevil in the previous year since the share of cotton acreage reflects
extensive margin determined at the beginning of the year. In other words, BWc,t−1 captures the
environment faced by farmers before their decision making.
14In the 1920 census in the sample states, for instance, 95.11% of housing units whose householders
were farmers were located within farms. Considering underdeveloped transportation system in the
early 20th century, it is reasonable to infer that ownership of dwelling was practically equivalent to
farm ownership. For instance, the total number of vehicle registrations in 1900 in the sample states
was merely 750. Though the number increased significantly to 1,643,668 in 1920 (Highway Statistics
Summary to 1995, Federal Highway Administration), the vehicle to population ratio remained low at
0.05. Moreover, in that most vehicles were owned by urban residents, it is an acceptable conjecture
that commuter vehicles hardly existed in the rural southern areas.
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production due to the weevil reduced the share of tenant farmers. Descriptively, the
results show that tenant farming was more prevalent on cotton fields than other crop
fields.
Table 2.2: Cotton specialization and prevalence of tenant farming
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable
share of
tenant farmers
avg literacy
adult tenant farmers
% children of
tenant farmers
working on farms
Cotton acreage share 0.168*** 0.167*** -0.365** -0.420** 0.628*** 0.660***
(0.060) (0.061) (0.170) (0.175) (0.188) (0.192)
Additional controls
dd Urbanization rate - -0.034*** - -0.105*** - 0.136***
- (0.010) - (0.037) - (0.042)
dd Share of Mfg workers in the total pop - -0.232*** -0.060 - 0.135
- (0.078) - (0.254) - (0.263)
dd Share of black population - 0.061** - -0.227*** - 0.037
- (0.031) - (0.061) - (0.083)
Number of counties 741 741 741 741 741 741
Number of observations 2223 2223 2223 2223 2223 2223
F-stat 11.64 11.66 12.77 11.64 11.66 12.77
OLS estimates 0.064*** 0.055*** -0.043 -0.035 0.163*** 0.159***
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered on 60mi-by-60mi grid squares are shown in the parentheses. Share of tenant farmers is defined
as the number of tenant farmers divided by the total number of farmers and farm laborers. The sample consists of respondents aged
10 to 70. Average literacy is computed from adult tenant farmers aged 25 to 70. The sample of columns 5-6 consists of children aged
8-15. All samples are balanced.
Moreover, cotton tenants had lower human capital than other farm labor. The
second outcome variable measures the average literacy of adult tenant farmers aged 25
to 70. Because the sample includes all tenant farmers of cotton and non-cotton crops,
the negative coefficients suggest that cotton tenants were less likely to be literate than
non-cotton tenant farmers by 40%. The large size of the coefficients is consistent with
significant variation of the adult literacy rate across counties. According to column
3, one standard deviation increase in the cotton share induced 0.6 standard deviation
decrease in the literacy variable. Using the same sample of tenant families, I compute
the percentage of children aged 8 to 15 who worked on farms. The positive coefficients
in columns 5 and 6 indicate that child labor was more common on the cotton fields.15
15In addition to geographical sorting of agricultural labor due to the weevil, sectoral reallocation
within counties could affect the estimates for child labor if cotton tenant families reallocated to less
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Both results are almost identical when using the sample of whole farm households.
In sum, the results confirm the low human capital of cotton tenants which echoes
“unskill-intensity” of cotton production (Street, 1955).
2.4 Mechanism: Mechanization, Labor Push, and Structural
Change
In Section 2, I show that the negative relationship between initial cotton specializa-
tion and local development started from the second half of the 20th century. This
section argues that cotton mechanization, which began in the South in the 1950s,
caused the negative legacy of cotton. The mechanism consists broadly of three parts.
First, as section 3 demonstrates, cotton farming depended on tenant farmers with low
human capital. Second, mechanization from the 1950s caused reallocation of cotton
tenants to manufacturing.16 Lastly, the inflow of cotton tenants reduced manufactur-
ing productivity persistently through two channels: composition effects and directed
technical change.
2.4.1 A Simple Two-Sector Model
To summarize the mechanism in a simple framework, I offer a two-sector model with
endogenous choice of technology in manufacturing. A comparative statics analysis
shows that cotton mechanization induces reallocation of unskilled labor out of agri-
culture, which causes decline in demand for skills in manufacturing.
The Model Setup
This section considers a local economy with agricultural and manufacturing sectors
child-labor-intensive sectors. In any cases, the positive estimates support strong reliance of cotton
production on child labor.
16Out-migration was not a feasible alternative to most cotton tenants since they could not afford
high migration costs. Moreover, there low human capital limited expected benefits from migration.
Details are discussed in Appendix B.1.
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which are open to free trade. Agricultural land consists of a continuum of farms by
separate owners. The amount of land is normalized to one. Given a unit of land, each
farm j can choose to grow cotton, Ycj = K
αc
cj L
1−αc
cj or other crops, Yoj = K
αo
oj H
1−αo
oj .
L,H and K are unskilled labor, skilled labor and physical capital respectively. The
difference in skill requirement reflects the “unskill intensity” of cotton production as
shown in section 3. The results do not change even if each crop is produced by both
types of labor as long as cotton production is more unskill-intensive. In addition,
αc < αo which denotes low capital intensity in cotton production.
17
Owners of cotton farms have monopsony power as the labor supply of cotton ten-
ants were relatively inelastic. First, cotton tenants were provided all the tools and
assets required for farming except their own labor. Second, they relied on non-wage
benefits provided by landowners (Alston and Ferrie, 1985, 1989, 1993). Lastly, in-
stitutional constraints existed in the South which restricted occupational mobility of
tenant farmers (Roback, 1984; Naidu, 2010). Furthermore, because local dependence
on cotton economy increased the political power of the planters and their ability to
provide paternalistic benefits (Ransom and Sutch, 1978; Alston and Ferrie, 1985,
1989), the elasticity of labor supply on cotton farms is assumed to be decreasing in
the share of cotton acreage.
Under symmetry of farms, total agricultural production becomes YA = sK
αc
c L
1−αc
c +
(1−s)Kαoo H1−αoo where s is the share of cotton acreage. In line with the instrumental
variable strategy, the share of cotton acreage is considered to be a parameter deter-
mined by crop-specific suitability. Appendix E.1 discusses endogenous crop choice.
Manufacturing production is given by YM = K
1−β
M (A
ρ
LL
ρ
M + A
ρ
HH
ρ
M)
β
ρ . The la-
bor input is a CES aggregate of skilled and unskilled labor with the elasticity of
substitution 1/(1 − ρ). AL and AH are unskill- and skill augmenting technologies.
17The differences in skill requirement and labor intensity were correlated each other as briefly
discussed in section 3. However, this model considers the properties of cotton production as a given
condition and focuses on how they affect the consequences of mechanization.
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Following Caselli and Coleman (2006), AL and AH are chosen from a menu of pro-
duction technologies AωL+A
ω
H = B. ω and B are strictly positive parameters where B
is the technology frontier faced by local manufacturers and ω reflects a trade-off from
choice of technology. In other words, local manufacturers in the cotton South choose
an optimal set of technologies available from the national economy. For instance, a
manufacturer abundant in cheap unskilled labor would rely more on assembly-line
production manned by unskilled workers to maximize profitability.
The total amount of unskilled and skilled labor in the economy is given by L and
H. While the fixed labor supply reflects costly spatial mobility of labor across coun-
ties, allowing partial spatial mobility of labor does not affect the qualitative results
because implications of the model come from changes in the price of labor. Physical
capital K is fully mobile at a rental rate r set nationally. All the inputs are mobile
across sectors.
Equilibrium
Before analyzing the consequences of cotton mechanization, I first derive equi-
librium conditions of the model. Appendix E.2 contains proofs omitted from the
text. From the agricultural sector, the unskilled wage is determined as wL =
η
η+1
(1−
αc)(
αc
r
)
αc
1−αc where η is the elasticity of unskilled labor supply on cotton farms.18 As
described in the model setup, η is a decreasing function of the share of cotton acreage.
In other words, monopsony power of an individual cotton farm increases in the aggre-
gate cotton share. If the cotton share is zero, then η = ∞ implying the competitive
labor market. In the same way, wH = (1 − αo)(αor )
αo
1−αo is derived independently
of cotton production. Given wL and wH , profit maximization in the manufacturing
sector leads to
18Cotton landowners maximizes Y (Lc) − wL(Lc)L − rK. Then MPL = wL + ∂wL∂  Lc Lc = wL(1 +
1/wLLc
∂Lc
wL
) = wL(1 +
1
η ) is derived which tells that unskilled labor on cotton farms is paid less than
its marginal productivity discounted by ηη+1
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LM/HM = (wH/wL)
ω−ρ
ω(1−ρ)−ρ and AL/AH = (LM/HM)
ρ
ω−ρ .
Combined with the constraint of technology frontier AωL+A
ω
H = B, the optimal choice
of technology is derived as
AL = B
1
ω
[
1 +
(
wL
wH
) ρω
ω(1−ρ)−ρ
]− 1
ω
and AH = B
1
ω
[
1 +
(
wH
wL
) ρω
ω(1−ρ)−ρ
]− 1
ω
.
This implies that, conditional on the technology frontier B, profit maximization of
manufacturers leads to higher demand for cheaper labor and more intensive use of the
relevant technology.19 Lastly, since K is fully mobile across the sectors and regions,
the optimality conditions only determine the wages and the ratios of production in-
puts. To close the model, I assume that H¯M units of skilled labor are employed in
manufacturing following their comparative advantages.20 Exogenous supply of HM
simplifies the analysis to be focused on the reallocation of unskilled labor, which is
the core of the mechanism. Given H¯M , the remaining labor and capital inputs are de-
termined automatically by the optimality conditions and market clearing conditions.
Cotton Mechanization: Comparative Statics
Cotton mechanization is represented by increase in αc which implies greater (lower)
intensity of capital (labor) in cotton production. As long as the rental rate of capital
is sufficiently high, cotton mechanization reduces unskilled wage wL in agriculture
(∂wL
∂αc
< 0) since return to labor on cotton farms declines.21 Following the decrease
19This relies on the assumption ω > ρ/(1 − ρ) which means sufficient trade-off between AL and
AH . In literature, the elasticity of substitution 1/(1− ρ) is estimated to be ranged from 1.4 to 1.8
(Katz and Murphy, 1992; Krusell et al., 2000; Goldin and Katz, 2009). According to the estimated
range of ρ, linear trade-off between AL and AH (ω >= 1) satisfies the condition sufficiently.
20In other words, skilled workers differ by their efficiency of human capital in each sector. For
instance, one can assume that a skilled labor i supplies hi = h× zki units of human capital in sector
k where zki ∈ {1, q} is drawn from an exogenous distribution with q > 1.
21Cotton mechanization affects return to labor in two opposite directions. First, decrease in labor
intensity reduces marginal productivity of labor directly. On the other hand, increase in marginal
productivity of capital can support labor productivity through complementarity between labor and
capital. If capital is sufficiently affordable in the market, then the latter impact would dominate
the former. In Appendix E.2, I show that r > 1 is a sufficient condition that cotton mechanization
reduces wL.
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in their return on cotton farms, unskilled workers are displaced from agriculture and
absorbed by manufacturing. This is easily shown from LM = H¯M(wH/wL)
ω−ρ
ω(1−ρ)−ρ
which is a decreasing function of wL. Furthermore, this induces more intensive use of
unskilled-complementary technology. The equilibrium condition implies that reduced
cost of unskilled labor increases profitability of choosing AL. Lastly, the impact of
cotton mechanization increases in the aggregate share of cotton acreage. The con-
sequences of cotton mechanization arise from decline in return to labor on cotton
farms. Since higher cotton share is associated with greater profits from unskilled
labor through monopsony power, the impact of cotton mechanization via return to
labor increases in the cotton share ( ∂
2wL
∂s∂αc
< 0 and ∂
2LM
∂s∂αc
, ∂
2AL
∂s∂αc
> 0).
2.4.2 Cotton Mechanization and Structural Change
“the South is becoming industrialized at a pace we must all admire.”
- John F. Kennedy (1954)
“· · · the number of mechanical harvester is increasing rapidly.· · · the displaced population
will have to be taken care of by a fuller utilization of Southern industrial resources.”
- Fite (1950)
This section examines the impact of cotton mehcanization on sectoral reallocation
of labor. Adoption of mechanical cotton pickers had two significant implications for
cotton production: reduction in intensity and seasonality of labor demand. As a
result, the mechanization of cotton production displaced many cotton tenants who
were absorbed by local manufacturing.
As a first step, I estimate the progress of cotton mechanization in the 1950s in
relation to the cotton share. Despite extensive historical evidence on cotton mech-
anization in the South (Musoke, 1981; Whatley, 1987; Heinicke and Grove, 2003,
2008), county-level data on mechanical cotton pickers is not available. Alternatively,
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I use the data of tractorization which is an effective proxy for adoption of mechanical
cotton pickers.
The strong relationship between tractor use and cotton mechanization comes from
unique features of cotton production. Until the introduction of mechanical pickers,
tractorization on cotton farms lagged behind other crops due to strong seasonality.
As the majority of labor was demanded during the harvest season for chopping and
picking cotton bolls by hands, labor-saving by tractors was highly limited on cotton
farms (Whatley, 1987). In this context, cultivation and harvesting of cotton produc-
tion were called the “twin bottlenecks” of complete mechanization (Street, 1955). On
the other hand, non-cotton crops could be tractorized earlier thanks to the efficiency
of tractors both in harvest and pre-harvest seasons. (Fite, 1950).
Figure 2·8: Tractorization in cotton and non-cotton states
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Note: The figure is drawn from 30 eastern states. Y-axis denote the number of
tractors per farm acre.
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By reducing seasonality of labor demand, adoption of cotton pickers accelerated
tractor use on cotton farms. Figure 2.8 shows a suggestive pattern: tractor use in
cotton states caught up with non-cotton states notably faster as of the 1950s. Based
on the unique patterns of tractorization on cotton farms, I estimate if higher cotton
share was followed by greater mechanization in the 1950s.
Table 2.3: The pace of mechanization in the cotton counties
Dependent variable: ∆ the number of tractors per acre between
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1940− 1945 1945− 1954
cotton acreage share 1879 -0.376 -0.207 0.228 0.269*
(0.229) (0.181) (0.172) (0.152)
N 741 741 742 742
F-stat 70.72 101.35 70.71 101.34
Predetermined controls Y Y Y Y
Slave to pop ratio 1860 Y Y Y Y
Socioeconomic controls N Y N Y
State fixed effect Y Y Y Y
Notes: The estimates are standardized coefficients. Robust standard errors clus-
tered on 60mi-by-60mi grid squares are shown in the parentheses
The estimation results are summarized in Table 2.3. The outcome variables are
changes in the number of tractors per farm acre computed from the Census of Agri-
culture. While comparisons between the 1940s and the 1950s fits the timing of the
mechanism more precisely, the number of tractors is computed only for 1940, 1945
and 1954 due to data availability. Taking into account an upward trend in tractor
use in agriculture, the negative coefficients in columns 1 and 2 are interpreted as a
consequence of “the bottlenecks” which impeded tractorization on cotton farms. In
contrast, columns 3 and 4 show greater increase in the use of tractors on cotton farms
beginning in the 1950s. Unless mechanization of cotton production hindered trac-
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tor use for other crops, the positive estimates suggest adoption of mechanical cotton
pickers followed by tractor use.
Adoption of mechanical cotton pickers resolved intensity and seasonality of labor
demand which facilitated the prevalence of tenancy on cotton farms. Accordingly, cot-
ton mechanization was followed by sizable displacement of cotton tenants who were
replaced by machines. In the words of Day (1967), “Mechanization was introduced
in stages, first affecting land preparation and cultivation as tractor power displaced
mules · · · finally harvesting as mechanical cotton pickers replaced the sharecroppers
and his family.”. 22
Given the consequences of cotton mechanization, counties with high cotton share
are expected to have displaced more tenant farmers. Because individual-level data of
farmers is not available at the county-level after 1940, I construct two proxy outcome
variables: changes in the share of tenant farms and the share of tenant acres. The
share of tenant farms (acres) is defined as the number of farms (acres) operated by
tenants divided by the total number of farms (acres). The variables are constructed
from decennial Census of Agriculture.
The IV estimates in Table 2.4 present how dependence on tenant farmers has
changed over time in relation to the history of cotton. In both panels, the estimates
show that higher dependence on cotton farming induced greater displacement of ten-
ant farmers as of the 1950s. As cotton mechanization in the South continued until
mid 1960s (Heinicke and Grove, 2003, 2008), the negative coefficients are observed in
the 1960s as well. Small and less significant estimates in columns 1 to 4 imply there
was no pre-trend in the impact of initial cotton share before the mechanization.
22Wright (1987) summarizes the consequence of cotton mechanization that “the development of
a successful mechanical harvester by 1950 · · · generated a decline of one million farm operators
between 1950 and 1959”. However, such interpretation about the consequence of labor push is
opposite to this paper. While the author infers that the decline in agricultural employment did not
provide manpower to southern industries due to local labor policies, evidence in section 4 of this
paper suggest labor reallocation from cotton fields to manufacturing within counties.
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Table 2.4: Displacement of tenant farmers in the cotton counties as
of the 1950s
Dependent variable: changes in the share of tenant farms between
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1930− 1940 1940− 1950 1950− 1960 1960− 1970
cotton acreage share 1879 -0.077 -0.074 -0.060 -0.064 -0.312*** -0.260*** -0.409*** -0.358***
(0.051) (0.048) (0.057) (0.056) (0.048) (0.046) (0.068) (0.071)
N 744 744 744 744 744 744 744 744
F-stat 71.08 101.64 71.08 101.64 71.08 101.64 71.08 101.64
Dependent variable: changes in the share of tenant farm acres between
1930− 1940 1940− 1950 1950− 1960 1960− 1970
cotton acreage share 1879 -0.091 -0.161* 0.069 -0.037 -0.572*** -0.487*** -0.226*** -0.182***
(0.097) (0.083) (0.059) (0.059) (0.093) (0.089) (0.068) (0.062)
N 744 744 744 744 744 744 744 744
F-stat 71.08 101.64 71.08 101.64 71.08 101.64 71.08 101.64
Predetermined controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Slave to pop ratio 1860 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Socioeconomic controls N Y N Y N Y N Y
State fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered on 60mi-by-60mi grid squares are shown in the parentheses. The share of tenant farms
(acres) is defined as the number of farms (acres) operated by tenants divided by the total number of farms (acres). Changes in the
share is computed from the share in each decade harmonized with 1880 county boundaries.
As a result of the labor push, cotton mechanization resulted in expansion of man-
ufacturing. Table 2.5 shows the labor push and consequential structural change at
the aggregate level. The outcome variables measure the growth rates of total farm
operators, total manufacturing employment, total unemployment and total popula-
tion.23 The first panel shows that in counties with greater legacy of cotton, there
was larger decrease in agricultural employment in the 1950s which was followed by
expansion of manufacturing employment.24
23Total population and total unemployment are from decennial census data. Total number of
farm operators and total manufacturing employment are obtained from Census of Agriculture and
County Data books respectively.
24The growth of total manufacturing employment is computed between 1954 and 1963, to maintain
consistency of the manufacturing data used in panel 2.
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Table 2.5: Sectoral labor reallocation after cotton mechanization
Dependent variable: 1950-1960 growth rate of
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Total
Farm operators
Total Employment
in Manufacturing
Total
Unemployment
Total
Population
cotton acreage share 1879 -0.312** -0.329** 0.642*** 0.755*** 0.360* 0.257 0.034 0.192
(0.158) (0.148) (0.242) (0.252) (0.196) (0.194) (0.375) (0.383)
N 742 742 721 721 742 742 742 742
F-stat 70.71 101.34 67.91 98.75 70.71 101.34 70.71 101.34
Dependent variable: 1940-1950 growth rate of
Total
Farm operators
Total Employment
in Manufacturing
Total
Unemployment
Total
Population
cotton acreage share 1879 0.037 0.006 -0.146 -0.153 0.284 0.323* -0.118 -0.049
(0.248) (0.265) (0.197) (0.224) (0.202) (0.194) (0.193) (0.177)
N 742 742 691 691 742 742 742 742
F-stat 70.71 101.34 66.43 99.84 70.71 101.34 70.71 101.34
Predetermined controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Slave to pop ratio 1860 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Socioeconomic controls N Y N Y N Y N Y
State fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Estimates shown in the table are standardized coefficients. Robust standard errors clustered on 60mi-by-60mi grid
squares are shown in the parentheses. Growth rates are computed from the level of variables in each decade harmonized with
1880 county boundaries. Establishments of textile, food and tobacco and stone, clay and glass products are classified into low-skill
and high-skill establishment consist of metal and chemical industries.
Moreover, increase in total unemployment and stable population suggest that
displaced cotton tenants reallocated across sectors within counties. In other words,
displacement of cotton tenants did not cause significant out-migration. The insignif-
icant relationship between cotton mechanization and out-migration could be a result
of two factors: high migration costs, which was not affordable to most cotton tenant
families, and their low human capital which reduced potential benefits from migra-
tion (Margo, 1990; Tolnay, 1988). In Appendix B.1, I show that the impact of cotton
mechanization on migration was small using the data of estimated net migration
rates from Bowles et al. (1977). Lastly, the second panel confirms that, before cotton
mechanization, there was no pre-trend of sectoral labor reallocation in relation to the
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cotton share.25
Table 2.6: Growth of manufacturing establishments after cotton
mechanization
Dependent variable: 1954-1963 growth rate of
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Mfg Estab
Total
Mfg Estab
Textile
Mfg Estab
Low-skill
Mfg Estab
Low-skill
(w/o textile)
Mfg Estab
High-skill
cotton acreage share 1879 0.525** 0.512** 0.401** 0.365** 0.737*** 0.690*** 0.368** 0.311* -0.400** -0.451***
(0.208) (0.218) (0.175) (0.173) (0.201) (0.210) (0.175) (0.187) (0.166) (0.173)
N 744 744 742 742 742 742 742 742 742 742
F-stat 71.08 101.64 70.71 101.34 70.71 101.34 70.71 101.34 70.71 101.34
Predetermined controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Slave to pop ratio 1860 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Socioeconomic controls N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y
State fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Estimates shown in the table are standardized coefficients. Robust standard errors clustered on 60mi-by-60mi grid squares are shown in the
parentheses. Growth rates are computed from the level of variables in each decade harmonized with 1880 county boundaries. Establishments of textile,
food and tobacco and stone, clay and glass products are classified into low-skill and high-skill establishment consist of metal and chemical industries.
Table 2.6 presents expansion of local manufacturing in terms of the number of
establishments, with heterogeneous impacts on low- and high-skill industries.26 Stan-
dardized coefficients are shown in the table. As in columns 1 to 4, cotton mechaniza-
tion was followed by growth in the number of manufacturing establishments which is
partially attributable to the growth of textile industries.27 The impact of cotton mech-
anization, however, was heterogeneous across industries. Aggregating the number of
establishments by industrial skill-level, the results show that cotton mechanization
impeded growth of high-skill industries (metal-related; chemical-related) contrary to
25While the estimates are not statistically significant, the second panel indicates slower growth in
manufacturing employment in the 1940s in relation to the initial cotton share, which was accompa-
nied by growing unemployment and less population growth. These patterns could be a result of the
prevalence of textile industries. If World War II caused a negative demand shock on textile products
due to higher demand for war-related industries, a positive correlation between cotton specialization
and the prevalence of textile industries could produce these results.
26The variables are computed from County Data Books in 1956 and in 1967 which record the
number of establishments with more than or equal to 20 employees for each industry. Because
industrial classification in 1954 is more refined, I follow industrial classification in 1963 to compute
the growth rates.
27I apply two adjustments to the case of zero establishments in 1954. If no establishments both
existed in 1954 and in 1963, I set the growth as zero. If positive number of establishments in existed
1963 but none in 1954, I assign the maximum growth rate among the other observations.
88
faster expansion of low-skill industries (textile; food and tobacco; stone, clay and
glass products). On top of the expansion of overall manufacturing, this suggests that
the inflow of cotton tenants hindered growth of industries which require high-skill
technologies. In section 4.3.3, I examine decline in demand for skills in more detail.
2.4.3 Structural Change and Industrial Productivity
“Cheaper labor is dear labor.”
- Mokyr(1991)
“Cheaper labor has fewer advantages of production, and this is precisely why it is cheap
labor.”
- Palmer(1894)
Empirical evidence so far indicates that cotton mechanization induced manufactur-
ing growth through sectoral reallocation of cotton tenants. This section shows that,
contrary to conventional notions, the consequences of the structural change was not
beneficial to local industrial productivity.28 The mechanism is based on the charac-
teristics of displaced cotton tenants. First, the inflow of cheaper29 but less productive
cotton tenants changed the composition of manufacturing workers in a negative way.
Second, an increase in the supply of cheaper unskilled labor induced directed technical
change which reduced demand for skilled labor in the long-run.
28I do not exclude inter-sectoral impact on other non-agricultural sectors. The focus on the
manufacturing sector is due to the availability of data for measuring productivity, but it is acceptable
to infer that similar inter-sectoral mechanism could have been effective in other sectors as well.
Significant decrease in per capita income as of the 1950s in Figure 2.6 can be interpreted as its
circumstantial evidence.
29Displacement from cotton farms was equivalent to total loss of livelihood to tenant families.
As they were left with little income, wealth or alternative opportunities, their reservation wages
could not but have been lower than comparable workers. In addition, according to Alston and
Ferrie(1993), tenant families on cotton farms were strongly reliant on paternalistic contracts instead
of institutional welfare system. This implies that there was little safety net available to displaced
cotton tenants.
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Decline in Manufacturing Productivity
To begin, I estimate the negative impact of cotton on manufacturing productivity
in the wake of mechanization. To measure labor productivity in the manufactur-
ing sector, I construct two outcome variables from the Census of Manufactures: per
production worker value-added and average wage of production workers. The value-
added per production worker is defined as total value added in manufacturing divided
by average annual number of production workers. Similarly, I divide total expendi-
ture for manufacturing production wages by the man hours of production workers to
obtain average wage.30
Table 2.7 shows the negative impact of the cotton on manufacturing productivity
exclusively after cotton mechanization. The negative estimates in columns 5 to 8
indicate decreases in average and marginal labor productivity in manufacturing as
of cotton mechanization. Furthermore, the inter-sectoral impact has been persistent
in the long-run. According to the specification without initial socioeconomic condi-
tions, one standard deviation increase in the cotton share caused a 30.41% decrease
in the value added per production worker in 1958. In 1982, the magnitude of the
impact became even larger: 31.98%. The estimates on the wage variable show similar
magnitude and patterns as well. Taken together, as illustrated in Figure 2.9, the
results support the negative impact of cotton on manufacturing productivity as a
consequence of cotton mechanization.
30Since man-hours of production workers are not available before 1958, I employ the number of
production workers as a denominator for earlier periods. However, the estimation results are robust
to using the number of workers as denominator for the entire period.
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Table 2.7: Cotton specialization and manufacturing productivity
Dependent variable: log of per worker manufacturing value added
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1920 1940 1958 1982
cotton acreage share 1879 -0.052 0.227 -0.278 -0.261 -1.470*** -1.343*** -1.560*** -1.101**
(0.465) (0.396) (0.391) (0.383) (0.446) (0.389) (0.526) (0.456)
N 714 714 595 595 676 676 651 651
F-stat 62.77 87.41 46.47 65.25 67.00 100.09 68.41 91.42
Dependent variable: log of manufacturing wage, production workers
1920 1940 1958 1982
cotton acreage share 1879 -0.072 -0.055 0.258 0.285 -0.581** -0.445** -0.869*** -0.555**
(0.219) (0.215) (0.268) (0.251) (0.228) (0.204) (0.238) (0.234)
N 714 714 595 595 676 676 657 657
F-stat 62.77 87.41 46.47 65.25 67.00 100.09 70.27 93.46
Predetermined controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Slave to pop ratio 1860 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Socioeconomic controls N Y N Y N Y N Y
State fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered on 60mi-by-60mi grid squares are shown in the parentheses.
World War II is a potential confounder of the mechanism. Since a significant
amount of investment was made on southern industries during the war (Fishback and
Cullen, 2013), the results might not reflect the proposed mechanism but instead be
a result of war spending. If greater share of cotton had induced industrial environ-
ments attracting less war spending, then it could have reduced labor productivity in
manufacturing independently of cotton mechanization. For instance, higher cotton
share could have expanded textile industries which were not suitable for wartime in-
vestment.
However, the timing of evidence does not match the hypothesis. While mili-
tary spending peaked in 1944 and receded markedly by 1950,31 the negative impact
of cotton on manufacturing productivity is not observed before the 1950s. More-
31In 1944, military outlays accounted for 35 percent of GDP and it fell to 5 percent by 1950. Given
that war dollars were concentrated on the most urbanized counties, significance of war spending on
local economy would have been even lower in the southern cotton counties.
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over, literature points out that war-related spending had limited impact on postwar
productivity growth (Fishback and Cullen, 2013; Fishback and Jaworski, 2016, Ja-
worski, 2017). Appendix B.2 shows that filtering out variation in wartime investment
strengthens the mechanism of cotton mechanization.
Figure 2·9: Transition in the legacy of cotton: manufacturing pro-
ductivity
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Estimates are from the most preferred specification without initial socioeconomic
conditions.
Changes in the Composition of Unskilled Labor
Sections 4.2 and 4.3.1 reveal that manufacturing growth after cotton mechanization
was followed by decline in manufacturing productivity. In this section, I argue that
the decline in manufacturing productivity is partially attributable to compositional
changes in manufacturing workers.
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To estimate how cotton mechanization affected the structure of manufacturing
workers, I utilize the complete count census data in 1940 and 5% sample in the
1960 census. Because the county of residence is not available in 1960 census, I use
PUMAMINI as a geographical unit of analysis. PUMAMINI is built from Census
tracts to have a population of 50,000 or more and exists only for the 1960 5% sample.
For consistency of analyses, I harmonize county-level variables in 1880 and 1940 with
PUMAMINI boundaries.
Based on three-digit occupational classification provided by IPUMS-USA,32 I fo-
cus on the occupation “laborers” which refers to production workers without involving
any specific skills. In that displaced cotton tenants had neither skill nor experience in
the manufacturing sector, this fits the definition of unskilled jobs which were poten-
tially available to them. The results are robust to using workers whose skill intensity
is lower than or equal to “laborers” as a sample.33 Taking the sample of laborers aged
20 to 70 in the manufacturing sector, I compare how the structure of laborers in man-
ufacturing changed between 1940 and 1960. In consideration of the larger average size
of PUMAMINI than that of county, standard errors are clustered on 150-square-mile
grid squares.
Table 2.8 supports that there was an inflow of cotton tenants into manufacturing
jobs. The first outcome variable measures changes in average educational attainment
of manufacturing laborers. As the mechanism predicts, columns 1 and 2 show that
higher cotton share led to less educational level of laborers after cotton mechanization.
The result is interpreted that cotton tenants, who were less educated than existing
unskilled labor in manufacturing, were employed as laborers and therefore reduced
average educational attainment. According to the specification without initial socioe-
32I use OCC1950 variable which applies occupational classification in the 1950 Census Bureau to
different years for comparability.
33Skill intensity of occupations is measured by EDSCOR50 variable which indicates the share of
workers in each occupational category who had completed at least one year of college.
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conomic conditions, one standard deviation increase in the cotton share caused 0.38
standard deviation decrease in average education of unskilled labor following cotton
mechanization.
Table 2.8: Compositional changes in manufacturing laborers 1940-
1960
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆average edu of
mfg laborers
∆rel shr of blacks
in mfg laborers*
∆share of females
in mfg laborers
∆share of migrants
in mfg laborers
cotton acreage share 1879 -2.470*** -3.120*** 0.319* 0.320* 0.393** 0.501** -0.287** -0.256**
(0.913) (1.016) (0.180) (0.183) (0.194) (0.218) (0.127) (0.121)
N 314 314 304 304 314 314 314 314
F-stat 26.85 26.13 26.51 25.56 26.85 26.13 26.85 26.13
Predetermined controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Slave to pop ratio 1860 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Socioeconomic controls N Y N Y N Y N Y
State fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered on 150mi-by-150mi grid squares are shown in the parentheses. County-level observations in
1940 are harmonized to PUMAMINI boundaries.
* Relative share of blacks is defined as the share of blacks in manufacturing laborers less the share of black in farmers. Because
the cotton share was positively related to share of black population in all the sectors, changes in the relative share of black workers
captures the reallocation of labor more effectively. Detailed definition of the variables in the table can be found in Appendix C.
The sectoral reallocation of cotton tenants is further supported by demographic
changes. The outcome variable for columns 3 and 4 is the relative share of black
manufacturing laborers. The relative share is defined as the share of black manu-
facturing laborers less the share of blacks in farmers. Thus, considering a relatively
higher share of blacks in cotton tenants, the positive estimates can be interpreted as
a reallocation of cotton tenants from farms to manufacturing. Similarly, columns 5
and 6 show greater entry of females into manufacturing laborers. This supports the
inflow of cotton tenant families who were strongly dependent on female labor (Wright,
1986; Bloome et al., 2017). Since they were left with little economic wealth and were
paid less in the labor market, females of the displaced tenant families would have
had higher needs for labor force participation. Lastly, following cotton mechaniza-
tion, the share of migrant laborers declined in the manufacturing sector. Since cotton
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mechanization created extra supply of unskilled labor within county, manufacturing
employers relied less on external source of unskilled labor.34
Directed Technical Change: Decline in Demand for Skills
The composition effects, however, are not sufficient to explain the persistent decline
in manufacturing productivity. For instance, gradual migration across counties could
have induced equilibration of national labor market (Kim, 1998; Rosenbloom and
Sundstrom, 2004). Alternatively, manufacturing producers could have dismissed for-
mer cotton tenants if they were too less productive. To explain the lasting impact
of cotton on manufacturing productivity, I suggest another channel in the context of
directed technical change.
This section argues that the inflow of cotton tenants reduced demand for skills in
manufacturing. Changes in the supply of endowment can induce technical change.
Theories of directed technical change predict that, given sufficient elasticity of sub-
stitution, technical change will be biased toward more abundant factors (Acemoglu,
1998, 2002). Empirical evidence of directed technical change is widely observed from
country-level (Caselli et al, 2006) to local labor markets (Acemoglu and Restrepo,
2018; Carneiro et al, 2014). Lewis (2011) and Clemens et al. (2017) find that lo-
cal labor markets responded to immigration shocks by adjusting labor-intensity of
production technologies. An analogous pattern is observed in a historical context as
well. According to Hornbeck and Naidu (2014), counties which were affected by the
Great Mississippi Flood in 1927 developed modernized and capital-intensive agricul-
tural technologies following outflow the of black population.
To measure relative demand for skills in manufacturing, I construct three out-
come variables. First, I decompose college wage premium following Goldin and Katz
34Internal migration as a response to exogenous supply of labor is observed in the context of
immigration as well. Using 1960-2000 census data, Borjas (2006) shows empirically that the inflow
of immigrant workers has been offset by lower in-migration rates within narrow skill groups.
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Equation 5 is derived from the production function Yc = [(AcsSc)
σ−1
σ +(AcuUc)
σ−1
σ ]
σ
σ−1
where U unskilled workers and S skilled workers inelastically supply their labor. c
denotes each geographical unit and σ is the elasticity of substitution between U and
S. As ws/wu and S/U are observed from the data, I can compute the demand shifter
applying σˆ = 1.64 estimated by Goldin and Katz35.
In addition, I estimate return to education of manufacturing workers from the
following standard mincer equation.
lnwcj = βceducj + γc1expcj + γc2exp
2
cj + δ
′Xcj + ucj (2.6)
wcj and educj are log weekly wage and years of schooling of individual j in geo-
graphical unit c36 . expcj is defined as max{0, agecj-6-educj} and Xcj is a vector of
individual controls including the number of children in each household and dummy
variables of black, female, marital status and household head. Lastly, I construct
a variable exploiting industrial distributions. After classifying 19 industries which
existed in 2010 but not in 1960,37 I compute the share of employment in the new
35The authors estimate σ using data from 1915 to 2005 at the national level. Depending on
specifications, estimated values of σ vary but the range is fairly small (1.4,1.84) in line with previous
literature. The decomposition exercise is robust to using different σˆ within the range.
36Since only intervalled educational attainment is available in the 1990 2000 and 2010 samples, I
impute the median values for each interval.
37Industrial classification is based on IND1990 variable which classifies industries from all years
since 1950 into the 1990 Census Bureau industrial classification scheme. In the 2010 ACS 5-year sam-
ple, the manufacturing sector consists of 74 industries among which 19 of them are new industries.
The new industries include: soaps and cosmetics; agricultural chemicals; tires and inner tubes; wood
buildings and mobile homes; primary aluminum industries; metal forgings and stampings; ordnance;
engines and turbines; construction and material handling machinery; metalworking machinery; com-
puters and related equipment; machinery, n.s.; household appliances; radio, TV, and communication
equipment; guided missiles, space vehicles, and parts; cycles and miscellaneous transportation; med-
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industries.
Table 2.9: Initial cotton specialization and demand for skills in man-
ufacturing 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable return to education
share of employment
in new industries ln(As/Au)
cotton acreage share 1879 -0.495*** -0.568** -0.440*** -0.447* -0.378** -0.455**
(0.153) (0.210) (0.153) (0.220) (0.154) (0.210)
N 298 298 298 298 298 298
F-stat 58.99 63.42 58.99 63.42 58.99 63.42
Predetermined controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Slave to pop ratio 1860 Y Y Y Y Y Y
Socioeconomic controls N Y N Y N Y
State fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Estimates shown in the table are standardized coefficients. Robust standard errors clustered on 150mi-
by-150mi grid squares are shown in the parentheses.
Table 2.9 shows that the history of cotton agriculture had negative impact on
skill demands in manufacturing measured in 2010. I use Public Use of Microdata
Area (PUMA) as a geographical unit and standardized coefficients are shown in the
table. Reduction in return to education in columns 1 and 2 indicate that cotton
specialization in the late 19th century caused less demand for educated workers in
manufacturing in the long-run. Similarly, columns 3 and 4 show that initial cotton
specialization hindered the growth of new manufacturing industries, which require
new and high-skill production technologies. Evidence from the college premium de-
composition strengthens the interpretation that the observed results are largely ex-
plained by the demand side.
While Table 2.9 shows the long-run negative impact of cotton on demand for
ical, dental, and optical instrument; toys, amusement, and sporting goods; manufacturing industries,
n.s.. The estimation results are robust to excluding machinery, n.s. and manufacturing industries,
n.s. from new industries.
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skills, it does not necessarily suggest changes in technology over time. To exam-
ine the path of directed technical change, I estimate equation 7 and 8 employing
state-year level variations in policy environments. Conditional on state-level policy
environment encouraging demand for skills, the equations examine how the history
of cotton agriculture impeded the positive policy effects.
ysct = αPolicyst + βCottonc × Policyst + γ′Xsct + θst+ θc + usct (2.7)
Cottonc × Policyst = δIVc × Policyst + η′Xsct + θst+ θc + usct (2.8)
The sample consists of workers aged 16 to 75 in manufacturing from 5% samples
in the 1980, 1990, 2000 census and the 2010 American Community Survey (ACS)
5-year data.38 As a geographical unit, I use CONSPUMA which identifies the most
detailed areas consistently from 1980 through 2011. Policyst is a state-level annual
index of policy innovativeness from Boehmke and Skinner (2012)39 which reflects in-
stitutional environment encouraging demand for skills. The index takes value from 0
to 1, varying significantly across states and years as in figure 2.10. The variable of
interest is Policyst ×Cottonc where Cottonc is the share of cotton acreage in 1879.40
The mechanism predicts β to be negative. Conditional on state-level policy environ-
ment, within-state variation in the cotton share would impede positive effects of the
policies on demand for skills. I control for state-specific time trends θst to control
for linear trends in state-level environment such as skill-biased technical change over
time. Xsct and θc are the vector of time-varying controls and CONSPUMA fixed
38Since a 5% sample is not available in 2010, I employ ACS 2006-2010 5-year data which provides
5-in-100 national random sample. All the results in this section are robust to using a single-year
ACS survey in 2010 which is 1-in-100 national random sample.
39After collecting 189 different policies comparable across states, the authors count the number of
polices which were available to each state in each year. For each year, polices which were adopted
by at least one state but not by state i is defined as “available” to state i. The adoption rate among
the available polices is called an index of policy innovativeness.
40Among the 180 CONSPUMAs within the sample states, 149 CONSPUMAs whose harmonized
cotton share in 1879 is positive are included in the sample.
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effect respectively.
Figure 2·10: State-year level variation in the index of policy environ-
ment
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Note: The index of policy environment is ranged from 0 to 1. Higher value of the
index implies that the state more actively adopted policies encouraging demand for
skills in that year. The index is constructed by Boehmke and Skinner (2012).
Cottonc × Policyst is instrumented by IVc × Policyst where IVc is the poten-
tial share of cotton acreage in 1879. While state-level policy environment could be
endogenous, within-state variation in the potential share of cotton is orthogonal to
state-wise confounders. For instance, previous specialization in high-skill industries
may encourage demand for skilled labor and policies for higher education simultane-
ously, but state-level industrial mix is not correlated with within-state variation in
the potential share of cotton. Thus, the equations causally estimate how the history
of cotton has affected the positive policy effects over time. On the other hand, the co-
efficients of Policyst should not be interpreted causally. Standard errors are clustered
on 200mi-by-200mi grid squares.
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Table 2.10: The long-run impact of cotton on demand for skills in
manufacturing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable return to education
share of employment
in new industries ln(As/Au)
Cotton× State Policy -0.202*** -0.175*** -0.104*** -0.105*** -0.071** -0.061**
(0.057) (0.058) (0.035) (0.032) (0.029) (0.028)
State Policy 0.075 0.054 0.122*** 0.122*** -0.055 -0.072
(0.059) (0.049) (0.035) (0.031) (0.057) (0.065)
Additional controls
dd Share of city population - -0.024 - 0.051 - 0.022
- (0.069) - (0.042) - (0.048)
dd Share of employment in agriculture - -0.123 - -0.025 - 0.025
- (0.181) - (0.035) - (0.077)
dd Share of blacks in Mfg - -0.444*** - -0.004 - -0.301***
- (0.105) - (0.128) - (0.076)
Number of CONSPUMAs 149 149 149 149 148 148
Number of observations 596 596 596 596 592 592
F-stat 502.00 577.15 502.00 577.15 498.59 256.04
Notes: Estimates shown in the table are standardized coefficients. Robust standard errors clustered on 200mi-by-200mi grid squares
are shown in the parentheses. To avoid over-rejection due to few clusters, T distribution with G−1 degrees of freedom is used where
G = 27 is the number of clusters. Share of cotton acreage in 1879 at county level is harmonized with CONSPUMA boundaries.
Table 2.10 shows that initial cotton specialization has impeded policy effects on
demand for skills in manufacturing. Standardized coefficients are shown in the table.
The negative coefficients of Cottonc × INNOVst in columns 1 and 2 indicate that,
conditional on state-level policy environment, additional education was less appreci-
ated in regions with greater legacy of cotton. Correspondingly, while the state-level
policy environment has facilitated growth of new manufacturing industries, the pos-
itive effects declined in relationship with the history of cotton agriculture. The last
columns show consistent results in terms of the demand-side factors of the college
wage premium.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper examines how the long-run impact of cotton agriculture on local devel-
opment has changed in the US South, with an emphasis on negative consequences of
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structural change. Using potential share of cotton acreage as an IV, I first show that
the history of cotton farming had negative effects on long-run development, only as
of the 1950s from time which cotton mechanization started in the US South.
I argue that the mechanization of cotton production caused the transition in the
legacy of cotton. The mechanism broadly consists of two components: low human
capital of cotton farming and structural change triggered by cotton mechanization.
Using an exogenous shock to cotton production-the boll weevil infestation-I show
that cotton tenants in the early 20th century possessed less human capital than av-
erage farm labor. As a result of cotton mechanization, cotton tenants with little
human capital were displaced and absorbed into the manufacturing sector. Sectoral
labor reallocation expanded the size of manufacturing, as shown by the growth of
employment and the number of establishments. The impact of cotton mechanization
on manufacturing growth, however, was concentrated in low-skill industries, while it
slowed the growth of high-skill industries.
Structural change caused by cotton mechanization reduced industrial productiv-
ity. Evidence from the Census of Manufactures shows that labor productivity in
manufacturing started to decline as of cotton mechanization. The negative impact
on manufacturing productivity is explained by two channels: composition effects and
directed technical change. First, by comparing the census data in 1940 and 1960, I
show that the inflow of cotton tenants reduced average level of educational attain-
ment for unskilled manufacturing labor. Second, I argue that its negative impact has
persisted through directed technical change. Using three proxies for skill demands,
I show that the history of cotton agriculture reduced demand for skills in manufac-
turing to this day. Employing a state-level annual index of policy environment for
industrial innovativeness, I further argue that the decline in demand for skills was a
result of technical change over time.
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The mechanism explored in this research extends understanding of structural
change and its implications on long-run development. While existing literature has
focused on the size of sectoral reallocation, this paper suggests that structural change
could have heteroegeneous effects on the evolution of technologies and productivity
based on agricultural background. Beyond the US South, this approach speaks to a
broader context of economic growth. For instance, equivalent structural change in a
developing- and a developed country may have opposite implications due to human
capital distributions within agriculture. To generalize these understandings, future
research will need to study how variation in agricultural patterns affect economic
development across different contexts.
The findings in this paper also suggest a direction for future research in economic
history. Contrary to the wide literature on persistent impact of local economic condi-
tions, I suggest that interaction between historical factors and an external force could
alter fundamentally the path of long-run development. By focusing on heterogeneous
legacies of different historical variables over time and space, richer analyses of the
deep roots of economic development can be articulated.
Appendix 2A. Robustness Checks
2A.1 The Share of Cotton Acreage in Alternative Years
I measure the dependence on cotton by the share of cotton acreage in 1879. 1879 is
chosen as the base year for two reasons. First, 1879 was before the boll weevil’s arrival.
Since the boll weevil infestation induced fluctuation in cotton production, choosing a
specific year after the weevil’s arrival could increase attenuation bias. Moreover, 1879
was more than a decade after the Civil War which fundamentally changed the system
of the old plantations. Ransom and Sutch (1978) observes that the old plantations
had largely disappeared by 1880 as they were divided into numerous separate tenancy.
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In spite of its historical fluctuation, county-level variation in cotton production had
been stable to some extent. To confirm that the estimation results are not driven by
specific conditions in the base year, I compute the share of cotton acreage in different
census years41 and check robustness of the estimation results. For each period, the
potential share of cotton acreage is re-computed using equation 2.
Table 2.11: Robustness to share of cotton acreage in different periods
Dependent variable: log of per capita output/income in year t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1920 1940 1960 1980
cotton acreage share 1879 0.524 1.089*** 0.823* 1.042** -0.842*** -0.661*** -0.708*** -0.478***
(0.430) (0.390) (0.487) (0.441) (0.238) (0.222) (0.164) (0.150)
N 714 714 595 595 737 737 737 737
F-stat 62.77 87.41 46.47 65.25 72.12 102.08 72.12 102.08
cotton acreage share 1899 0.838*** 1.020*** 0.741* 0.631 -0.379 -0.402* -0.329** -0.272**
(0.310) (0.302) (0.431) (0.406) (0.237) (0.206) (0.144) (0.130)
N 713 713 594 594 736 736 736 736
F-stat 64.26 70.11 49.72 58.34 64.18 68.88 64.18 68.88
cotton acreage share 1909 0.932*** 1.181*** 0.572 0.564 -0.295 -0.264 -0.355** -0.265**
(0.310) (0.312) (0.419) (0.404) (0.248) (0.221) (0.141) (0.128)
N 714 714 595 595 737 737 737 737
F-stat 57.60 62.29 47.77 53.65 55.49 52.53 55.49 52.53
Predetermined controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Slave to pop ratio 1860 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Socioeconomic controls N Y N Y N Y N Y
State fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered on 60mi-by-60mi grid squares are shown in the parentheses.
The results are summarized in Table 2.11. In panels 2 and 3, I show the alternative
estimates with the cotton share measured in 1899 and in 1909 respectively. Also,
corresponding to Figure 2.6, I plot the alternative estimates and their 95% confidence
intervals over a ten-year interval in Figure 2.11. Consistent with the original results,
the estimates of the alternative cotton shares show a transition as of the 1950s.
Though the estimates are smaller and less significant potentially due to attenuation
41The share of cotton acreage in alternative years is computed from the same set of crops used for
the 1879 cotton share. Because the Census of Agriculture in 1900 and 1910 report acreage of more
diverse crops, this could be a factor that reduces explanatory power of the robustness checks.
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bias, both Table 2.11 and Figure 2.11 support the negative legacy of cotton after the
period of cotton mechanization.
Figure 2·11: Transition in the legacy of cotton: alternative cotton
share
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Dependent Variable: Log Per Capita Output/Income
Note: X-axis denotes the year in which per capita output/income was measured.
Estimates are from the most preferred specification without initial socioeconomic
conditions.
2A.2 Consistent Outcome Measures over Time
Because county-level per capita income was not available before 1959, I construct per
capita output as a proxy for earlier period. To ensure that the break in the estimates
is not from the switch in the outcome variables, I re-plot Figure 2.12 employing the per
capita output measure as an outcome variable for all the available years. As shown
in Figure 2.12, the results are not sensitive to the definition of outcome variables.
Both Figure 2.6 and Figure 2.12 show that the coefficients change from positive to
negative as of the 1950s. One difference is that the estimates in the later period of
Figure 2.12 are less significant and more volatile. This comes from the fact that per
capita output measure is a less efficient proxy for per capita income in more recent
period. First, per capita output does not include value added from the service sector
which has grown consistently. Second, because output values in the later periods are
from county data books which were published between each decade, per capita values
104
are computed from imputed population.
Figure 2·12: Transition in the legacy of cotton: consistent outcome
variable
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Dependent Variable: Log Per Capita Output
Note: X-axis denotes the year in which the dependent variable is measured. Esti-
mates are from the most preferred specification without initial socioeconomic con-
ditions.
2A.3 Long-Run Impact of Alternative Crops
To clarify that the transition beginning in the 1950s was a unique feature of the im-
pact of cotton specialization, I re-estimate equation 1 using the share of alternative
crops as an explanatory variable. The acreage share of each crop is instrumented by
its potential share predicted from equation 2.
First, I estimate the impact of initial specialization in corn and wheat which oc-
cupied the largest share of crop acreage in the US South. In the southern sample
states, the acreage share of corn, wheat and cotton in 1879 was 47.6%, 13.0%, and
24.3% respectively. Figures 2.13 and 2.14 illustrate the IV estimates of corn and
wheat specialization on local development over time. Contrary to the case of cotton
in Figure 2.6, the long-run impact of corn and wheat specialization do not show any
transition patterns after cotton mechanization started.
In addition, I estimate the long-run impact of sugar and tobacco specialization to
address slavery as a potential confounder of the mechanism. Because cotton produc-
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tion in the South strongly depended on slave labor, interaction between the legacy of
slavery and an exogenous shock in the 1950s may generate a similar transition in the
long-run impact of cotton specialization. Figures 2.15 and 2.16, however, reject the
hypothesis. While production of sugarcane and tobacco depended strongly on slave
labor as well, the long-run impact of specialization in sugar and tobacco does not
change significantly after the 1950s.
Figure 2·13: The long-run impact of corn specialization
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Dependent Variable: Log Per Capita Output/Income
Note: X-axis denotes the year in which the dependent variables are measured.
Estimates are from the most preferred specification without initial socioeconomic
conditions. The explanatory variable is the share of corn acreage in 1879, which is
instrumented by its potential share.
Figure 2·14: The long-run impact of wheat specialization
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Dependent variable: Log Per Capita Output/Income
Note: The explanatory variable is the share of wheat acreage in 1879, which is
instrumented by its potential share.
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Figure 2·15: The long-run impact of sugar specialization
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Dependent variable: Log Per Capita Output/Income
Note: The explanatory variable is the share of sugar acreage in 1879, which is
instrumented by its potential share.
Figure 2·16: The long-run impact of tobacco /specialization
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Dependent variable: Log Per Capita Output/Income
Note: The explanatory variable is the share of tobacco acreage in 1879, which is
instrumented by its potential share.
Appendix 2B. Alternative Explanations
2B.1 Migration
The mechanism in section 4 argues that displaced cotton tenants were absorbed by
the manufacturing sector. Why did displaced cotton tenants not migrate out? First,
migration was a costly option. Because displacement from cotton farms left little
wealth and income to tenant families, high migration costs were not affordable to
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most cotton tenants. Moreover, local credit systems were not accessible to them
because credit markets in cotton counties were based on the one-crop system. Without
engaging in cotton production, credit was hardly available (Street, 1955; Ransom and
Sutch, 1978). In addition, low human capital of cotton tenants reduced potential
benefits from migration. As pointed out by Margo (1990), human capital was a
crucial factor for return to migration of blacks. Tolnay (1998) empirically estimates
that black migrants who left the South had significantly higher levels of education
than the sedentary southern population. In this context, low human capital of cotton
tenants is inferred to have discouraged their migration decisions.
Table 2.12: The legacy of cotton and net migration in 1950s
Dependent variable : net migration rate in 1950s
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total White Black
cotton acreage share 1879 -0.035 0.153 0.036 0.163 -0.027 0.123
(0.332) (0.336) (0.346) (0.361) (0.300) (0.337)
N 742 742 742 742 698 698
F-stat 70.71 101.34 70.71 101.34 63.29 91.75
Predetermined controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Slave to pop ratio 1860 Y Y Y Y Y Y
Socioeconomic controls N Y N Y N Y
State fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Estimation of net migration rates is from Bowles et al. (1977). The estimates are standard-
ized coefficients. Robust standard errors clustered on 60mi-by-60mi grid squares are shown in the
parentheses.
Table 2.12 shows small and insignificant impact of the cotton share on migration.
The outcome variables are net migration rates estimated by Bowles et al. (1977)
for total population, white population and black population respectively. For each
sample, the estimated coefficients are small and statistically insignificant.
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2B.2 World War II
World War II could be a potential confounder of the mechanism in that local in-
dustries experienced unprecedented increase in military spending. Moreover, because
most of the military spending was made on industrial sectors (Fishback and Cullen,
2013), its continuing impact after the war could have generated a sharp decrease in
manufacturing productivity in the cotton counties independently of cotton mecha-
nization. For an example, if the cotton counties had received less war investment due
to the prevalence of textile industries, then their local manufacturing productivity
after the war would have decreased due to less capital deepening.
Table 2.13: Cotton specialization and WW II investments
Dependent variable: log of WW II investment per capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
source of financing Total Public Private
cotton acreage share 1879 -2.418* -1.704* -1.429* -0.940* -0.721 -0.488*
(1.403) (0.881) (0.820) (0.501) (0.543) (0.271)
N 377 377 377 377 377 377
F-stat 42.67 56.50 42.67 56.50 42.67 56.50
Predetermined controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Slave to pop ratio 1860 Y Y Y Y Y Y
Socioeconomic controls N Y N Y N Y
State fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Data on the value and location of wartime investment is drawn from Jaworski(2017). Robust
standard errors clustered on 60mi-by-60mi grid squares are shown in the parentheses.
First, I estimate how the background of cotton agriculture affected wartime invest-
ment. The outcome variables are per capita values of wartime investment depending
on the source of financing. Data on the value and location of wartime investment is
drawn from Jaworski (2017). The results in Table 2.13 show that less investment was
made on cotton counties during the war. Moreover, the estimates are not sensitive
109
to the source of financing. This suggests that the negative impact of cotton on war
spending was not a result of the government’s arbitrary selection.
Figure 2·17: Wartime investment and manufacturing productivity
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Note: X-axis denotes the year in which the dependent variables are measured.
Estimates are from the most preferred specification without initial socioeconomic
conditions.
However, variation in wartime investment does not confound the suggested mech-
anism. To see if World War II caused the sharp decline in manufacturing productivity
independently of cotton mechanization, I repeat the estimation in section 4.3.1 with
and without controlling for the size of wartime investment. The results are summa-
rized in Figure 2.17. As in Figure 2.9, the outcome variables are value added per
production worker and average wage of production workers in the manufacturing sec-
tor. In both cases, controlling for wartime investment does not change the results.
Preferably, the break in manufacturing productivity becomes rather clear since the
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additional control removes the negative impact of wartime investment before cotton
mechanization.
2B.3 Robustness to Slavery Control
The history of slavery is a potential confounder of the mechanism. Given the his-
torical relation between cotton and slavery (Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997, 2002;
Wright,1978), high cotton share in 1880 is expected to be correlated with the ex-
tent of slavery in the earlier period. To check if the results were biased due to the
slavery control, I repeat the estimations both with and without controlling for slave
to population ratio in 1860.
Table 2.14: Robustness of the estimation to slavery
Dependent variable: log of per capita output/income in year t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1940 1960
cotton acreage share 1879 0.565 0.823* 1.039** 1.042** -0.812*** -0.842*** -0.647*** -0.661***
(0.400) (0.487) (0.442) (0.441) (0.203) (0.238) (0.225) (0.222)
N 595 595 595 595 737 737 737 737
F-stat 61.44 46.47 64.89 65.25 85.27 72.12 102.04 102.08
Predetermined controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Slave to pop ratio 1860 N Y N Y N Y N Y
Socioeconomic controls N N Y Y N N Y Y
State fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered on 60mi-by-60mi grid squares are shown in the parentheses. In columns 1 to 4, per capita
output is employed as a proxy for per capita income.
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Figure 2·18: Robustness to slavery
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Note: X-axis denotes the year in which the dependent variables are measured.
Estimates are from the most preferred specification without initial socioeconomic
conditions. The blue (green) coefficients and confidence intervals are estimated with
(without) the slavery control.
Table 2.14 and Figure 2.18 shows that the estimation results are robust to the
exclusion of the slave to population ratio. In each specification, statistical significance
and size of the estimates do not change largely when the slavery control is excluded.
In addition, F-statistics of the first-stage hardly changes which suggests that the
potential share of cotton acreage predicts its actual share strongly both with and
without the slave control.
Appendix 2C. Data and Variables
Predetermined Controls
Land suitability for cultivation: County-level average of an index of land suitability
for cultivation from Ramankutty et al. (2002).
Crop specific suitability : county-level average of attainable yields from FAO’s Global
Agro-Ecological Zones. To construct the potential share of crop acreage, I compute
county-level suitability of thirteen crops whose acreage information was recorded in
the 1880 Census of Agriculture. The attainable yields were computed under the
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assumptions of intermediate input level and rain-fed conditions but the results are
robust to using attainable yields under low input level. In the main regressions, I
control for suitability of cotton, corn and wheat as independent controls which were
the three major crops in the US South.
Terrain altitude: County-level average of median elevation at 0.5 arc-min resolution
from FAO/IIASA (2010). The quadratic term is also included in the main specifica-
tion to reflect its non-linear effects.
Terrain slope: County-level average of the terrain slope index at 0.5 arc-min reso-
lution from FAO/IIASA (2010). The quadratic term is also included in the main
specification to reflect its non-linear effects.
Temperature/Precipitation: County-level average of annual temperature/precipitation
from FAO/IIASA (2010). The quadratic terms are also included in the main specifi-
cation to reflect its non-linear effects.
Latitude/Longitude: Latitudinal/Latitudinal distance from the equator, calculated
from the centroid of each county using shapefiles from IPUMS-NHGIS. The quadratic
term is also included in the main specification to reflect its non-linear effects.
Distance to cities : Minimum distance to the cities (St Louis, Chicago, Brooklyn,
New York, Boston), calculated from the centroid of each county using shapefiles from
IPUMS-NHGIS.
Distance to coastline: Minimum distance to nearest coastline, calculated from the
centroid of each county using shapefiles from IPUMS-NHGIS and a raster files from
Natural Earth.
Slave ratio: Slave to population ratio in 1860 from Haines and ICPSR (2010).
Literacy rate: Average literacy rate (10+ age group) in 1880, computed from U.S
Census data digitized by Haines and ICPSR (2010).
Share of black population: Share of black population in 1880, computed from U.S
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Census data digitized by Haines and ICPSR (2010).
Urbanization rate: Share of population in urban area (places 2,500+), computed from
U.S Census data digitized by Haines and ICPSR (2010).
Value of farm equipment : Log of the value of farm equipment per farm acre in 1880,
computed from the Census of Agriculture digitized by Haines and ICPSR (2010).
Average farm size: Average farm size in 1880, computed from the Census of Agricul-
ture digitized by Haines and ICPSR (2010).
Per capita output : Log of total output value divided by total population. Total out-
put value is defined as the sum of value added in manufacturing and value of total
agricultural output. After 1940, per capita output is available in years between each
decade, so population is imputed based on population growth rates between each
decade. Computed from U.S Census data and county data books Haines and ICPSR
(2010).
Per capita income: Log of per capita income from the Bureau of Economic Analysis
and US Census Bureau.
Manufacturing value added : Log of value added in the manufacturing sector per pro-
duction worker. Total value added and the average number of production workers in
the manufacturing sector are obtained from U.S Census data and county data books
digitized by Haines and ICPSR (2010).
Manufacturing wage: Log of average production worker wage in the manufacturing
sector. Total wage expenditure for production workers, annual average number of
production workers and total man-hours of production workers are obtained from
the Census of Manufactures and county data books digitized by Haines and ICPSR
(2010).
Tractors per acre: Total number of tractors divided by the number of farm acres,
computed from the Census of Manufactures digitized by Haines and ICPSR (2010).
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Share of tenant farms/acres : The number of farms/acres operated by tenants divided
by total number of farms/acres, computed from the Census of Agriculture digitized
by Haines and ICPSR (2010).
Total farm operators : The number of farm operators including farm owners, tenant
farmers and farm managers, obatined from the Census of Agriculture digitized by
Haines and ICPSR (2010).
Total employment in manufacturing : The number of annaul average of manufactur-
ing employyes obatined from the County Data Books digitized by Haines and ICPSR
(2010).
Total unemployment : Difference between the size of labor force and total employ-
ment, computed from the U.S Census data digitized by Haines and ICPSR (2010).
Total Establishments : The number of manufacturing establishments with more than
20 employees, obtained from the County Data Books digitized by Haines and ICPSR
(2010).
Urbanization rate: Share of population in urban area(places 2,500+), computed from
U.S Census data digitized by Haines and ICPSR(2010).
Share of manufacturing population: The number of workers in the manufacturing sec-
tor divided by total population, computed from the complete count census provided
by IPUMS-USA.
Share of black population: The number of black population divided by total popula-
tion, computed from U.S Census data digitized by Haines and ICPSR(2010).
Share of tenant farmers : The number of farmers who rented their housing units di-
vided by the number of farmers and farm laborers aged 10 to 70. Data is from the
complete count census data provided by IPUMS-USA.
Share of female/young farm labor : The number of female or young(age<=13) divided
by the number of farmers and farm laborers aged 10 to 70. Data is from the complete
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count census data provided by IPUMS-USA.
Literacy rate of adult tenant farmers : The share of adult tenant farmers who can read
and write, computed from the complete count census data provided by IPUMS-USA.
% children of tenant farmers working on farms : The share of children of tenant
farmers whose occupations are recorded as farmers or farm laborers. Data is from
the complete count census data provided by IPUMS-USA.
average education of unskilled : Average highest grade of full-time laborers in the
manufacturing sector. In 1940, laborers who worked 52 weeks in the previous year
are defined to be full time workers. Due to data restriction, laborers who worked at
least 50 weeks are classified into full time workers in 1960. Data is from the 1940
complete count census and the 1960 5% census provided by IPUMS-USA.
relative share of blacks in unskilled : Difference between the share of blacks in manu-
facturing laborers and the share of blacks in farmers. Data is from the 1940 complete
count census and the 1960 5% census provided by IPUMS-USA.
share of females in unskilled : The share of females in manufacturing laborers. Data
is from the 1940 complete count census and the 1960 5% census provided by IPUMS-
USA.
share of migrants in unskilled : The share of migrants in manufacturing laborers. Re-
spondents who moved from a different county within 5 years are defined as migrants.
Data is from the 1940 complete count census and the 1960 5% census provided by
IPUMS-USA.
Share of city population: The number of population in cities, computed from the
census data provided by IPUMS-USA.
Share of employment in agriculture: The share of full-time workers aged 15 to 70
in Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheres, computed from the census data provided by
IPUMS-USA.
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Share of blacks in manufacturing : The share of black full-time workers aged 15 to 70 in
the manufacturing sector, computed from the census data provided by IPUMS-USA.
Appendix 2D. Harmonization of Administrative Boundaries
Figure 2·19: Intersection of 1880 counties and 1960 PUMAMINIs
Note: The black line is the boundary of PUMAMINI and the light gray line shows
the intersection of PUMAMINI and 1880 county boundaries.
Empirical analyses in this paper utilizes a few different administrative boundaries
in multiple periods. In case disparate boundaries are employed for an estimation, I
harmonize variables with a consistent geographical unit. For instance, estimation in
section 4.3.2 requires the county-level cotton share in 1879 to be harmonized with
1960 PUMAMINI boundaries.
Harmonization is done by the following steps. First, the county (base) and
PUMAMINI (target) borders are intersected using their shapefiles. In Figure 2.19,
the black line is the border of PUMAMINIs and the light gray line shows the bor-
der of all fragments generated by intersecting PUMAMINIs and counties. Second,
county-level data is assigned to each fragment. This procedure relies on the assump-
tion that the county-level data is evenly distributed over space. Finally, assigned data
117
is normalized in proportion to each fragment’s area and aggregated into PUMAMINI
level.
Appendix 2E. Crop Choice and Proofs of the Model
2E.1 Crop Choice
The share of cotton acreage s could be understood as a function of crop-specific
suitability in line with the instrumental variable strategy. To incorporate the idea,
production functions are slightly modified. For each farm j, crop g is produced as
Y ∗gj = (1 + pigj)Ygj where Ygj and Y
∗
gj are the ex-ante and ex-post productions re-
spectively. Ex-ante production functions are given as Ycj = K
αc
cj L
1−αc
cj and Yoj =
Kαooj H
1−αo
oj identical to the functions in section 4.1. pigj, which I call profit factor,
is always positive and consists of two components. More specifically, pigj = e
θg+ugj
where θg is land suitability for crop g and ugj is a farm-crop-specific production shock.
Ahead of production, farm owners make a two-step decision. First, they choose
which crop to grow. Then, they determine the amount of inputs based on the ex-ante
production functions. For instance, the owner of farm j growing cotton chooses Lcj
and Kcj which maximize ex-ante profit Ycj −wLLcj − rKcj. One thing to note is that
a positive externality of choosing cotton does not affect individual crop choice. As
described in section 4.1, the monopsony power is a source of profits on cotton farms in
that the elasticity of unskilled labor supply η decreases in the share of cotton acreage.
However, as long as a sufficiently large number of farms exist (a continuum of farms
in this model), crop choice of an individual farm does not affect the aggregate crop
mix. In this context, I assume that farm owners do not consider potential monopsony
power on cotton farms in maximizing ex-ante profits.42
42In other words, farm owners maximize ex-ante profits presuming the competitive unskilled wage.
While the infinite elasticity of labor supply makes algebra simpler, assuming farm owners share a
common prior of the elasticity ηe <∞ does not change the structure of crop choice.
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Given the optimal choice of inputs maximizing ex-ante profits, Y ∗gj = (1 + pigj)Ygj
implies that expected ex-post profit for each crop is equal to picjYcj and piojYoj respec-
tively.43 Thus, picj and pioj represent the profitability of cotton and other crops at
farm j and the farm owner chooses to grow cotton if P (picj > pioj). If the production
shock ugj is iid with type I extreme value distribution, the share of cotton is derived
as
s =
∫
P (picj > pioj)dF (j)
=
∫
P (eθc+ucj > eθo+uoj)dF (j)
=
∫
P (θc + ucj > θo + uoj)dF (j)
=
eθc
eθc + eθo
following conditional logit discrete-choice models in McFadden(1974) and Berry(1994).
2E.2 Proofs
Prices
Under the symmetric equilibrium, each cotton farm solves MaxKc,LCK
αc
c L
1−αc
c −
wL(L)Lc−rKc. Then first order conditions are derived as wL = ηη+1(1−αc)(Kc/Lc)αc
and r = αc(Lc/Kc)
1−αc . Given the rental rate of capital r from the national market,
wL =
η
η+1
(1− αc)(αcr )
αc
1−αc is obtained. Similarly, first order conditions of non-cotton
farms wH = (1−αo)(Ko/Ho)αo and r = αo(Ho/Ko)1−αo lead to wH = (1−αo)(αor )
αo
1−αo .
Technologies
A representative manufacturer maximizes K1−βM (A
ρ
LL
ρ
M +A
ρ
HH
ρ
M)
β
ρ −wLLM −wHHM
subject to AωL+A
ω
H = B where ω > ρ/(1−ρ). Taking ratio of the first order conditions
43Ex-ante profits Kαccj L
1−αc
cj − wLLcj − rKcj and Kαocj H1−αooj − wHHoj − rKoj are zero. Adding
to this, extra production picjYcj and piojYoj comprise ex-post profits.
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for LM and HM implies
wL
wH
=
(AL
AH
)ρ(LM
HM
)ρ−1
(E1)
From AωL +A
ω
H = B, ∂AH/∂AL = −(AL/AH)ω−1. Combined with this, the first order
condition for AL leads to
(AH
AL
)ω−ρ
=
(HM
LM
)ρ
(E2)
Using equations E1 and E2, the ratios of labor inputs and technologies are deter-
mined as LM/HM = (wH/wL)
ω−ρ
ω(1−ρ)−ρ and AL/AH = (wH/wL)
ρ
ω(1−ρ)−ρ . Moreover,
the latter equation and AωL + A
ω
H = B implies AL = B
1
ω
[
1 +
(
wL
wH
) ρω
ω(1−ρ)−ρ
]− 1
ω
and
AH = B
1
ω
[
1 +
(
wH
wL
) ρω
ω(1−ρ)−ρ
]− 1
ω
.
Input Demands
Given H¯M , LM = H¯M(wH/wL)
ω−ρ
ω(1−ρ)−ρ . Labor market clearing condtions sLc +LM =
L and (1− s)Ho + H¯M = H determine labor demands in agriculture.
Comparative Statics
From wL =
η
η+1
(1 − αc)(αcr )
αc
1−αc , ∂wL
∂αc
= η
η+1
1
1−αc (
αc
r
)
αc
1−αc log(αc
r
) is derived. Since
αc ∈ (0, 1), ∂wL∂αc < 0 as long as log αcr < 0 or αc/r < 1. Thus, r > 1 becomes a
sufficient condition for ∂wL
∂αc
< 0. Furthermore, as η is a decreasing function of s,
it is shown straightforward that ∂
2wL
∂s∂αc
< 0. Lastly, LM = H¯M(wH/wL)
ω−ρ
ω(1−ρ)−ρ and
AL = B
1
ω
[
1 +
(
wL
wH
) ρω
ω(1−ρ)−ρ
]− 1
ω
imply that AL and LM are decreasing functions of
wL given ω > ρ/(1−ρ). From ∂wL∂αc < 0 and ∂
2wL
∂s∂αc
< 0, it follows that ∂AL
∂αc
, ∂LM
∂αc
, ∂
2AL
∂s∂αc
,
∂2LM
∂s∂αc
< 0.
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Chapter 3
Cotton Agriculture and Long-Run
Economic Inequality: An Inter-Sectoral
Linkage
3.1 Introduction
Cotton has played a fundamental role in the economic history of the US South. As
discussed in the previous chapters, cotton agriculture shaped local development in
the South through an institutional channel or the process of industrialization. On
top of this, Chapter 3 addresses another legacy of cotton agriculture on economic
inequality in the US South.
This chapter argues that the prevalence of cotton farming increased local economic
inequality in the long-run. I first show that cotton specialization in 1879 induced a
significant increase in income inequality even to this day. Moreover, beyond the agri-
cultural sector, I suggest inter-sectoral effects of cotton specialization on long-run
economic inequality. According to evidence from the complete count census in 1940,
initial cotton specialization caused a considerable increase in wage inequality in the
service sector. In contrast, there is no significant effects observed on the other non-
agricultural sectors.
To explain the inter-sectoral effects of cotton agriculture on wage inequality, I
examine causal relationships between cotton specialization and occupational struc-
tures in each sector separately. First, I show that initial cotton specialization reduced
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occupational diversity of the local service sector, but such effects are not observed in
the other non-agricultural sectors. I further argue that the decrease in occupational
diversity in the service sector resulted from an expansion of employment share in
low-wage occupations, followed by contraction of middle- and high-wage occupations.
Moreover, where cotton farming was more prevalent, workers in low-wage occupations
earned less than those in the same occupations in different counties. On the other
hand, cotton specialization did not affect average wages of middle- and high-wage
occupations across regions.
A mechanism of the inter-sectoral effects remains an issue. Considering the ex-
pansion of employment in low-wage occupations followed by a decrease in their wage
level, an explanation based on labor supply channel would be the most plausible ap-
proach. Though I leave an exact mechanism as a future work, this chapter excludes
two potential explanations. First, I reject a hypothesis that labor supply of cotton
tenant families increased wage inequality in the service sector. While the evidence
shows that cotton specialization induced higher labor force participation of tenant
farm families in the service sector, this effect is not only observed in low-wage occu-
pations, but also in other occupations. Second, I find that racial wage gap is not a
valid channel. The evidence shows that the effects of cotton specialization on racial
wage gap were not significant in the service sector, and they were relatively stronger
in high-wage occupations.
In the rest of the chapter, Section 3.2 estimates the long-run effects of cotton
agriculture on economic inequality, focused on the inter-sectoral linkage to the local
service sector. Section 3.3 discusses potential mechanism.
122
3.2 Cotton Agriculture and Long-Run Economic Inequality
3.2.1 Local Economic Inequality in the Long-Run
Figure 3·1: Geographical correlation between initial cotton special-
ization and long-run income inequality
This section shows that prevalence of cotton farming in the late 19th century increased
local economic inequality in the long-run. Figure 1 illustrates strong correlation be-
tween cotton specialization in 1879 and income inequality in 2010 measured by Gini
index. In spite of the geographical pattern, the figure itself does not imply a causal
relationship due to omitted variables. For instance, share of cotton agriculture could
be strongly associated with share of African Americans which would mechanically
increase income inequality through racial income disparity. Otherwise, slavery could
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be an omitted variable that induces geographical variation in economic inequality
between blacks and whites persistently (Bertocchi and Dimico, 2014; Jung, 2018).
To estimate the causal relationship, I employ the estimating equation and instru-
mental variable strategy suggested in section 2.2. The outcome variable is the Gini
index of income inequality at the county level which is measured in 1970, 1990, and
2010. The data sources are Nielsen et al. (1997), Census Bureau, and American Fact
Finder respectively.
Table 3.1: Cotton agriculture and local income inequality in the long-
run
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Gini index of income in 1970 1990 2010
Cotton share 1879 0.124*** 0.089*** 0.110*** 0.089*** 0.104*** 0.079***
(0.033) (0.031) (0.031) (0.033) (0.029) (0.030)
N 741 741 741 741 741 741
F -stat 70.64 101.16 70.64 101.16 70.64 101.16
Predetermined controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Slave to pop ratio 1860 Y Y Y Y Y Y
Socioeconomic controls N Y N Y N Y
State fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered on 60mi-by-60mi grid squares are shown in the parentheses.
Based on the IV strategy, Table 3.1 shows that initial cotton specialization in-
creased local income inequality in the long-run. The size of the effects is remarkably
large. According to column 5, one standard deviation increase in the cotton share in
1879 caused a 3.12 standard deviation increase in income inequality in 2010.
For more comprehensive understanding of the long-run relationship between cot-
ton agriculture and economic inequality, this section examines the effects of cotton
share in 1879 on wage inequality in 1940 using the complete count census data. For
the estimation, I employ the sample of workers aged 20 to 70 who worked at least 40
weeks in the last year. Using their weekly wage, I construct the Theil’s L index of
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wage inequality. Theil’s L index belongs to generalized entropy inequality measures.1
I switch from Gini to Theil’s L index in this section because the latter is decompos-
able. In that cotton agriculture involves issues of racial disparity, it is important to
analyze the effects of cotton specialization on inequality between- and within races
separately. The causal relationship between cotton specialization and overall wage
inequality, however, is strongly robust to using Gini index.
Table 3.2: Cotton specialization and Wage Inequality 1940
Dependent variable: Theil’s L index for individual wages 1940
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Total Between Race Within Race Within Black Within White
Cotton share 1879 0.280*** 0.241*** 0.175*** 0.152*** 0.106** 0.089** 0.030 0.014 0.129** 0.107**
(0.061) (0.060) (0.035) (0.034) (0.045) (0.044) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.052)
F -stat 65.21 94.79 65.21 94.79 65.21 94.79 65.21 94.79 65.21 94.79
N 691 691 691 691 691 691 691 691 691 691
Predetermined controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Slave to pop ratio 1860 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Socioeconomic controls N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y
State fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered on 60mi-by-60mi grid squares are shown in the parentheses. The sample includes counties with at least 5
observations of black and white workers.
Using Theil’s L index of wage inequality, Table 3.2 shows the causal effects of the
cotton share in 1879 on local wage inequality measured in 1940. The sample consists
of black and white workers aged 20 to 70 who worked at least 40 weeks in the last
year. For the purpose of racial decomposition, I exclude counties with less than 5
observations of black or white workers.
Columns 1 and 2 indicate that initial cotton specialization increased wage inequal-
1For a region with sample size N, the formula of generalized entropy inequality measure is given
by GE(α) = 1α(α−1)
[
1
N
∑N
i=1
(
yi/y¯
)α
− 1
]
where yi is wage of individual i and y¯ is the mean wage.
The value of this measure depends on the choice of the parameter α which determines the weight
to distances between wages at different parts of the wage distribution. The most commonly used
parameters are 0 and 1, and GE(0) and GE(1) are called Theil’s L- and Theil’s T index respectively.
Because lower parameter value implies more sensitivity of the index to the differences at the bottom
of the distribution, I use Theil’s L index as a main variable, but the estimates are robust to using
Theil’s T index as an outcome variable.
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ity in 1940, which is consistent with the increase in long-run income inequality as in
table 3.1. To further examine the structure of the causal relationship, I decompose the
wage inequality into between- and within race components. Columns 3 and 4 show
that the prevalence of cotton agriculture had significant effects on wage inequality
between blacks and whites. This is consistent historical observations. As Alston and
Ferrie (1985, 1989) suggest, local dependence on cotton economy was associated with
the political power of the planters. If this institutional environment affected black
workers negatively, it could have increased wage inequality between black and white
workers. In another way, cotton specialization could have reduced reservation wage of
low-skilled workers. Because cotton agriculture was managed by poor tenant farmers
locked in debt peonage (Ransom and Sutch, 1978; Wright, 1986), non-agricultural
workers in counties with higher cotton share would have had less outside options in
agriculture.2
The causal effects of cotton specialization on wage inequality, however, was not
only a matter of race. Columns 5 and 6 demonstrate that cotton agriculture also
had significant effects on within-race inequality, which is accounted for by wage in-
equality within white workers as shown in columns 9 and 10. This implies that,
beyond traditional approaches to cotton in the context of racial differences, we need
a further explanation for the mechanism of the long-run relationship between cotton
agriculture and economic inequality.
3.2.2 Cotton and Economic Inequality: Sectoral Approaches
For a precise understanding of the structure of inequality, this section focuses on het-
erogeneity of the effects of cotton specialization on wage inequality across the sectors.
The relationship between the prevalence of cotton farming and wage inequality in non-
2Table 3.2 does not directly reflects inequality within agriculture because the inequality is mea-
sured in terms of wage.
126
agricultural sectors shows significant differences. Figure 3.2, for instance, illustrates
differences in the geographical distribution of wage inequality in the manufacturing-
and service sectors. In particular, while the wage inequality in the service sector
exhibits a similar pattern to the distribution of the cotton share, that of the manu-
facturing sector appears to be less correlated with local cotton specialization.
Figure 3·2: Geographical Disbribution of Wage Inequality: Manufac-
turing and Service sectors
Note: The sample for each sector includes counties with at least 5 observations of
black and white workers.
Using the IV strategy, Table 3.3 shows the heterogeneous relationship between cot-
ton specialization and wage inequality in the non-agricultural sectors. The outcome
variable is the Gini index of wage inequality in Mining and Construction, Manufac-
turing, Wholesale and Retail Trade, and Service sectors. As shown in columns 7
and 8, higher cotton share in 1879 caused greater wage inequality in the local service
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sector. Furthermore, the inter-sectoral effect is shown to be a unique feature of the
service sector. Columns 1 to 6 indicates that there was no significant relationships
between cotton agriculture and wage inequality in the other non-agricultural sectors.
Table 3.3: Heterogeneous effects of cotton on wage inequality across
sectors
Dependent variable: Gini index of wage inequality 1940
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mining and
Construction Manufacturing
Wholesale
and Retail Service
Cotton share 1879 0.008 0.032 0.049 0.034 0.035 0.046 0.148*** 0.121***
(0.234) (0.161) (0.311) (0.146) (0.350) (0.200) (0.038) (0.034)
F -stat 54.08 86.31 52.46 77.74 60.27 93.44 66.88 97.86
N 579 579 558 558 572 572 667 667
Predetermined controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Slave to pop ratio 1860 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Socioeconomic controls N Y N Y N Y N Y
State fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered on 60mi-by-60mi grid squares are shown in the parentheses. The sample of each
sector includes counties with at least 5 observations of black and white workers.Industrial classification follows IND1950
variable provided by IPUMS-USA.
Heterogeneity in the effects of cotton on wage inequality is explained by occupa-
tional and industrial structures. Table 3.4 shows that cotton specialization reduced
occupational- and industrial diversity uniquely in the service sector. Based on 3-digit
classification of occupations and industries provided IPUMS-USA, I calculate the
measures of diversity as 1 minus the Hirschman-Herfindahl index of the employment
shares in occupational- and industrial group.3 The results indicate that the preva-
lence of cotton farming reduced both occupational- and industrial diversity in the
service sector, contrary to insignificant effects on the other non-agricultural sectors.
Less diversity, however, does not directly imply greater inequality. For instance, if
3For each county c, the index of occupational (industrial) diversity θc = 1 −
∑
i s
2
ci where si
denotes the share of employment in occupational (industrial) group i.
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less occupational diversity reflects the prevalence of middle-wage occupations, then
the measure of wage inequality would decrease. Alternatively, expansion of low-wage
occupations followed by a decrease in occupational wage differences can also lead to
a decrease in occupational diversity and in wage inequality simultaneously.
Table 3.4: Heterogeneous effects of cotton on occupational structure
across sectors
Dependent variable: Occupational diversity 1940
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mining and
Construction Manufacturing
Wholesale
and Retail Service
Cotton share 1879 0.124 0.153 0.108 0.090 -0.035 -0.050 -0.246*** -0.199***
(0.421) (0.280) (0.606) (0.273) (0.753) (0.423) (0.053) (0.051)
F -stat 54.08 86.31 52.46 77.74 60.27 93.44 66.88 97.86
N 579 579 558 558 572 572 667 667
Predetermined controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Slave to pop ratio 1860 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Socioeconomic controls N Y N Y N Y N Y
State fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered on 60mi-by-60mi grid squares are shown in the parentheses. The sample of each
sector includes counties with at least 5 observations of black and white workers.
To support that less diversity was a channel between cotton specialization and
wage inequality in the service sector, Table 3.5 estimates the effects of cotton special-
ization on the occupational structure of the local service sector. Using occupational
income scores assigned by IPUMS-USA, I classify occupations in the service sector
into low-, middle-, and high-wage occupations.4 The first panel of Table 3.5 demon-
strates that the prevalence of cotton farming reduced employment share in middle-
and high-wage occupations in the service sector, followed by a significant increase in
the share of low-wage occupations. Furthermore, columns 1 and 2 of the second panel
4I choose the occupation scores of private household workers and Automobile mechanics as thresh-
olds for low- and high-wage occupations. The estimation results are robust to choosing different
thresholds in a similar range.
129
shows that the increase in the share of low-skilled occupations was accompanied by
a decrease in the average wage of workers in the occupational group. On the con-
trary, columns 3 to 6 indicates small and insignificant effects of cotton agricluture
on the average wage of middle- and high-skilled occupations.5 Taken together, Table
3.5 demonstrates that the increase in wage inequality in the service sector resulted
from two channels: an expansion of the employment in low-wage occupations, and a
decrease in their wage level.
Table 3.5: Occupational structure of the service sector 1940
Dependent variable: Share of employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
low-wage
occupations
middle-wage
occupations
hige-wage
occupations
Cotton share 1879 0.360*** 0.285*** -0.248*** -0.188*** -0.112*** -0.097***
(0.079) (0.074) (0.067) (0.064) (0.034) (0.035)
Dependent variable: Log average wage
low-wage
occupations
middle-wage
occupations
high-wage
occupations
Cotton share 1879 -0.702*** -0.562*** -0.059 -0.014 -0.036 -0.023
(0.180) (0.165) (0.133) (0.123) (0.188) (0.183)
F -stat 66.88 97.86 66.88 97.86 66.88 97.86
N 667 667 667 667 667 667
Predetermined controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Slave to pop ratio 1860 Y Y Y Y Y Y
Socioeconomic controls N Y N Y N Y
State fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered on 60mi-by-60mi grid squares are shown in the parentheses.
5Because private household workers occupies 27.5% of the whole sample, which corresponds to
88% of low-skilled occupations, I check the robustness of the estimation results.
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3.3 Discussion
The evidence so far shows two empirical facts. First, there was an inter-sectoral
linkage between cotton specialization and wage inequality in the local service sector.
Second, the inequality resulted from an expansion of low-wage occupations accompa-
nying a decrease in their average wage.
A mechanism of the inter-sectoral linkage remains an issue. The explanation needs
to satisfy two important conditions. First, it should explain why the effects of cotton
specialization were restricted to the service sector. Second, the persistence of the
inter-sectoral impact should be clarified. While it is left as a future work to identify
an exact mechanism, this section suggests that at least two potential explanations
are excluded.
First, labor supply by cotton tenants could be a potential channel. As discussed
in Chapter 2, cotton tenant farmers had lower human capital than any other kinds
of low-skilled labor. If the cotton tenants worked in low-wage service occupations
during the pre-harvest season, then the increase in the employment share in low-wage
occupations and the decrease in their wage level could be explained. Second, racial
wage gap wage could be an alternative explanation. Given the association between
cotton specialization and concentration of local political power to large farm owners
(Alston and Ferrie, 1985, 1989), higher cotton share in agriculture could have induced
institutional environments more against black labor force even in the non-agricultural
sectors.
Table 3.6, however, reject the hypotheses. In the first panel, I use the share of
workers from tenant households as an outcome variable. Tenant households are de-
fined as households whose head is a farmer living in a rented housing unit. Because
the prevalence of tenant farmers was a key characteristic of cotton farming, the share
of workers from tenant households can be used as a proxy for labor supply of cotton
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Table 3.6: Cotton specialization and the labor force in the service
sector 1940
Dependent variable: Share of workers from tenant households
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
low-wage
occupations
middle-wage
occupations
hige-wage
occupations
Cotton share 1879 0.082** 0.084*** 0.090*** 0.086*** 0.083*** 0.074***
(0.034) (0.031) (0.028) (0.028) (0.022) (0.023)
Dependent variable: Average racial wage gap
low-wage
occupations
middle-wage
occupations
high-wage
occupations
Cotton share 1879 -0.127 -0.193 0.323 0.372 0.613 0.594
(0.378) (0.371) (0.209) (0.223) (3.414) (1.785)
F -stat 66.88 97.86 66.88 97.86 66.88 97.86
N 667 667 667 667 667 667
Predetermined controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Slave to pop ratio 1860 Y Y Y Y Y Y
Socioeconomic controls N Y N Y N Y
State fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered on 60mi-by-60mi grid squares are shown in the parentheses.
tenant families in the service sector. According to the results in the first panel, higher
cotton share led to greater share of service workers from tenant households but the
effects are not restricted to low-wage occupations. Moreover, the average share of
workers from tenant households are less than 5% in each sample of low-, middle-,
and high-wage occupations. Considering that workers from tenant households also
include those from non-cotton tenant households, labor supply of cotton tenants is
quantitatively not sufficient to explain the increase in wage inequality.
The second panel rejects the hypothesis of racial wage gap. For each group of
occupations, I use the average wage gap between black and white workers as an
outcome variable. The results suggest that cotton specialization and racial wage gap
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in the service sector did not have a strong causal relationship. Columns 2 to 4 show an
increase in racial wage gap in middle- and high-wage occupations, but the coefficients
are statistically insignificant and the patterns do not match Table 3.5, the expansion
of low-wage occupations and the decrease in their wage level.
To conclude, this chapter shows that cotton specialization increased economic
inequality in the long-run, and it was through an inter-sectoral linkage exclusively
between cotton agriculture and the local service sector. Using the complete count
census data in 1940, I further show that the causal effects on wage inequality in
the service sector resulted from an expansion of the share of low-wage occupations
accompanied by a decrease in their wage level. The remaining task is to explain
how cotton specialization affected the occupational structure of the service sector.
Considering that cotton specialization increased employment in low-wage occupations
and a reduced their average wage level simultaneously, a mechanism based on labor
supply channel would be the most plausible explanation. In the future works, I will
focus on empirical investigations to provide a precise explanation of the inter-sectoral
impact on wage inequality of the service sector.
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